AN INTRODUCTORY TREATISE

ON

SANSCRIT HAGIOGRAPHA:

OR THE

SACRED LITERATURE OF THE HINDUS.

IN TWO PARTS:

PART I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS
PART II.—THE VEDA AND PURANAS.

With Appendix and Notes.

Richard BY
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TO

THE RIGHT REV. HENRY LORD BISHOP OF LIMERICK,
ARDFERT, AND AGHADOE,

This Volume

IS MOST RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

The Author hopes that this Treatise may be useful in correcting erroneous impressions with regard to the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus. His quotations from Sanscrit writings are such as not only illustrate the structure of the principal philosophical systems now current in Hindusthán, but also are an evidence of higher intellectual attainments than the natives of India are popularly supposed to possess, and show that the barbarous and degrading polytheism prevalent in India is not invariably taught or recommended in the theology of the Hindu people. It is not his design, however, to eulogize a religious system which, although more plausible than is popularly supposed, is false in principle and pernicious in practice; but to trace outlines which may be in-

structive and interesting at a time when public attention is so much occupied with all that concerns the native population of India, and to point out the weakness of those philosophical speculations, the novelty or plausibility of which might attract ardent and inexperienced minds. As a guarantee for the soundness of his statements, the Author subjoins the favourable opinion expressed with regard to his work by Professor Wilson (Boden Professor of Sanscrit in the University of Oxford) :—

"There is much in this Treatise that is evidence of diligent study and right judgment, and that might throw much light upon the Hindu systems of thought and belief, where the subject is little known. As a popular treatise I should think its publication would do good.—H. H. Wilson, M. A., F. R. S., *Boden Professor of Sanscrit, University of Oxford.*"

Moy, *September*, 1859.

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AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE

ON

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PART I.

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CHAPTER I.

Introductory Remarks, containing an Account of the Origin and Opinions of the principal Philosophical Schools of the Hindus, and the Authors to whom each School is attributed, with a short Notice of the Hindu Sacred Writings.

THE most ancient author of a school of philosophy among the Hindus, whose entire work has been preserved to modern times, was Kapila, who invented the Sánkhya or *numeral* philosophy—which very closely resembles the metaphysics and philosophy of Pythagoras, and of which an analysis is given in another chapter. Kapila's doctrines were adopted and embellished with numerous additions and variations by another very ancient author, Patanjali, the author of the second form of the Sánkhya phi-

losophy, called "the Sánkhya with Iswara." The next founder of a philosophical school among the Hindus was Gautama (or Gotama). His doctrines were adopted by his successor, Kanáda; and the name of *Nyáya* has been bestowed upon the system taught by them both. *Nyáya* is a word which, in Sanscrit, denotes the operations and conclusions of reason, being derived from नी, which means *to acquire* or *apprehend*, and is therefore applied to the philosophy of Kanáda and Gotama, which comprises not only a system of metaphysics, but which is also argued according to the principles of logic and dialectics, and the recognised rules of art, containing not only enthymemes, but also regular syllogisms, differing from the European system in this respect, that, whereas in the Aristotelian logic the syllogisms consist of three parts, viz., the major and minor premises and the conclusion, the syllogisms in Nyáya dialectics consist of no less than five parts. The second Nyáya school, that which was founded by Kanada, is called *Vaiseshika*, either from their inculcating the theory of eternal atoms, or from their entering into minutiæ and particulars in their reasoning, more than was customary among the disputants of the earlier school of Gotama. In the philosophy in general professed by the Naiyáyikas, or followers of the Nyáya, there is a combination

of rhetoric and logic which is paralleled by the style of Origen and some of the early Fathers or writers belonging to the early Christian Church. In another chapter of this Essay the reader will find a summary of the tenets of the Nyáya philosophy, as expounded by Anna Bhatta, a writer in modern times belonging to the same sect. His compendium, which embodies the principal dogmas of Gotama and Kanáda, is known by the name of *Tarka Sangraha*, in Sanskrit, तर्कसंग्रहः But the most famous system of Hindu philosophy is that which was founded by Vyása, and elaborated by his pupil and successor, Jaimini, which is named from, and professes to be entirely founded upon, the teaching and texts, properly explained, of the Hindu Scriptures, the inspired books of the Vedas. Their system is known by the name of Mímánsá, a word which has much the same signification with Nyáya, as referring to the operations of the mind. The philosophical school of Vyása is better known by the name of Vedánta, वेदान्तः which means the scope or end of the Veda, on the texts of which, as Vyása explained them, his doctrines are professedly grounded, and from this the philosophers of this school are known by the name of *Vedántins*. The Púrva Mímánsá was written by Jaimini, and

contains a compilation of theological and moral sentences, as well as of points of law, in addition to the philosophical dissertations. The Uttara Mímánsá was composed by Vyása. There are several treatises in popular use among the Hindus, containing the chief aphorisms of the Vedánta philosophy. But the one to which reference is most frequently made in the following pages is the *Vedántá Sára*, वेदान्तसारः which means *the kernel of the Vedánta.* Thus the Mímánsá is in two parts; the Nyáya in two parts; and the Sánkhya is in two parts. And those schools contain all the notable doctrines and leading principles of the Hindu theists. Such is the classification:—First, the Púrva Mímánsá, by Jaimini; second, the Uttara Mímánsá, by Vyása; third, the early Nyáya School, by Gotama; fourth, the later Nyáya School, or Vaiseshika, by Kanáda; fifth, the Sánkhya with Iswara, by Patanjali; and sixth, the Sánkhya without Iswara, by Kapila. And as Theology, Logic, and Arithmetic are among the principal and favourite studies and sciences which the learned Hindus cultivate, the titles of those popular philosophical sects are taken and derived from them: Mímánsá, Theology; Nyáya, Logic; Sánkhya, Arithmetic. Here I may remark that there is a close affinity in doctrine and argument between the Hindu philosophical

schools and the most celebrated sects of classical times. Thus the early Nyáya closely resembles the Peripatetic school of which Aristotle was the founder. The Vaiseshika corresponds with the Ionic, founded by Thales. The two Mímánsás which constitute the Vedánta system do not widely differ from representing the main features, at least, of the far-famed philosophy of Plato; and the first and second Sánkhyas have much similarity with the Italic school of Pythagoras, and the Stoic philosophy of Zeno. So that we may observe that the most distinguished philosophers and metaphysicians in classical times had their prototypes or predecessors at a much earlier period among the Hindus—at a time and in a country where we could scarcely have supposed that learning and philosophical inquiry could have made much progress, had not the records and remains of the learning of India, in those early times, indubitably been transmitted to the present age, and partially, at least, been examined with the acumen and keenness of modern literary curiosity. Thus we see that Gotama corresponds with Aristotle; Kanáda with Thales; Jaimini with Socrates; Vyása with Plato; Kapila with Pythagoras; and Patanjali with Zeno.

The Vedánta and Nyáya philosophers agree in acknowledging a Supreme Eternal Being, as well

as in holding a belief in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. And they describe this Supreme Being as an Essence, eternal, and pervading all space, and giving life and existence to all things. And, according to their ideas, the following are the modifications under which the Supreme Being is present as an eternal, independent, universal, pervading Spirit, viz., *Brahma*, *Kutastha*, *Jiva*, and *Ish*. They do not, however, consider that these various modifications exhibit the divine nature as subject to change, or that the various phases in which this all-pervading Being is pleased to manifest his attributes and perfections are individual existences. They who are ignorant of Brahma, they say, may differ in their opinions concerning Jiva and Ish or Iswara; the former being the soul or life of man; the latter being the divine spirit. But when this condition of ignorance, *ajnánánta*, अज्ञानान्तं, has been dispelled, all these distinctions and delusions disappear also; and to the intellectual understanding there exists then one only all-pervading spirit. Creation, also, is not considered by them to be either the immediate or gradual production of existing things, but to be simply and exclusively the manifestation of what has been existing eternally in the one universal Being. The followers of the Vedánta consider human life

and its occupations as retaining the soul in the prison of passion and earthly affection. The Naiyáyikas admit the authority of the Veda; but the Vedántins do more than this: they accept the texts of the Vedas as infallible dogmas, rather than as containing matter for argument, or discussion, or free inquiry. Collating these passages of the Vedas, which they rely upon, they have styled them by a significant expression, *upanishat pramána*, उपनिषत्प्रमाणं, *the evidence of the proof.* The Nyáya philosophy, on the contrary, abounds with much abstruse logical reasoning. The sect of Gotama, as I have already remarked, is very ancient, and those who adhere to it are called, by way of distinction, *Naiyáyikas.* The followers of Kanáda, who are termed *Vaiseshikas*, have a code of reasoning (rules for reasoning) which they term *tarkik*, from *tarka*, तर्क: i. e. *reductio ad absurdum*,—a favourite mode of arguing in Nyáya logic. They believe that spirit and matter are both eternal; the former enjoying life and thought; the latter, inert and lifeless, and moving only according to the impulse communicated by spirit. They do not, however, suppose that the world in its present form has existed from eternity, but only the primary matter of which it is composed. Hence they hold that in its compound

state it is perishable, but in its primitive or atomic state eternal. The combinations and aggregates which compose the material universe, they say, are produced by the energy of an almighty and intelligent Cause, who is also the Supreme Being, *Brahma*, ब्रह्म. And as matter is not capable of action, they hold that the motions of material bodies must be caused by some Being different in nature from any material objects.*

Though the Naiyáyikas believe that the soul is an emanation from the Supreme Being, they carefully distinguish its individual existence from that Being; and observe that, in its state of union with matter, it is subject to error, and liable to the evil effects produced by things external to the mind. According to their theory, while it is embodied in a material form, the soul is in a state of imprisonment, and is subject to pain and suffering; but having by intense study arrived at the knowledge of the natural elements and principles, it finally attains to union with the Supreme Being. Thus the soul may be considered as an emanation from God, but not a portion of that Divine Spirit which is indivisible. They compare it, by way of illustration, to the heat and light which issue from the sun continually, without ever in the least dividing

* See Note 1.

or diminishing the substance of the mass of the solar body; or the flame of a torch which is propagated without the original bulk being lessened.

The philosophy of the Vedánta school is founded upon the contemplation of the Infinite Being, considered either as simple abstract essence, unmoved and at repose, or as exhibiting active energy. In the first capacity the Infinite Being is termed *Brahma*, ब्रह्म; and *Kutastha*, कूटस्थ. In the latter capacity he is termed Jiva, जीव; and Iswara, ईश्वरः i. e. Brahma is Infinite Being, in the state of simple quiescence; Iswara, the same Being, exerting energy, and causing the phenomena of the material universe; while Jiva is the principle of sensation, and, as such, applies to the soul of man. For the Vedánta philosophy maintains that all the visible phenomena of the material world have no existence out of the soul's sensation, and that the appearance of things as we see them is not real, but *máyá*, माया, and must be attributed to ignorance, अज्ञानं. The drift of all Vedánta teaching is, that God and the soul, or souls of men, are capable of being identified; and that the universe is the power and motion of this Infinite Being. But for a more explicit statement of their opinions, I must refer my readers to a subsequent chapter on the Vedánta system. Yet

the Vedántins insist that God and the soul may also be considered as *distinct.**

The Sánkhyas, whose opinions seem to approach most nearly to Pantheism, and the most considerable sect of whom do not believe in the providence of God, or in his moral government of the world, believe in the existence of two Eternal Beings—*prakriti*, प्रकृति, and *purusha*, पुरुष. *Purusha* signifies *the soul*, and by *prakriti* the Sánkhyas understand, not exactly *nature*, but rather the uncompounded essence which is the hypostasis or substratum of all the visible phenomena of nature, and from which those phenomena proceed.

The Sánkyhas conceive that *purusha* (the soul) exists in an eternal state of rest, incapable of action, and a mere spectator of the various and diversified tableaux which *prakriti* (nature in its simplest form) displays of itself, and of its powers and qualities, until those tableaux have all been exhausted, and the soul, having attained liberation, rejoins the vast universal soul, from which each individual human soul has been, not *detached*, but *enclosed off*, from the universal soul, until the period of liberation arrives, or *nature* returns to a state of inactivity at the end of the *Kalpa*, or period of the

* See Note 2.

continuance of existing creation.* That thus the same round of activity on the part of nature, and of contemplation on the part of the soul, succeeded by inactivity on the part of nature, and the resolution, or returning, of individual souls into the vast original universal soul, goes on to all eternity.

In all these systems of philosophy the doctrine of the metempsychosis,† or transmigration of the soul, as a necessary and preliminary step to its liberation, is maintained. It "migrates"—*sansarati*, संसरति—and this migration is repeated over and over again from one body to another, from a lower to a higher, or from a higher to a lower creature, according to the amount of knowledge attained to in its former gross bodily habitation, and according to the virtuous or vicious impressions which it may have received as the result of moral conduct during life, according to which the soul may be qualified for a more elevated rank in the scale of creatures, or depressed still lower than it was before. This transmigration, as Hindu philosophers affirm, must be repeated until the soul has been conducted to the knowledge of that one and all-pervading Essence in which, under the various denominations of Brahma and Iswara, Jiva

* See Note 3. † See Note 4.

and Purusha, all things live and move and have their being. Until its own nature, i. e., the nature of the soul, has been ascertained, the soul, remaining ignorant of its own nature, and labouring under the delusion that it is a sensitive, finite, individual being, is incapable of liberation. But when, having investigated these distinctions, it comprehends them, then finally the delusion, *máyá*, is dispelled, and the soul recognises itself as being one with the One Infinite, Eternal Spirit.

We shall presently have an opportunity of examining the doctrines of these philosophical systems more particularly in the succeeding chapters, in which the reader will also find a statement of references to native authorities. I shall conclude my remarks on the philosophies of Hindustan for the present, and proceed to make a few preliminary observations on their Vedas* and other sacred treatises. The statements which I have made will certainly appear strange to those who have been accustomed to judge by appearances only, and to estimate the standard of Indian theism by the popular idolatry and debasing superstition, for the practice of which the Indian peninsula is proverbial. Even with regard to this idolatry, it is only fair to

* By the *Vedas* I mean the divisions of the *Veda*.

state, that educated Hindu apologists in general plead the same excuse which has in all ages of the world been assigned for the worship of images in polite circles, namely, that it is not the *image* which they worship, but Him of whom it is the emblem; and to which excuse a direct answer may be given, viz., that however lofty their philosophical views may be, in *practice* their conceptions of things divine are sadly depreciated by this iconolatry; and the minds of the credulous multitude, who are not capable of understanding such distinctions, are sadly misled. "We have" (said some of the literati at the sacred city of Benares to an inquiring European visitor) "in our temples a quantity of different statues; for instance, those of Brahma, of Siva, of Ganesa, and Bhavání, who are the principal and most perfect Devatás; and also a number of others of less perfection, to which we pay much honour. We prostrate ourselves before them, and offer to them flowers, rice, scented oils, saffron, and other valuables with much ceremony. Nevertheless, we do not think that these images are Brahma himself or Vishnu, and so also of the others, but only their images and representations; and we do not pay them those honours except on account of that which they represent. They are in our temples for this purpose, that there may be something before

the eyes which may attract the mind; and when we pray, it is not to the image we pray, but to him who is represented by the image. In all things else we acknowledge that it is God who is the absolute Master, and the only Almighty One."*

We may now proceed to the second part of this chapter, which, being an introductory one, I conceive would not fully answer the end of an introduction if it did not contain a concise statement cencerning the chief Hindu standard theological books and authorities,—those which are in popular credit and esteem in India, or are believed in as *inspired*,—and on which, as such, the philosophical systems (*quoad* divine sanction), lean for support. But although all the weight may fairly be conceded to them which tradition, from a very remote period, can bestow, those pseudo-divine volumes are deficient in the proper evidences of *inspiration*. But I must not anticipate that which it behoves me hereafter to detail at length. The Hindu Scriptures named Vedas—a word which in Sanscrit signifies *knowledge*, वेद्—are said to have been revealed by Brahma to Manu, and by him to have been communicated to a holy sage or Rishi, ऋषि, named Bhrigu, and afterwards arranged in their present

* See Note 5.

order by Vyása, or Krishna Dwaipáyana, to whom also the composition of the sacred heroic poem, the Mahábhárata is attributed. The Vedas are in four parts or volumes:—First, the Rig-veda, the collection, sanhitá, of sacred hymns; second, Yajur-veda; third, Sáma-veda; and fourth, Atharva-veda; or the veda of hymns, the veda of prayers, the veda of psalms, and the veda of religious and sacrificial formulæ. The vast original tree of the Vedas having been divided into four principal stems, soon branched out into an extensive forest. The Rig-veda Sanhitá was divided by Sakapurni into three portions, and he added a glossary, constituting a fourth. Of the Yajur-veda there are no less than twenty-seven branches compiled by Vaisampáyana, the pupil of Vyása. Jaimini, a pupil of Vyása, divided the Sáma-veda into several branches; he divided it, with the assistance of Sumantu and Sukarman, into the fifteen parts of the northern chanters, and into the fifteen parts of the eastern chanters. There are five Sanhitás of the Atharva-veda, explaining, respectively, the five Kalpas or rules of ceremonial. Such are the divisions and subdivisions of the Veda. The heroic poem named Mahábhárata, written by Krishna Vyása, relates the wars between the Kurus and the Pańdus. Arjuna, the favourite of Vishnu, bears

a conspicuous part as the hero of the poem. The epic poem named Rámáyana is an account, considered to be inspired, of the wars and adventures of Ráma, an incarnation of Vishnu. These two poems, the Mahábhárata and the Rámáyana, are the textbooks of the second or mytho-heroic stage of Hindu theology.* The different works which are known by the name of Puráńas, in Sanskrit पुराण signifying *old*, are attributed to a more recent date than the Vedas or the Epic Poems. In them the divine honours of Siva and Vishnu are especially dwelt upon; therefore they may be classed into *Saiva Puráńas* and *Vaishnava Puráńas*. They are in number eighteen, and are said to be founded on the ancient Hindu traditions.

Such are the principal received religious books of Hindu theology. I purposely omit noticing certain others, with which this Essay is not, I conceive, concerned; viz. the Angas, Upángas, and Upapuránas, which are supplementary and exegetical additions to the Vedas and Puráńas, but not considered in the light of inspired authorities, and therefore not employed much, I believe, as references in the teachings of Hindu philosophy. Thus it may be considered that there are three eras or

* See Note 6.

periods of the Hindu religion. The age of the Vedas first—the prevailing character of the ritual in which is the worship of the elements personified. Of *Agni*, अग्नि, *fire; Váyu*, वायु, *air; Varuna*, वरुण, *water; Aditya*, आदित्य, *the sun.* Nor is there reason for supposing that at the time when the entire ritual of the Hindu nation was contained in the Vedas, any images or sensible representations of those elements were worshipped. The second period, in which the traditions of the Mahábhárata and Rámáyana were added to the popular belief, may be regarded as a transition state from the simple primitive form of worship and doctrine prescribed in the Vedas to the more showy emblematical and philosophical "Symbola" of the Pauránik treatises and Sanhitás. The Vedas accordingly indicated the period of elemental worship; the heroic poems, that of the origin and reputation of legends; and the chief characteristic of the Puránas* is Pantheism, meaning thereby the identity of the Deity, not with the individual elements, but with nature or the universe. Siva, or Vishnú, is represented in the Puránas as not only the cause

* The Puránas are supposed to have assumed their present form about the time of Sankara Achárya, in the eighth or ninth century of the Christian era.

of all that is, but as being himself all that is, as the one Universal Being who is all things—from whom all things proceed, and to whom all things return. As an instance of this, I shall give a quotation from the Vishnú Purána, Book I. chap. xxii., containing a most sublime description of Vishnú, with which I shall appropriately terminate this chapter.

(*Parásara loquitur*).—"The supreme condition of Brahma which is meditated on by the Yogis as invested with form is Vishnú, composed of all the divine energies and the essence of Brahma, with whom the mystic union that is sought is effected by the devotee, whose whole mind is addressed to that object. This is the embodied shape of Brahma, composed entirely of his essence. And in him, therefore, is the whole world interwoven; and from him and in him is the universe, and he is the supreme Lord of all, comprising all that is perishable and imperishable; he bears upon him all material and spiritual existence, identified in nature with his ornaments and weapons."

(*Maitreya loquitur*).—"Tell me in what manner Vishnú bears the whole world abiding in his nature, characterized by ornaments and weapons?"

(*Parásara loquitur*).—"Having offered salutation to the mighty and indescribable Vishnú, I repeat

to you what was formerly related to me by Vasishtha. The glorious Hari wears the pure soul of the world, undefiled and void of qualities as the Kaustubha gem. The chief principle of things (*pradhána*) is seated on the Eternal as the Srívatsa mark. Intellect abides in Mádhava in the form of his mace. The Lord (*Iswara*) supports Egotism (*Ahankára*), अहंकारं, in its twofold division of subtile elements and organs of sense,* in the emblems of his conch-shell and his bow. In his hand Vishnú holds, in the form of his discus, the mind whose thoughts fly swifter than the winds. The necklace of the deity Vaijayantí, composed of five precious gems, pearl, ruby, emerald, sapphire, and diamond, is the aggregate of the five elemental rudiments.† Janárddana bears in his numerous shafts the faculties both of action and perception. The bright sword of Achyuta is holy wisdom, concealed at some seasons in the scabbard of ignorance (*ajnána*). In this manner soul, nature, intellect, egotism, the elements, the senses, mind, ignorance, and wisdom, are all assembled in the person of Hrishikesa. Hari, in a delusive form, embodies the shapeless elements of the world as his weapons and ornaments for the salvation of mankind. Pun-

* See Note 7. † See Note 8.

darikáksha, the Lord of all, assumes nature with all its products, soul, and all the world. All that is wisdom, all that is ignorance, all that is, all that is not, all that is everlasting, is centered in the destroyer of Madhu, the Lord of all creatures. The supreme eternal Hari is time, with its divisions of seconds, minutes, days, months, seasons, and years. He is the seven worlds—the earth, the sky, heaven, the world of patriarchs, of sages, of saints, of truth—whose form is all worlds; first-born before all the first-born; the supporter of all beings; himself self-sustained; who exists in manifold forms, as gods, men, and animals, and is thence the sovereign Lord of all; eternal, whose shape is all visible things; who is without shape or form; who is celebrated in the Vedánta as the Rich, Yajush, Sáma, and Atharva Vedas. Inspired history and sacred science; the Vedas and their divisions; the institutes of Manu and other lawgivers; traditional scriptures and religious manuals; poems, and all that is said or sung, are the body of the mighty Vishnú assuming the form of sound: all kinds of substances, with or without shape, here or elsewhere, are the body of Vishnú. 'I am Hari; all that I behold is Janárddana.' Cause and effect are from none other than him. The man who

knows these truths shall never again experience the afflictions of worldly existence."

I conclude this chapter with the above quotation, which also serves as a suitable introduction to the second chapter, which contains a statement of the Sáukhya Philosophy, given more at length than has been done in the short notice which I have already taken of it in this introductory chapter.

CHAPTER II.

Containing a Concise Explanation of the Sánkhya Philosophy.

THE main principle of all Hindu metaphysics, the foundation of all Hindu philosophy, is a belief in the metempsychosis[1]. And the great object of their philosophical research is the discovery of the means of escaping from successive migrations, the discontinuance of corporeal being, the liberation of soul[2] from body. The liberation of soul from body cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities[3] of nature. The chief inquiry, therefore, with which, according to the Sánkhyas, philosophy should begin its investigations, with a view to attaining its design, is concerning the means by which pain and other infirmities may be removed. For the complete cure of those evils is not to be effected by such remedies as are obvious, and easily applied, and which at best only effect temporary relief. Even death is not an exemption

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SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Sansára. [2] Purusha. [3] Múrtti.

from pain, since the soul which has been separated from the body by the stroke of death must be born again into the world. Now the Sánkhya philosophy pretends to be able to unravel the mystery, and to teach the only sure and infallible method of attaining this desirable result, as it is said—"He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top knot only, or be shaven, is liberated; of this there is no doubt."

(The Sánkhya philosophy is so termed because it observes precision of reckoning in the enumeration of its principles, *sánkhya* signifying *numeral.*) And since the means which are commonly resorted to, with a view to overcome worldly evil, cannot perfectly effect that object,* and not even devotional means are sufficient for this purpose (since even the *gods* are finite), the design of the Sánkhya system is to show how *knowledge* provides final deliverance from the infirmities of corporeal being. And this knowledge is the knowledge of

* "The inquiry into the means of preventing the three sorts of pain is not superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 1.

the twenty-five principles divided into the perceptible[1], the imperceptible[2], and the soul. The perceptible principles are, intellect (the great one)[3], egotism[4], the five subtle rudiments, the eleven organs of perception and action, and the five gross elements. The imperceptible principle is nature (the chief one)[5], and lastly, the soul[6]. He who knows these knows the twenty-five principles[7], and in consequence possesses perfect knowledge.* Nature is the *múla prakriti*, मूलप्रकृति, the existing essence which is the root and substance of everything except soul. There are also the *vikriti*, the variations of *prakriti*, which, being derived, in their turn become productive. And soul is *anubhaya rúpa*, neither produced nor producing.†

Now, with regard to those two, *soul* and *nature* :

* "The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure, and in some respects defective. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul."

† "Nature, the root, is no production; soul is neither a production nor productive."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, Nos. 2 and 3.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Vyakta. [2] Avyakta. [3] Mahat. [4] Ahankára. [5] Prakriti pradhána. [6] Jna ("that which thinks"). [7] Tatwa.

soul, we may remark, agrees in some respects with inorganized nature, but is in every respect unlike to organized nature. Soul and inorganized nature agree in being eternal, in constancy, omnipresence, immutability, self-support, entireness, and singleness.* But organized nature is prolific. Soul is unprolific. Nature and its manifestations are irrational. Soul is rational. Soul is devoid of qualities. Nature and its manifestations have the *three qualities*[1]. In fact, nature unmodified is the three qualities in equipoise, or the equal state of *goodness*[2], foulness[3], and darkness[4].† Soul is distinct from nature, because, wherever there is an aggregate, such as the products of nature, there must be an enjoyer; wherever there is something to be seen, there must be a superintendent; and because there is the possibility of being detached from the world, which is nature's visible manifestation,

* See Note 9.

† "The qualities respectively consist in pleasure[5], pain[6], and dulness[7]. Goodness is considered to be alleviating and enlightening; foulness, urgent and versatile, darkness heavy and enveloping."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, Nos. 12 and 13.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Guna. [2] Satwa. [3] Rajas. [4] Tamas. [5] Sukha. [6] Duhkha. [7] Móha or Visháda.

there is a multitudinous existence of soul. Birth is the association of soul with body; death, its detachment from that body. Soul, however, is always existent and eternal, and not, *per se*, subject to birth or death;* moreover, it has not action.†

The union of soul with nature causes a creation. Soul has reason[1], and the design of nature's union with it is, that soul may contemplate[2] nature; and as by this union soul experiences (or seems to experience) pain, it soon desires to be released again. Nature, for this purpose, develops its products, as it is only in the state of perceptible principles that nature can be contemplated, and as it is only by a perfect understanding of nature's developments that soul can detach itself from combination with nature[3]. Thus it is for the sake of a double purpose, viz., the soul's enjoyment of nature, and libe-

* "Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates."—*S. Kárikà*, No. 69.

† "Soul is witness, solitary spectator, bystander, passive."—*Ibid.* No. 62.

"As a man who is not a thief, being taken up along with thieves, is supposed to be a thief also,—so soul, being connected with the three active qualities, is supposed, through merit, to be active."—*Gaurapáda.*

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Chêtanâ. [2] Darsana. [3] Kaivalya.

ration afterwards, that the world is developed.* Such is the Sánkhya theory concerning the soul and its union with nature.

The knowledge by which liberation is obtained is that of nature and of soul, viz., that nature is the equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and that soul is perfect, devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. Intellect has two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness.† The properties of intellect produced by the quality of goodness are knowledge, virtue, dispassion, and power. The properties of intellect produced by the quality of darkness are vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. Egotism or consciousness is the instrument by which the impression of individuality is conveyed to soul. The senses, mind, consciousness, and intellect, unite in conveying ideas to soul.‡ These ideas are derived from the grosser and visible elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, which are modifications and productions of the rudimen-

* "For the soul's contemplation of nature, the union of both takes place, and for its abstraction. By that union a creation is framed." —*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 21.

† "Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 23.

‡ See Note 10.

tal[1] elements. Subtile bodies* are formed by an aggregate of the subtile elements, and are so called to distinguish them from gross bodies, which are generated from the gross elements. Subtile body is lasting; it migrates,† according to the imperative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances; or, in consequence of virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celestial abodes. Thus the subtile body migrates until knowledge has been attained. When that has been attained, the soul, abandoning all body, acquires liberation. Subtile body is lasting, and the same in all the different stages of transmigration. The body composed of gross elements is dissolved by death, and returns to earth and its other component particles. Subtile body is primæval, or produced by nature before the universe.‡ Subtile body becomes in-

* "Subtile bodies, *súkshma*, and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these the subtile bodies are lasting; those that spring from father and mother are perishable."

† "Subtile body, primæval[1], unconfined[2], material, composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying, invested with dispositions, mergent[3]."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, Nos. 39 and 40.

‡ See Note 11.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Tanmátra. [2] Asakta. [3] Linga.

vested with dispositions[1], that is, morally modified, in consequence of intellect[2] being one of its component parts.* According to this theory, living bodies[3] consist of two envelopes, one of a subtile, and one of a gross nature.† The latter perishes, and is decomposed after death; the former lives on through all the stages of transmigration. The gross body envelopes the subtile body, which in its turn envelopes the soul,‡ and accompanies it constantly through successive gross bodies until the soul's liberation, or until the period of universal dissolution restores its component parts to their primitive and common parent.§ The *remote* cause of transmigration is the concurrence of soul's purpose, and nature's influence in effecting soul's liberation. But besides this, I must not omit to mention the special or *immediate* cause of migration; the cause, on account of which subtile body ascends from the gross body of a man

* "Through the influence of intellect, the whole of subtile body is affected by dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed from contact with a fragrant champa flower."—*Sánkhya Tatwa Kaumudí.*

† See Note 12. ‡ See Note 13. § See Note 14.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Bhâva. [2] Buddhi. [3] Déha, देह, *living body.*

to that of a higher being, or descends to the body of a lower animal.* The reason of this depends upon the relation in which such subtile body stands to certain occasional means or causes, virtuous or vicious, which, being regularly graduated, lead to corresponding rewards or punishments after death, which rewards or punishments consist in being born again, through the transmigration in an exalted or degraded condition. Virtue and vice, as such instrumental means or causes, are called *nimitta*, निमित्तं; and their consequences (being experienced in the migration of the subtile body after death to a higher or lower sphere, as its condition of reward or punishment for its conduct pursued in the flesh) are termed *naimittika*, नैमित्तिकं. Accordingly, there are eight causes enumerated for the migration of the subtile body, and eight corresponding changes of condition, in one or other of which it finds itself placed every

* "By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region below; by knowledge, is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage."—*Sánkhya Kárikd*, No. 44.

"Virtue leads upwards; by upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of Brahmá, Prajápati, Soma, Indra, the Gándharbas, the Yakshas, the Rákshasas, and the Pisáchas; or, if vice be the efficient cause, it migrates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or a mineral."—*Gaurapáda*.

time death is undergone. These eight causes are —*Virtue*[1], the effect of which in the transmigration is elevation[2] in the scale of being; *Vice*[3], the effect of which is degradation; *Knowledge*[4], which produces liberation from existence; *Ignorance*[5], which causes bondage; *Dispassion*[6], which causes dissolution of the subtile bodily form[7]; *Passion*[8], which produces migration; *Power*[9], which causes unimpediment; and *Feebleness*[10], which produces obstruction[11].* The five varieties of obstruction,† or error, are obscurity[12], illusion[13], extreme illusion[14], gloom[15], and utter darkness[16]. These all imply ignorance of self, and their effect must be counteracted by a knowledge of the principles. Thus there may be said to be two creations, the *bhávákhya*, भावाख्य, the conditional creation, from *bháva*, भाव, which signifies the disposition of the mind, and the rudimental or creation of the subtile body, which is

* See Note 15.

† "By dispassion is absorption into nature; by foul passion, migration. By power, unimpediment; by the reverse, the contrary." —*S. Káriká*, No. 45.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Dharma. [2] Sthána. [3] Adhárma. [4] Jnyána. [5] Ajnána. [6] Vairágya. [7] Prakriti laya. [8] Rága. [9] Aiswaryya. [10] Anaiswaryya. [11] Viparyaya. [12] Tamas. [13] Moha. [14] Máhámoha. [15] Támisra. [16] Andha támisra.

called *lingákhya*, लिंगाख्य: Another name for the former is *pratyaya sarga*, प्रत्ययसर्ग: and for the latter another name is *tanmátra*, तन्मात्र.

Now these two creations, the intellectual and the bodily, may be considered as acting and reacting upon each other; for since the conditions of the intellect which have been enumerated as consisting of virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power, and feebleness, can only be manifested in a bodily state, this manifestation requires the use of a bodily creation; therefore, as I have remarked, they act and react upon each other. Bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue; vice and virtue again in their turn occasion bodily condition. Like the seed and the tree, each mutually productive of the other, the tree bears the seed, from the seed springs the tree again to put forth seed, and so on for ever. But one result of bodily condition is knowledge, which effects that liberation by which soul is disengaged. Subtile body, then, is dissolved into its rudiments, and the dispositions or condition of the intellect terminate. The succession of these two kinds of creation, as mutually cause and effect, is said by the commentators to be eternal, since, even in the commencement of a new *Kalpa*, *bodily existence* is

attributable to there having been similar existences in the preceding *kalpa*. Thus Jaigíshavya says:—"By me living repeatedly in ten great creations;" and Kapila asserts that the Veda was remembered by him from a former state of being. Having thus particularized the Sánkhya notions with regard to soul and body, or bodies, and the connexion between them, its cause, conditions, and duration, we come to the other great principle, nature (*prakriti*). Now, as nature acts *spontaneously*, note that this *spontaneous* action is solely for the deliverance of each soul that is in corporeal bondage. I mean by the *spontaneous* action of nature,* that nature is not influenced by any external intelligent principle. Soul experiences pain in the different stages of existence until its corporeal frame is discontinued, although soul is not itself susceptible of pain, or decay, or death. These liabilities are seated in nature, but nature is unconscious and insensible. Soul has the consciousness of pain, on account of its connexion with rudimental body. When soul is released from body, its susceptibility of pain ceases. And the spontaneous action of nature† is illustrated in two ways,—by the comparison of the secretion of milk: "As it is a function of milk,

* See Note 16.

† "The evolution of nature from intellect to the special elements

which is an unintelligent substance, to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief principle to liberate the soul;" and by the comparison of a dancer: "As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul."

To sum up these remarks:—The drift of the Sánkhya philosophy seems to be to advocate the supremacy of nature,—that *nature is God*, i. e. possesses those attributes and qualities which we are accustomed to attribute to an Independent Being as Creator of nature. If there be any doubt as to the accuracy of my statements respecting the Sánkhya philosophy, I can only say that the same is directly affirmed by Gaurapáda in his commentary: —"According to this (statement), Iswara (God) is declared to be the cause of the world; others say, spontaneity is cause. Here, therefore, the Sánkhya teachers have said, 'How can beings endowed with qualities proceed from Iswara, who is devoid of qualities?' Therefore the causality of *nature* is rendered probable—Iswara is without qualities. The origin of the three worlds endowed with quali-

is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively, done for another's sake as for self."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 66.

"Nature is like an utensil, having fulfilled soul's object, it ceases." —*Gaurapáda.*

ties from him would therefore be an inconsistency. By this same reason soul also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause; 'time' (they say) 'is the five elements; time destroys the world; time watches, when all things sleep; time is not to be surpassed. There are but three categories: the discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul, and in one of these *time* must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of time; spontaneity merges into it; and time, therefore, is not the cause, neither is spontaneity. *Nature* alone is *cause*, and there is no cause of nature."

Besides this notion of the independence of nature, the Sánkhya philosophy also maintains the notion of the universality of soul. The knowledge of the principles, by which liberation is effected, is said to consist in this,* namely, a conviction of there being really no such thing as individuality, and of the abstract nature of soul, that "neither *I* am, nor is aught mine, nor do *I* exist,"

* "So, through study of principles, the conclusive incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am[1], nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."—*S. Káriká*, No. 64.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Násmi.

i. e. that there is no real *activity*, nor *property*, nor *individual agency*. They also consider that there would not be any connexion between the eternal self-existent principle, nature, and the universal abstract inert principle, soul,—that there would be no connexion or union between these two principles (and consequently that there would be no creation, were it not for a twofold necessity, arbitrary, eternal, and imperious: viz., firstly, that the objects of sense should be apprehended and understood; and secondly, that the difference between the qualities (*guna*) and soul, should be apprehended and understood. When these two objects have been accomplished, the end of creation has been attained (meaning by creation the development of nature, *prakriti*); and, to use a Sánkhya illustration, "as in the case of a settlement of accounts between debtor and creditor," when such a settlement has been effected, their connexion ceases: just so, after the settlement of nature's qualities and powers, by the enumeration and display thereof; the connexion between nature and soul is dissolved, and terminates.

Such is the Sánkhya philosophy, as taught by Kapila.*

* See Note 17.

CHAPTER III.

Containing a Concise Explanation of the Vedánta Philosophy.

The fundamental principle of the Vedánta system of Hindu philosophy is that there is no real existence whatever except soul,* and that soul is identical with God, all else being unreal, and owing its apparent reality to ignorance, अज्ञान, *ajnána*. This general term, *Ignorance*,† may be considered either collectively or distributively, but, properly understood in the Vedánta sense, it denotes that which limits the knowledge possessed by the soul, which, only for it, would be as God,‡ omniscient

* "Salutation to Ganesa!" (see Note 18). "For the accomplishment of what is desired, I take refuge with the indivisible existence, knowledge, and joy, no object fitted for voice to declare, nor for mind to comprehend, Soul, the substratum of all."—*Vedánta Sára*, No. 1.

† "The real is God, consisting of existence, knowledge, and happiness,—the one without a second; the unreal is the whole aggregate of the senseless, beginning with *ignorance*."—*Ibid.*, No. 20.

‡ "This is the fact to be known for certain, that the soul and God are one, for this is the design of all Vedánta treatises."—*Ibid.*, No. 15.

(i. e. the ideas proceeding from the mind would comprehend and envelop all things.*) Ignorance, therefore, according to this simplest idea of it, is the limit to the knowledge of the individual soul, which limit is caused by the fact of the soul being individualized. And this ignorance makes itself an object of perception to men's senses and minds in the form of the three qualities (*guna*) purity, foulness, and darkness, of a compound of which the material phenomena of the world consist. Since the human soul does not fully comprehend that itself is an (indivisible) part of the Deity, who is in truth the only reality[1]—all things else being unreal[2]—and also, not comprehending fully the phenomena of nature (the simplest idea of which, nature, and its phenomena, is furnished by the *guna* or qualities, and their compounds), the human soul, since it is ignorant of this, is truly said to be obstructed as to its capabilities of expansion by *ajnána*. Nature also, being misunderstood by the soul, is treated as *ajnâna* personified (the effect produced upon the soul being taken for the cause).† Universal soul, or pure spirit, is *nirguna*, i. e. free from

* See Note 19. † See Note 20.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Vastu, वस्तु. [2] Avastu, अवस्तु.

any influence of the *guna*, and is identical with Deity: individual soul, or divided spirit, is not *nirguna*, because it is surrounded by the material world, which is, therefore, called the mantle of Iswara, and by another name, *ajnána*, because ignorance passes the counterfeit for reality.* Hence there arise other conditions in which *ajnána* may be considered, *ajnána* in the aggregate,† and *ajnána* in a distributed sense.‡ And forasmuch as the principal attribute of Deity is conceived to be *knowledge*, and as I have already observed the Vedántins conceive the universal soul and Deity to be one and the same, *knowledge* is represented in this curious system of philosophy as the maker of the world.§ Now these statements of the Ve-

* "Of this *ignorance* there are two powers, envelopment and projection."—*Vedánta Sára*, No. 36.

† "This aggregate *ajnána*, since it is the abode of one who is its superior, has chiefly pure goodness in it, and very little of the other two *guna*, passion and darkness. Intellect, of which this is the body, being possessed of such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and superintendence over all, imperceptible, all-pervading Maker of the world, is called *Iswara*."—*Ibid.*, No. 25.

‡ "The distributed appearance of *ajnána*, since it is the abode of the inferior (the human soul), has chiefly impure goodness in it; soul located in this, having such qualities as want of knowledge and want of power, is called *prájna*, the very defective intelligence."—*Ibid.*, No. 31.

§ "*Chaitanya* is in its own right the instrumental cause, and, in virtue of what it is located in, the substantial cause,—as the spider is

dánta system are not to be considered as mythical, or as an allegory, the key to which may be discovered in some less *transcendental* solution. The Vedánta system appears to me to have really only two terms in its vocabulary, viz., *chaitanya*[1] and *ajnána*[2], with its two powers of envelopment[3], and projection[4].* Now, as the Vedántins hold that there is no difference† between collective and distributed ignorance, a similar agreement to this explains how also they believe that there is no difference between the human soul and Iswara (the Lord).‡ This is a state of the soul which is attained by *knowledge*,

personally the instrument, and, in virtue of its own body, the substance in regard to its product, the thread."—*Vedánta Sára*, No. 40.

* See Note 21.

† "Of these two, collective and distributed ignorance, there is no difference, as there is none between a forest and the trees of which it is composed, or between a body of water and the streams and drops of which it is composed. And there is likewise no difference between the Lord and the individual soul affected by these two kinds of *ajnána*, as there is none between the ethereal space that is occupied by the forest and by the trees."—*Ibid.*, No. 34.

‡ "There is no difference between the Lord and the individual soul, as there is none between the ethereal expanse that is reflected in the whole body of water, and in the separate waters of which it is composed."—*Ibid.*, No. 34.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] चैतन्यं, chaitanya, intellect. [2] अज्ञानं, ajnána. [3] आवरणं, ávarana. [4] विक्षेपं, vikshepa.

and which is in Vedanta treatises technically termed *the fourth** तुरीय: i. e. the fourth condition of the soul: the first being the soul when awake; the second condition being dreaming; the third condition of the soul being *dreamless* sleep; and the fourth and most perfect being when the soul loses all consciousness of individuality, and becomes one with the Universal Spirit who is thought, joy, and existence.

Having thus concisely stated the Vedánta views as nearly as possible in their own peculiar philosophical phraseology, although, as I have already observed, their expressions are not to be considered exactly in what we would term an allegorical sense, I shall take the liberty of attempting (with the consent of certain critics, whose English and German metaphysics in many respects resemble the opinions we have been considering, and hoping that I shall not misrepresent the Vedánta opinions in any important particulars) to divest the theory of its dogmatic disguise, and to represent it in such a point of view as may be intelligible to ordinary readers, interpreting its transcendental terminology, and removing its paradoxical appearance. Let me,

* "They regard him as blessed, tranquil, without duality, the *fourth*."

therefore, solicit the attention of my reader to the following remarks, observing that I do not suggest them as explaining the Vedánta system *in extenso*, but its principal and most striking features:—

The Deity (Brahma) is indivisible, is existence, is knowledge and happiness, pure spirit, almighty and omnipresent. Therefore, the material world must be contained in him, and must have proceeded from him. And we may conceive that all things, visible and invisible, were produced after this manner. The Divine will from eternity resolved upon creating. The proximate effect of this resolution being conceived, was a concentration, as it were, of the Divine energy and activity around the Divine will. This concentration of the Divine energy and Divine activity developed itself forthwith in the various modifications and the denominations of the *spiritual* world. Hence it would follow, that the souls of men, being one of these denominations, whatever may be their *apparent* individuality, are *boná fide* undetached from the Divine essence; and for the same reason it follows that they are also eternal.

Now this concentration of the divine energy and activity around the divine will, which issues in the manifestation of the spiritual world, is termed *Iswara*, the Lord. And since everything

has its shadow, and an invariable accompaniment of anything being present is the presence, or possible presence of its shadow, even so the necessary effect of the manifestation of Iswara is the manifestation of the shadow of Iswara. The shadow of Iswara we discern in the qualities of purity, activity, and repose, and the various compounds made up of these qualities being manifested; in other words, the combinations and phenomena of the *natural* world. And forasmuch as this shadow (as the darkness encompasses the light)—forasmuch as this shadow encompasses *Iswara* (which is the Divine energy and activity concentrated round the Divine will determined on creating), the shadow is called "the vesture of Iswara." Therefore, the Vedántins say that "nature is the vesture of Iswara." And, since *this shadow* envelopes the various subdivisions of Iswara, which subdivisions are the souls of men, and they do not understand that it is only a *shadow;* with reference to this error made by the souls of men, the shadow is also called *Ajnána, Ignorance.* "*Ajnána* is nature." "*Ajnána* is the vesture of Iswara." And why are the souls of men in error with regard to this adumbration of Divine activity, purity, and repose? and why do they suppose the combinations thereof to be real existences, when they are

only a shadow? Why is the soul ignorant that, as being part of the universal spirit, itself is the only real existence? Because the shadow, *ajnána*, with its two powers of envelopment and projection, surrounds the intellectual soul (*chaitanya*) continually and completely, and compels the soul to contemplate it, and presents continually various phenomena for the soul's inspection; and then, when the soul turns inwardly to gaze upon itself, it does not distinguish itself, nor see itself as it really is; it sees nothing but the *shadow*, and imagines the *shadow* to be *everything;* just as to the eye, when it has been gazing attentively upon some particular bright colour for a length of time, everything around, no matter what its real colour may be, appears to be of that particular colour to which the eye has become accustomed.

Having thus endeavoured to explain the theory upon which the Vedánta philosophy appears to be framed, I have also to add, that there is but little attempt at argument made in the treatises belonging to the Vedánta School: little attempt is made by them, to prove by an appeal to reason, the peculiar doctrines of their system. This is curious enough when we consider that the Vedánta philosophy is very popular among the Hindus, a nation who pride themselves not a little on their logical

acumen. But the reason of it is, because they rely upon texts of the Veda in proof of their doctrines, and exact implicit, unquestioning acquiescence in whatever the texts of the Veda teach, or appear to teach. With regard to the Veda, and the influence thus exercised upon the systems of Hindu philosophy, I refer my readers to the chapter in which the subject of the Veda is considered. It only remains, therefore, before concluding this chapter on the Vedánta philosophy, to specify certain details held by them in reference to the human soul and body, and the connexion which exists between these, that my reader may comprehend more fully their peculiar phraseology, in case he should feel disposed to dive more deeply into the mysteries of Vedánta idealism.

Ignorance (*ajnána*), as I have already observed, is represented as endowed with two powers, one by which it envelopes soul, and another by which it projects the phantasmagoria of the world. Now the order of the development of the phantasmagoria of the world is from the subtile सूक्ष्म *súkshma*, to the gross, स्थूलं, *sthúla*, elements; भूतं, *bhúta*. First the subtile elements appear,*

* "From intellect immersed in ignorance, with the projective power in which darkness prevails, there arises the ether; from the

and they invest the soul with a subtile body[1].* The gross elements arise from a mixture and compounding of the subtile elements;† and out of these same gross elements are formed the heavens and the earth, and the bodies of men and animals. But the soul of a man is supposed to be cased and enveloped in a series of bodies. There is first the intelligent sheath of the soul[2];‡ there is secondly the mental sheath[3].§ Then life or vitality is con-

ether, air; from air, fire; from fire, water; and from water, earth." —*Vedánta Sára*, No. 41.

* "From these are produced the subtile bodies, and the gross elements."—*Ibid.*, No. 43. See Note 22.

† "Although the five gross elements are alike in respect that each is made up of all the five subtile ones, yet the name of *ether* is appropriate to one, and the name of another subtile element to another. But they differ in having each a large portion of one subtile element, and a small portion of each of the others. Thus, in the ether, the quality of *sound* is manifested; in air, sound and *tangibility;* in fire, —sound, tangibility, and *colour;* in water, sound, tangibility, colour, and *savour;* and in earth, sound, tangibility, colour, savour, and *odour.*"—*Ibid.*, No. 69.

‡ "This understanding (*buddhi*) being associated with the intellectual organs, is the intelligent sheath of the soul."—*Ibid.*, No. 49.

§ "The mind, being associated with the organs of action, becomes the mental sheath."—*Ibid.*, No. 51.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Súkshma saríra. [2] Vijnánamaya Kosha. [3] Manomaya Kosha.

sidered as a third sheath[1];* and over all, as a fourth covering, the gross body is superadded, which, as it is strengthened and increased by nourishment, is termed the *nutrimentitious* sheath[2]. And the soul itself is termed differently, according as reference is had to one or all of these envelopments. Thus, with reference to the intelligent sheath, it is called जीव, *jîva—the inferior*—while—with reference to the subtile body—it is called तैजस, *taijasa—the resplendent;* as a general term applying to all the envelopments it is called हिरण्यगर्भ, *hiranyagarbha—gold-embryo;* and with reference to them individually, *soul-thread;* and with regard to the gross body it is called *viswa*, the *pervader*. But there is no difference in its organization, whether it be considered individually or collectively, whether it be considered with reference to one or more or all of these conditions, it is still the same, unchanged and unchangeable.†

* "The vital airs associated with the organs of action become the vital sheath."—*Vedánta Sára*, No. 57.

† "Here, too, as in other cases, where an aggregate may be viewed either collectively as one thing, or distributively as many things, there is no difference between the distributive and the collective aggregate of the gross, and between the pervader and the spirit of humanity lo-

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SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Pránamaya Kosha. [2] Annamaya Kosha.

When a man is in the full enjoyment of his waking faculties and senses, and powers of action, his soul is, philosophically speaking, farthest from the state of liberation which the Vedántins regard as the highest happiness, for he is then enveloped in all the sheaths which *ajnána* (ignorance) has fabricated. When he falls asleep and dreams, his soul is considered as having for the time got rid of the incumbrance of the gross body, and the objects seen in dreams are considered as subtile, and forms of the subtile elements. When a man sleeps so soundly that he has no dreams, his soul is approximated another degree nearer to liberation, having got free from the subtile as well as the gross body; yet the soul being still encompassed by the power of *ajnána*, ignorance, must be also rid of this incumbrance, and must become simple intellect, until finally it loses all sense and consciousness of individuality, and must cease to be able to make even itself an object of thought. The soul reaches its highest climax when it sees itself only as Brahma, or *universal* spirit, and feels itself to be identical with the great mind of the universe, unchangeable and eternal.

cated in these, as there is none between the forest and its trees, or between a body of water and its constituent waters."—*Ibid.*, No. 75. See Note 23.

CHAPTER IV.

Containing a Concise Explanation of the Nyâya Philosophy.

As the end of logic, or dialectics, is to assist reason in judging of truth and goodness, which ethics enable men to practise more effectually, and with greater satisfaction to themselves, than would be their case if they were left without any precise information as to what their duty is, and how they are to set about performing it; and the sensible results of which truth and goodness, as manifested by the Deity in the phenomena of the material world, the science of physics treats of,*—we may consider the physics and ethics of the Hindus to be treated of in the systems of the Sánkhya and Vedánta philosophies, according to *their* respective doctrines, and the *Nyáya* philosophy to contain the rules of Hindu logic, by which rules, like the bars of an iron cage, the *Naiyáyikas*, or adherents of the *Nyáya* philosophy, confine alike the subtleties of metaphysics and the account which nature ren-

* See Note 24.

ders of her laws and their results. Thus, we find extensively used for this purpose in Nyáya treatises an oriental form of syllogism[1],* differing slightly from the one which is attributed to Aristotle, but having subject[2] and predicate[3], major[4] and minor[5] premises, and conclusion[6].†

But the Nyáya philosophers employ their logic in a very practical manner when they teach that the great scope of all sound philosophy consists in the practice of virtue,‡ and in being guided in our actions by the dictates of reason,—the faculty which enables us to distinguish truth from falsehood. The Nyáya philosophers make the operations of reason, when employed upon the inquiry —*quid agendum?* to consist in observing a just *medium* between extremes. Thus bravery consists in

* "When one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition for the instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another."—*Tarka Sangraha*, Chapter on Inference.

† See Note 25.

‡ "Virtue[7], or merit, arises from the performance of what is enjoined; but vice[8], or demerit, from the performance of what is forbidden."—*Ibid.*, Chapter on Testimony.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Parámarsa. [2] Paksha. [3] Linga-parámarsa. [4] Vyápaka. [5] Vyápya. [6] Anumiti. [7] Dhermma, धर्म्म: [8] Adhermma, अधर्म्म:

the *medium* between cowardice and presumptuous rashness; liberality, in a *medium* between avarice and profusion; and temperance and moderation in gratifying appetite, to be indispensable in the pursuit of wisdom and happiness. They acknowledge a Supreme Eternal Being, and believe in the immortality of the soul, and describe the former briefly as the eternal essence who pervades space and bestows life. They also ordain that the most implicit reverence should be paid to the Vedas and Sástras, as containing the will of this supreme being revealed with authority, and thus communicated to men.* The great error of the Naiyayikas is in holding that *mind*[1] *and matter* are *eternal*, the one eternal,† and enjoying life and thought; the other inert and lifeless, and moving only as it is impelled by spirit. They do not, however, sup-

* "Speech is of two kinds, sacred, *vaidika*, वैदिकं, and profane, *laukika*, लौकिकं, the former being uttered by God, is all authoritative; but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative; otherwise it is not so.—*Tarka Sangraha*, Chapter on Testimony.

† "Mind is the instrument which effects the apprehension of pleasure, pain, &c., it is innumerable through there being one assigned to each soul: it is in the form of an atom, and is eternal."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Manas (mind).

pose that the world in its present form has existed from eternity, but that the materials from which the Creator's power has originated the present forms of things are eternal. Hence they hold that the forms and figures of things are perishable, but that the atoms of which they are composed,* that those atoms are eternal; and of them the elements are compounded—earth, water, light, air, and ether.†

* See Note 26.

† "Earth[1] is distinguished by the quality of smell; it is of two kinds, eternal and transient: it is *eternal* in the form of atoms, transient in the form of aggregates or products."—*Tarka Sangraha*, Category of Substances: Earth.

"Water[2] is distinguished by being cool to the feel, and this is of two kinds, eternal and transient: eternal in the shape of atoms, transient in the shape of products."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Water.

"Light[3] is distinguished by being hot to the feel; it is of two kinds: eternal in the form of atoms, transient in the form of products."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Light.

"Air[4] is colourless, and sensible to the feel; it is of two sorts: eternal and transient—eternal in the form of atoms, transient in the form of aggregates."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Air.

"Ether[5] is the substratum of the quality of sound, it is one, all pervading and eternal."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Ether.

"The cause of the employment of the terms *past*, and the like, is

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Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Prithivi, प्रथिव्य्. [2] Ab, आव्. [3] Tejás, तेजाः [4] Váyu, वायु. [5] Akása, अकशं.

They also maintain that the soul* is an emanation from the Supreme Being, but they distinguish the soul in its individual existence from that Being, and observe that in its confined state, and united with matter, the soul is subject to error, and liable to become the slave of passion, and to be influenced by effects produced by things not originally in the mind, but external to it. This is their common maxim, viz., "that truth and intelligence are the attributes of God, not of the individual soul which is susceptible both of knowledge and ignorance, of pleasure and pain: therefore, God and the *individual* soul are distinct. If this is denied, how are we to account for the soul being confined to ma-

time[1]; it is one, all-pervading and eternal."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Time.

"The cause of the employment of the terms *eastern*, and the like, is place[2] (or space and direction); it is one, eternal, and infinite."—*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Place.

* "The seat of knowledge is the soul[3]: it is twofold, the living soul and the supreme soul. The supreme soul, or spirit, the Lord, the omniscient, is One only—subject to neither pleasure or pain. Living soul is distributed one to each human body; it is infinite and eternal." —*Ibid.*, Category of Substances: Soul.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Kála, कालः [2] Dik, दिक् [3] Atmán, आत्मान्

terial habitations, and again released from them? They also hold that the combinations which compose the material universe have been and are produced by the energy of this almighty and intelligent First Cause, as, since matter is not capable of action or motion of itself, it must be acted upon and moved by a different being. While embodied in matter, the soul is in a state of imprisonment, and is under the influence of evil passions, but having, by virtue of the prescribed preparatory ordeals, arrived at the knowledge of principles, it takes its place with the eternal being. In this state of supreme bliss, still its individuality does not terminate, although, having been made perfect, by virtue of perfection it has been absorbed in the universal spirit; it is supposed in some inexplicable or incomprehensible manner, that it still retains the nature of defined and individual existence. The Naiyáyikas differ from our opinions, not only in ascribing *eternity* to *atoms*, but also in identifying *power* with extreme *minuteness*. Hence, they are familiarily termed by those of others sects, "Vaiséshikas," i. e. "belonging to the sect who reverence minute things." For, according to their metaphysics, whatever receives impressions from without, whether those impressions be produced by mind, or by matter upon mind, or upon matter, whatever

thus is capable of receiving impressions, as being moveable and impulsive, must have ascertained and proportionate magnitude. But that which is impassive and immutable is not only without form or figure, but also without perceptible magnitude. Hence, as they hold a supreme Creator and Mover of the world, and of all that is connected therewith, who is incapable of receiving impressions, inasmuch as the qualities of perception, volition, and action or motion, are inherent in him: they also, contrary to our usual modes of thinking, ascribe to the Supreme Being a principle of imperceptible magnitude.* The Naiyáyikas seem to be especially fond of investigating and defining not only abstruse matters, but of attempting to explain the obscure by something still more obscure; however, it is manifest that their system is founded upon purely devout principles, and the inexpressible difficulty which any one who tries must find, in giving a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of such terms as *substance*, *matter*, *form*, &c., must make calm inquirers pause before they hastily censure opinions, which, although contrary to our received opinions, are maintained by many learned and acute Orientals, and concern subjects of extreme

* See Note 27.

difficulty, and of an abstruse character, such as the Nyáya system treats of. As an instance of this inclination to subtle reasoning with which Nyáya writers are affected, I may bring forward the Nyáya classification[1] of non-existence, and well may the brains be termed "nimble," which devised the following definition, viz.:—

"Antecedent non-existence[2] is without beginning, and has an end. Such is the non-existence of an effect, previously to its production. Destruction[3] has a beginning, and no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect subsequent to its production. Absolute non-existence[4] is the counterpart of what is distinguished by union during the three times—past, present, and future: mutual non-existence[5], or difference, is the counterpart of what is distinguished by the relation of identity."*

This is indeed explaining obscure things by terms still more obscure. The two first cases of non-existence are not to be denied, but still it is not a precise mode of reasoning to argue as to what a thing is from stating what it is not. The two first

* Tarka Sangraha: Definition of Non-existence.

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] Padártha. [2] Prágabháva. [3] Pradhwansa. [4] Atyantábháva. [5] Anyonyábháva.

cases of non-existence are intelligible,—thus, it is clear that a thing does not begin to exist until after it has been made, and when it has been destroyed, it ceases to be.

In many instances, however, the Nyáya logic has a close affinity with the system contained in European treatises on the same subject. For instance, the Nyáya definition of a fallacy is as follows:—"The fallacy of inconclusiveness is threefold —*first*, where there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside[1]; *second*, where the inconclusiveness is apparent from the form of the expression[2]; and *third*, where invariableness of concomitancy is not established[3]." Now, compare this definition with the following one:—"Fallacies have been usually divided into two classes—those in the form, and those in the matter; a fallacy in form is one in which the conclusion does not really follow from the premises, and a fallacy in matter is one where the conclusion does follow from the premises, though there be something faulty in the procedure. These must evidently include every possible fallacy, since, whatever

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SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Asrayá-siddha. [2] Swa-rúpá-siddha. [3] Vyápy-atwá-siddha.

objection can be brought against any argument, or apparent argument, must be an objection either against the conclusion, or against the premises, or against the connexion between the premises and the conclusion, that is, against the conclusiveness of the apparent argument."* The objection in the Nyáya definition, "that there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside," is an objection against the *matter*. The objection "that the inconclusiveness is apparent from the form of the expression" is an objection against the *form* (or the premises). And the objection "that invariableness of concomitancy is not established," is an objection against the connexion between the premises and the conclusion. Again, as a second instance, the fallacy of "irrelevant conclusion," or "petitio principii," that is, assuming as a premise the very proposition which in other words is proved as the conclusion, corresponds with the Nyáya *asádhárana*, असाधारण : "asserting what belongs to none besides the individual."

I have thus endeavoured to point out and to illustrate in this and the two former chapters the principal dogmas of the three great Hindu systems

* See Archbishop Whateley's "Lessons on Reasoning," page 127.

of philosophy,—the Sánkhya, Vedánta, and Nyáya schools. I have not contemplated in these chapters to furnish a *systematic* review of them, for such a design would require materials which would occupy, I may confidently say, many bulky volumes.

I offer these chapters, however, as a synopsis of the chief principles of those three systems, conveyed as nearly as possible in the terms of native authors, for reference and illustration; and I request my readers to turn to them wherever, in the controversial chapters which are to follow, they meet with allusions and statements or quotations which require to be verified, and do not find the authority quoted at the foot of the page which contains the statement or allusion, which I have made it my study to transcribe in every important case, knowing that such authority is the surest guarantee for statements which cannot be considered as *ex parte*, when they are supported by such evidence.

I have still to tax the patience of my readers, who may think that enough has been said about Sánkhya, Vedánta, and Nyáya doctrines. I must a little longer tax their patience, and occupy their time with a few pages which contain a selection from these preceding chapters of the points men-

tioned in them, which seem to be most at variance with our opinions, but which are the belief of Hindu inquiring minds, and are the objectionable points in which their acute natural theology blunders from the truth.

This statement shall form the subject of Chapter V., after which the refutation follows in due course.

CHAPTER V.

CONTAINING A STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS.

SECTION I.

Objections to the Sánkhya System of Philosophy.

1st. BECAUSE it carries the conclusions obtained by inference[1] beyond their legitimate bounds.*

2nd. Because it holds that effects[2] must have a cause[3] which is determinable.†

(We may admit "that effect subsists antecedently to the operation of cause, for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence," i. e. that every effect which can be produced from

* "Sensible objects become known by perception, but it is by inference that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 6.

† "Intellect and the rest of the derivative[4] principles are *effects*. Whence nature (*prakriti*) is concluded as their cause—in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar."—*Ibid.*, No. 8. See Note 28.

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Sámányato drishtát. [2] Sat-káryyam. [3] Kárana. [4] Hetumat.

a given cause exists antecedently to production in that cause: for instance, in a web of thread, everything already exists that can be manufactured from thread,—but there must be also taken into consideration the *will* of the *manufacturer* who does not weave everything, but some things, or one fabric out of it.)

3rd. It maintains the eternity of individual souls.*

4th. And the eternity of nature† in its crude form.

5th. Also, that soul has no power of action.‡

6th. And that mind, consciousness, and intellect are three distinct internal instruments.§

7th. Because it teaches the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, in the envelope of the subtile

* "A discrete principle is causable, impervading, mutable, supporting, mergent, governed. The indiscrete one is the reverse."—See Note 29. (The indiscrete one (see Note 30) includes not *prakriti* and *purusha*).—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 10.

† "There is nothing prior to nature, whence follows its non-production; and, therefore, it is without cause. An indiscrete is eternal, as it is not produced. The primary elements are not produced from anywhere. Soul is without cause, being no production."—*Gaurapáda.*

‡ "Soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, passive."—*S. Káriká*, No. 19. See Note 31.

§ "Of the three internal instruments, the functions are their respective characteristics,—these are peculiar to each."—*Ibid.*

body, through a series of gross bodies until the period of liberation.*

8th. Because it cannot be proved that subtile body exists at all, or that, as they hold, any body or material substance uncombined originally is capable, from its subtile nature, of passing into other material substances, such as rocks, &c., without disorganizing such material substances, or producing chemical changes in them; and, without positive proof, such a doctrine ought not to be believed.*

9th. Or that the transmigration of the soul, in its envelope of subtile body into a higher or lower order respectively of gross body after death, is really a *state of reward*[1] or *punishment*[1] for its moral conduct in former being, or that the *reward of good deeds*[2], or the *punishment of crimes*[2] committed in the flesh can consist in receiving a higher or lower order of fleshly tabernacle when resuming the career of life :† for if you take away memory, or the con-

* "Subtile body is lasting; it migrates according to the imperative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances; or, in consequence of virtue, it proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celestial abodes, until knowledge is attained; when that is attained, the sage, abandoning all body, acquires liberation."—*Gaurapáda.*

† "Subtile body, primeval, unconfined[3], material[4], composed of in-

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] Naimittika. [2] Nimitta. [3] Asakta. [4] Niyata.

sciousness of a former better state, it is not easy to prove wherein the punishment* of existing in a lower sphere consists.

10th. To consider (as the Sánkhyas do) the operations of nature to be entirely spontaneous,† is virtually to deny the superintendence of Providence.‡ The spontaneous action of nature is illustrated by the Sánkhya in two ways: by the comparison of the secretion of milk,—"As it is a function of milk (an unintelligent substance) to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief principle to liberate the soul."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 58. And by the comparison of a dancer,—"As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does nature desist,§ having manifested herself to soul."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 59.

11th. It is an error to hold that nature is the cause of everything including time, and that there

tellect with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying, invested with dispositions, mergent."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 40.

* "By virtue, is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region below."—*Ibid.*, No. 44.

† "This evolution of nature from intellect to the special elements is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively, done for another's sake as for self."—*Ibid.*, No. 66.

‡ See Note 32.

§ "Nature is like an utensil: having fulfilled soul's object, it ceases." —*Gaurapáda.*

is no cause of nature, that is, that nature is self-existent and eternal—in other words, possesses those attributes which we attribute to Deity only—according to the following remarkable passage from the Bháshya Commentary. This statement declares—"Iswara to be the cause of the world: others say that spontaneity is cause." Here, therefore, the Sánkhya teachers have said,—"How can beings endowed with qualities proceed from Iswara who is devoid of qualities; or, how from soul, equally devoid of qualities? Therefore, the causality of nature is rendered probable. According to some, time is cause. Time is the five elements: time destroys the world; time watches when all things sleep; time is not to be surpassed. There are but three categories: the discrete principle; the indiscrete principle; and soul: and by one of them, time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle, for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of time; spontaneity merges into nature; and time, therefore, is not cause; neither is spontaneity. Nature alone is cause: and there is no cause of nature." But Váchespati observes:—"Nature cannot act without rationality; therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its

character; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the Director of Nature, which is Iswara, or God."

12th. They imply by their doctrine that our actions do not proceed from free will,* but that all things are governed by necessity.

SECTION II.

Objections to the Vedânta System of Philosophy.

1st. They hold that the soul of man is identical with God, and therefore eternal, &c.†

* "Thus all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascertainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others, are denied as acts of soul; consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I, as an individual agent, exist."—*Sánkhya Tatwa Kaumudí.*

"'Neither I am,' denies the agency of soul; 'nor is aught mine,' denies its attachment to any objects; 'nor do I exist,' denies its appropriation of faculties."—*S. Pravachana Bháshya.*

"The conclusion is incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 64.

† "The eternal, pure, intelligent, free, self-existent, and self-evident thought alone is the soul. Such is the direct conviction of those who understand the scope of the Veda."—*Vedánta Sára*, No. 91.

"This is the fact to be known for certain, that the soul and God are one, for this is the drift of all Vedânta treatises."—*Ibid.*, No. 15.

"The real is God, consisting of existence, knowledge, happiness, without a second. The unreal is the whole aggregate of the senseless, beginning with ignorance."—*Ibid.*, No. 20.

2nd. They believe that the material world is unreal, and has no existence except in the mind and imagination.* The Vedántic belief is that all things which exist are but the *vivarttas*, or revolutions, and manifestations of the one only universal spirit. They, accordingly, hold that *effect* is not a separately existing thing, but the revolution of an existing thing; and they maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are only its present operations. The popular form of Vedántism asserts that nothing exists but *cause*, and that *effects* are *máyá*, *illusion*. From this supposed identity of cause and effect the Vedántins conclude and infer the pantheistic doctrine, that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both *cause* and *effect*, which they illustrate by texts from the Vedas. "The existent verily was unevolved." "This, the existent, was before all things." "The Unborn was verily before all."

3rd. The Vedántic hypothesis is improbable as to the emergence of the subtile body when we *dream*. "The distributive totality of *taijasa*, *the resplendent*, from its being subtile in comparison with the gross body, is called the subtile body: it

* "The error of clothing the real with the unreal."—*Vedánta Sára*, No. 79. See Note 33.

is the triad of sheaths formed of intelligence, mind, and vitality, and as it is made up of the continuance of our waking thoughts, it is *dream*, and for that reason it is called 'the scene of the dissolution of the totality of the gross.'"*—*Vedánta Sárá*, No. 65.

SECTION III.

Objections to the Nyâyâ System of Philosophy.

I shall not specify the various objections which may be taken against this system, being directed against and concerning the antiquated method in which Hindu logic is taught, and which perhaps Europeans are not at liberty to decry, because it may be suited to Indian intellect and habits of training better than any which might be substituted in its place. I shall, accordingly, only instance two philosophical errors.

1. The Naiyâyikas believe in the existence of eternal atoms. Hence, they are also called Vaiséshikas, i. e. atomic, or particle-philosophers. They hold that the forms and figures of the matter of which the world is composed are perishable, but that the atoms of which that matter is com-

* See Note 34.

posed are eternal.* Thus, for instance, the following statement is made in the "Tarka Sangraha," a compendium of the logical philosophy, compiled by one Anna Bhatta, in order to indoctrinate students with the opinions of Kanada, the chief author of the Nyáya system. "Mind is the instrument which effects the apprehension of pleasure, pain, &c., it is innumerable, through there being one assigned to each soul, it is in the form of an *atom* and is *eternal.* Earth is distinguished by the quality of smell; it is of two kinds, eternal and transient: it is eternal in the form of atoms; transient in the form of aggregates or products. Water is distinguished by being cool to the feel, and this is of two kinds, eternal and transient: *eternal* in *the shape of atoms;* transient in the shape of products. Light is distinguished by being hot to the feel; it is of two kinds, *eternal* in *the form of atoms;* transient in the form of products. Air is colourless and sensible to the feel; it is of two sorts, *eternal* and transient: *eternal in the form of atoms;* transient in the form of aggregates. Ether is the substratum of the quality of sound; it is one, all-pervading and eternal." — *Tarka Sangraha:* Category of Substances.

* See Note 35.

2. The Naiyáyikas believe in the *eternity* of the souls of men (that they have existed from eternity). "The seat of knowledge is the soul: it is twofold, the living soul and the supreme soul. The supreme soul or spirit, the Lord the omniscient, is one only, subject to neither pleasure nor pain. Living soul is distributed, one to each human body; it is *infinite* and *eternal*.

CHAPTER VI.

SECTION I.

Confutation of the Vedántic Doctrine, that the Soul of Man is identical with God.

The argument of this section is to prove that God is distinct, really and not apparently, from all other spirits, and from matter, which doctrine is contrary to the Vedántic theory that "the soul of man is identical with God." According to their dogma —"the eternal, pure, intelligent, free, self-existent, and self-evident thought alone is the soul. Such is the direct conviction of those who understand the scope of the Veda." "This is the fact, to be known for certain, that the soul and God are one, for this is the drift of all Vedánta treatises."—*Vedánta Sára*, Nos. 91 and 15. God is a distinct spirit, because a plurality of self-existent beings would be contrary to the clearest ideas we have of the order of things. All the real perfections, which

men have ever had any notion of, we ascribe to the supreme self-existing being. Being sure that He is infinite and eternal, we constantly ascribe these perfections to him: being confident also that the excellency of His nature must be entitled to all possible perfections, we cannot conceive two such independent self-existent principles. And to understand how God is really distinct from all other spirits, and not only from all other spirits, but also from matter, we must premise in what the difference between God and spirits, and also in what the difference between spirits and matter, consists; in both cases the difference being with regard to their qualities. Now the chief properties, as we conceive, of spirit are perception, understanding, and the power of beginning motion; and the chief or apparent properties or qualities of matter we know to be solidity, extension, and a capacity for receiving motion or impulse. Matter, therefore, is a distinct thing from spirit, as each has its peculiar qualities, and *a fortiori*, that which, having solidity, extension, and mobility, is by virtue of such qualities capable of being compounded and divided, must be quite another thing from that chief spirit, the distinguishing idea concerning whom is, that He is simple and indivisible. Again, if God may be identified with the souls of men, it must follow

that all the wicked and foolish thoughts of men must be the thoughts of God. But since we are sensible of the difference between good and evil, wisdom and folly, and all things thereunto appertaining, we cannot believe that qualities so contrary and incompatible can be assigned to the same principle. For this would be to suppose the purest and most simple essence to be composed of the most conflicting and inconsistent characteristics. Since, therefore, the thoughts of every human soul are not also the thoughts of God, this is an argument that God and the soul are not one. Nor can motion, as the Sánkhyas affirm, be essential to matter, since, if matter had been self-active, it never could have formed the present arrangements which it exhibits of compound masses of different shapes and sizes, and of various degrees of density. For, if motion is essential to matter, it must belong to the atoms or primitive particles of which matter is compounded, and to each of those particles in an equal degree (at least we have no reason to assume the contrary). The consequence of this must be, that motion would be equally spread through the whole mass of matter, and then, since every atom equally partakes of the dividing or moving principle which we suppose to be inherent in them

all,* no satisfactory reason could be assigned why some parts of matter are more divided than others. Again, if matter were self-active, which is a characteristic of Deity, there would not be any variety of motion; the well-known law of mechanical impulse, that action and reaction are equal, holding good through space, wherever space is occupied by atoms, inasmuch as every particle would have motion in an equal degree with all other particles, all atoms being (according to the notion we conceive of an *atom*), all atoms being of equal magnitude, or rather, I should say, being of equal minuteness. Although it has been said, that, since we must admit that every part of matter is in motion, therefore we may conclude that motion is inherent in it, for the same reason, on account of which we define extension as belonging to matter, namely, that every portion of matter is extended; still, there is this difference between extension and motion as connected with matter,—viz., extension is *inseparably* included in our idea of matter; motion is not inseparable from the same idea: because, granting it to be true, that all matter is continually in motion, we might, without doing violence to our reasoning faculties, equally well conceive of matter as at rest.

* See Note 36.

Therefore, the idea of motion is not inseparable from the idea of matter, nor, if it be assumed that the property of divisibility which belongs to matter implies motion in matter as inherent, should we forget that there is a distinction between motion and a capacity for receiving it; and that nothing more is necessarily consequent upon divisibility than the latter, for we can conceive a thing to be divisible, although it never happened to have had its parts moved by actual division: thus, motion is not *necessarily* included in our idea of the divisibility of matter; and, accordingly, we conclude that motion is from *without*—that matter has received its motions from the impulsive will of God. This, then, furnishes another proof that God is distinct from matter, because we conceive of Him as the author of motion. Motion, as we have remarked, is not essential to matter, nor can it be proved that an infinite series of impulses has been communicated by one portion of matter to another from eternity,* which would be to suppose that the first impulse had not been given by some active principle, independent of matter. Our notion of eternity is that it is devoid of succession; therefore, if matter was eternal, it never could have been, and there would be no pos-

* See Note 37.

sibility of its ever being differently arranged or modified, for the notion of the eternity of matter is incompatible with the notion of its having an inherent power of motion. Or, if it be asserted that the Naiyáyikas (which is true) do not maintain that *compound* matter, but only that the *atoms* of which the compound consists, that those atoms, but not the compound, are *eternal*, and that the presumption is that they are indivisible and indestructible,—I ask, is not the acknowledged fact of their having been moved and displaced, dissolved and combined, is not this inconsistent with the properly conceived idea of eternity? for mobility implies succession, and eternity does not permit of succession, which is an implied change. No! if the atoms of which the world is composed were eternal, there would be no vacuum to keep them asunder; there would be no power or possibility of their changing their places or mutual relation of distance to each other; they would continue for ever suspended in illimitable space, without a power of attraction, or repulsion, or cohesion, or they would form one vast impenetrable, inert mass, without a power of combination or elasticity. Therefore, God, in the proper notion of God, as the *Eternal* Being, is distinct from matter. Likewise is He distinct from the souls or spirits of men,

with which the Vedántins affirm that He is identical. For, if it be true that "God and the soul are one;" it follows that as God is one, all souls must be one; all particular souls would be but the *one soul* residing in different individuals—and then, all the present workings of that one soul would be in common; but this would be contrary to experience, which assures us that that which thinks in each individual thinks only for itself, and knows nothing of what passes within in the case of others. As, therefore, reasoning concludes against the past infinite duration of any successive motion or movable beings, but does not touch the eternal existence of God, in whose nature there is no past nor future, who is omnipresent with respect to *duration* as well as space: thus, reasoning also concludes that the spirits of men, and all other spirits, are of God's creation, but do not, as a sum total, constitute God Himself.

SECTION II.

The Controversy as to the Manifestation of God's Power in Creation.

The argument of this section is to prove that there is one eternal, infinite Spirit, God, who has also, in the literal sense of the word, *created* all other spirits, which are finite, and also the substance or

matter, of which the world is composed—contrary to the doctrines of the Vedánta and Sánkhya systems.*

The doctrine of the Vedanta philosophy on this subject is expressed in short maxims, viz., for instance:—"The real is God, consisting of existence, knowledge, and happiness, without a second. The unreal is the whole aggregate of the senseless, beginning with ignorance;" and "the error of clothing the real with the unreal." The Vedántins hold that all that exists is but the *vivarttas*, or revolutions, and manifestations of the one only universal spirit. They, accordingly, consider that effect is only the revolution of an already existing thing; that is, they believe in an identity of *cause* and *effect*; that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and effect, and that what we commonly call the effects of His power, the world and all material things, are only manifestations of the great First Cause.† But also, with regard to the creation of spirits, and of the soul of man, it is very true that even in the earliest periods of thought and research into the nature and constitution and future of the soul, there existed a great diversity of opinion and conjectures—opinions and conjectures inconsistent with the belief

* See chaps. ii., iii., and v., Sections 1 and 2. † See Note 38.

in its being a distinct creation, and designed to exist for ever in its integrity.* Because, as might be expected in those early, but clever, essays of the intellect there was a certain degree of obscurity and vagueness in their ideas concerning God and spirits, soul and matter, and a looseness and want of precision in their mode of philosophizing on those subjects, which led to confusion of things which are essentially distinct. Indeed, the palpable uncertainty of the metaphysics of his age led one of the most profound thinkers of antiquity to discard such speculations from the rule of *faith*, and to uphold the superiority of moral practice above philosophy. With regard to which latter science, he taught that there could be no sufficient or satisfactory result to be obtained from it, unless it rested upon the basis of belief in a Divine *Creator* and Governor of all things, who exercised a superintending providence over His works, and also in a future and eternal state of retribution awaiting the souls of men.† Also, it is agreed, that before men began to philosophize, the *universal tradition* of mankind was, that the *world* was *made* by *God*.

Such is the testimony of one of the most eminent and inquiring authors of antiquity, who

* See Note 39. † See Note 40.

states that a universal belief existed that the world was *made*, although a difference of opinion existed as to the modes and methods of its production.* And although, when they began to philosophize, men became greatly divided in their opinions, still, with but few exceptions, they all saw and admitted the necessity of ascribing the *creation* of matter to an Infinite Mind, and of admitting Him to be the first active Cause of all things. The general belief was in one supreme God, under whom were inferior degrees of spirits proceeding, but distinct from, Himself, and that this supreme God communicated the knowledge of Himself to them, which, in turn, they revealed to the inhabitants of the earth.†

Such is the argument derived from *tradition*, that God has, in the literal and proper sense of the word, *created all* other spirits. Another argument as to their distinctness from each other, and from God, is derived from considering the law of *subordination* which universally prevails in every system compared with other systems, as well as in the parts of every system compared with each other. For we may fairly presume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the same law which is so manifest in the visible world, likewise extends itself

* See Note 41. † See Note 42.

to things invisible. Now, since there is a gradual progression from things inanimate to things which have vegetable life, and from thence to animals, through the various stages of mollusks, invertebrate, and vertebrate, terminating in man, as the most perfect animal; and since there is in man an evident relation of his bodily parts and organs to the use of the faculty which reasons and reflects, and makes the body its instrument—itself being invisible; and since all different ranks of beings point to something above them, to which they themselves are in subordination: it is only reasonable to suppose that man, who is compounded of soul and body, is, in respect to the former, related to that which is above him, as in respect to the latter he is related to that which is below him; consequently, whatever Being is the source and fountain of all that power, wisdom, and goodness which we see in the material world, to the same Being we ascribe all that is excellent and superior in the *soul*, as His *creature*. And thus, whatever *perfections* and *endowments* the souls of men, and other spirits have, are derived from a Being *much more perfect*, because He *communicates* those *endowments*. Hence, also, we may conclude that God as the head—upon whom the entire chain of subordination, spiritual and material, depends as the *Creator*—is the only Eternal Being,

because He has no superior or antecedent. To suppose, that all things have been from eternity without a *supreme* intelligent Power which has disposed, and arranged, and distributed them, is unphilosophical. Need I add, that that supreme intelligent Power is not, as the Sánkhyas affirm, *nature* "the chief principle," *prakríti pradhána*;* but the one, self-existent, unchangeable, independent God from whom all things receive existence and motion? Nature has no powers, no existence, but what it receives from Him, whatever is moved or acted upon is moved or acted upon by Him who comprehends all things, but is not Himself comprehended.

"If any one finds it too great a strain upon his thoughts to admit the notion of a substance strictly immaterial—that is, from which extension and solidity are excluded—he can find no difficulty in allowing that a particle as small as a particle of light, minuter than all conceivable dimensions, may just as easily be the depository, the organ, and the vehicle of consciousness, as the congeries of animal substance which forms a human body, or the human brain. That being so, it may transfer a proper identity to whatever shall hereafter be united to it; may be safe amidst the destruction of its integu-

* See Note 43.

ments; may connect the natural with the spiritual, the corruptible with the glorified body. If it be said that the mode and means of all this are imperceptible by our senses, it is only what is true of the most important agencies and operations. The great powers of nature are all invisible,—gravitation, electricity, magnetism,—though constantly present, and constantly exerting their influence; though within us, near us, and about us; though diffused throughout all space, overspreading the surface, or penetrating the contexture of all bodies with which we are acquainted,—depend upon substances and actions which are totally concealed from our senses. The Supreme Intelligence is so Himself."*

Thus the essential differences between spirit and matter, and God the Creator and Sovereign Disposer of both, may not be palpably apparent to the discrimination of our senses; but is it necessary that our own faith should be determined by such a criterion? While, on the other hand, we should be on our guard against the other extreme, which appears to me to be an error of the Hindu philosophers, viz., *too great* a *partiality* for *hypothesis*.

* See Note 44.

SECTION III.

The Sánkhya and Nyáya Doctrine, as to the Pre-existence of the Soul, refuted.

On this subject the Sánkhya doctrine is as follows: —" A discrete principle is causable, impervading, mutable, supporting, mergent, governed. The indiscrete one (including nature (*prakriti*) and soul (*purusha*)) is the reverse." — *Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 10.

" Soul is without cause, being no production." —*Gaurapáda.*

And the Naiyáyika definition is this :—

" The seat of knowledge is the soul. It is two-fold, the living soul and the supreme soul. The supreme soul, or spirit, the lord, the omniscient, is one only, subject to neither pleasure nor pain. Living soul is distributed one to each human body; it is infinite and eternal."—*Tarka Sangraha.*

The soul must have a cause of existence either in the necessity of its own nature (in which case it must have existed from eternity), or by the will of some Being who has created it. Since the soul is situated in man, either there must have been an infinite succession of men with souls, without the existence of any Cause which originated them (which notion, being that of *succession*, is incon-

sistent with the idea of *eternity*); or else men must have received their souls from some agent or power which had none itself; or thirdly, the soul of man was created by some Intelligent and Superior Being. But, that soul cannot be originated by that which has no soul, is easily proved, for one thing cannot give to another thing any perfection which it has not in itself: soul is a perfection, and, therefore, that which has not soul cannot transmit it. "It is self-evident that the faculties and operations of thinking, perceiving, and willing must proceed from something or other as their efficient cause; so that if these operations are neither inherent in matter, nor acquirable by any motion of the parts of matter, it necessarily follows that they must proceed from some incorporeal reasoning agent within us, such as mind."

We cannot certainly understand the method of the soul's operations as connected with mind; yet we are as convinced of the reality of them as we can be of any possible or conceivable fact. And by these operations we have proof of the existence within us of this intelligent, immaterial soul, which, if it be supposed to have existed from eternity, and to be coeval with God, must be incapable of receiving new impressions, or of being moved by them. Or, if we are to suppose that the human

soul, itself existing from eternity, revolves through a succession of new births,—phases of corporeal existence,—in that case we must suppose it to be a *portion* of the *Divine Spirit*, in which case *all* human souls, being *equally* parts of the same Divine Unity, should be found to correspond *exactly* in sentiments, capacities, tastes, and emotions, and also to be on an equality with God in *His* peculiar attributes of power, wisdom, and omnipresence, as well as eternity—both which suppositions are palpably at variance with experience, and with the facts of the case. Indeed, I conceive that the *fact* of the soul passing through *successive states*, as well as the *supposition* of its passing through *successive bodily existences*, is fatal to the notion of its *eternity*. We admit, no doubt, that the soul is eternal as to the futurity which awaits it. With respect to the future, *eternity* awaits the soul; but it is its duration at *the* other end which is cut off and terminated, which we call "having a beginning." The soul of man is immortal, although there was a time when it had no existence. On this supposition all the phenomena of the soul with which we are acquainted appear easy and natural, and such as we might expect would occur to a spiritual being which has had a beginning. Its consciousness, for instance, of present personal

identity; its limited memory; its gradual acquisition of knowledge; its aspirations after higher things; the differences observable in the qualities and characters of different souls; all the results of a constitution subject to successive impulses, to the impressions of external occurrences, to the slow developments of times and seasons: none of which things could have any power or influence to produce emotion (which is a change of feeling), to alter, to add to, to diminish or disturb the equilibrium of the soul of man, if it had existed from eternity. Let us look into this matter minutely. What is our knowledge concerning our souls? Whence does it arise? On what does its certainty depend? On *Consciousness*. Our knowledge of the existence of our souls depends upon the inferences which we may draw from a careful consideration of ourselves. This consideration satisfies us of our individuality, and of our identity, and of our existence. The same consciousness which bears testimony to these facts also assures us that the functions of the mind are real, and that we can determine ourselves to think on subjects at will, to move and to rest, to act, or to abstain from acting, according to the direction of the will. And in some particular cases, we have equal power to move or not to move, to think or not to think, according as we please;

while in other cases we are constrained to determine and to act in one particular way. In the former case, we are said to have liberty of action; in the latter, we are said to act from necessity. And, according to these conditions, our actions are said to be voluntary or involuntary. And there are also things which we have a propensity for, or an aversion to; objects which we desire or dislike; designs and resolutions which we conceive or discard, without any prompting from without, without any previous or preparatory impulse by which such emotions might be accounted for. Hence we may conclude that there exists something antecedent to our conceptions, and which from within influences the mind pretty much in the same manner as it is influenced from without by *matter;* something which serves as the substratum of the thinking and conceiving mind. And this substratum of the mind is the soul.* As the impressions received by the mind from without are a proof to consciousness of the reality of things which are without: even so, the impressions received by the mind from within are a proof to consciousness of the reality of that which is within, namely, the *soul.* As to the future existence of the soul for ever, we cannot prove this positively

* See Note 45.

by *reason*. But reason does not contradict such a belief; on the contrary, analogies are in favour of it. But as to the *pre-existence* of the soul, especially its *eternal* pre-existence, this is a doctrine to which I cannot subscribe, because reason objects to a doctrine which teaches the past infinite duration of successive motion and mutable beings; and we all experience transitions and changes in our minds, produced not only by the emotions which are occasioned by external objects, but also by the internal cause, *the soul*. As, therefore, this internal agent produces *changes* in the mind by the emotions which it causes, we infer that itself also is subject to change, otherwise the emotions which it produces in the mind would be uniform. Therefore, we conclude against the eternal pre-existence of the soul, as we cannot comprehend how anything that changes can be eternal. Reason, however, does not contradict the notion of the eternal existence of God,* in whose nature there is no past or future, who is omnipresent not only as to space, but as to duration; and with respect to such eternity, *motion* as well as *succession* is impossible. His existence is a *self-existence*, or a *necessary* existence; therefore, it is *eternal*: all the characteristics of an eternal being concur in Him, but those characteristics do not concur with respect to the

* See Note 46.

human soul, which has not necessary existence, and which we believe to be reserved to a very high destiny, but not to have had an eternal pre-existence, nor indeed to be in any respect equal to God. As to the condition in which the soul finds itself placed, after the severance of its connexion with the corruptible human body by the stroke of death, we have every reason to conjecture and to consider that the place where the souls of men dwell after death is different and distinct from this world, their place of abode during their connexion with the living human body.* We do not believe that they descend to the darkness and oblivion of the grave along with the defunct earthly remains, nor that, enveloped in a more delicate corporeal integument, which death has no power over, they reappear, and, assuming new perishable bodies, again run the race of life. We believe indeed in the resurrection† of the one body which the soul of each man once tenanted, and its reunion for ever with the said soul at the day of judgment. This, however, as it is one of the *revealed* doctrines of the Christian religion, I am not at liberty to discuss, without departing from the design of this treatise: it is enough to say that it entirely differs‡ from the doctrine of the *transmigration.*

* See Note 47. † See Note 48. ‡ See Note 49.

SECTION IV.

The Hypothesis of Prakriti, and of Eternal[1] Atoms, disputed.

The point to be proved in this section is, that matter is not eternal, either in the shape of atoms, or in the shape of Prakriti. The Sánkhyas believe in Prakriti, according to their definition of it, mentioned in the fifth chapter, viz., "There is nothing prior to *nature*, whence follows its non-production, and, therefore, it is without cause. An undiscrete is eternal; as it is not produced, the primary elements are not produced from anywhere." "A discrete principle is causable, unpervading, mutable, supporting, mergent, governed. The undiscrete one (which is *múla* prakriti) is the reverse." The Naiyáyikas believe that *all matter* is composed of *eternal*, indivisible, impenetrable *atoms*, according to their classification, which I have quoted in the fourth chapter, viz.:—

"Earth is distinguished by the quality of smell: it is of two kinds, eternal and transient.

"It is eternal in the form of atoms, transient in the form of aggregates or products.

"Water is distinguished by being cool to the

SANSCRIT TERMS.—[1] नित्यं (nitya).

feel, and this is of two kinds, eternal and transient: eternal in the shape of atoms, transient in the shape of products.

"Light is distinguished by being hot to the feel; it is of two kinds: eternal in the form of atoms, transient in the form of products.

"Air is colourless, and sensible to the feel; it is of two sorts: eternal and transient—eternal in the form of atoms, transient in the form of aggregates.

"Ether is the substratum of the quality of sound; it is one, all-pervading and *eternal.*"

I have in a former section explained and treated of the Vedánta theory of the world; and of all matter being unreal, and that the only real existence is *soul*, the substratum of all things.* Two opinions have yet to be considered, viz., that of the Sánkhyas, who hold that the crude materials (*prakriti*), the *material* substratum of the world (*prakriti pradhána*),—that this has existed from eternity, and likewise that these materials have been developed by a certain innate power, inherent in this material substratum, which is nature, or *prakriti;* in manifestations which have succeeded each other from eternity in regular courses and intervals—*árambhas*, आरम्भ: "As a dancer, having exhibited

* See Note 50.

herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul."*

The second opinion, which has yet to be considered, is that of the Naiyayikas, that all material substances are composed of atoms, which atoms are eternal, but not so the forms which they have assumed. Both the Sánkhya and Nyáya systems teach that the materials of the world are eternal. But the former system also teaches that those materials have been formed and fashioned from eternity. Now, to repeat an observation which I have already made, it is difficult, or rather, impossible, to conceive an eternal succession of *motion* of *any kind*, or of *productions* and *generations*. Succession implies motion, and motion is inconsistent with the idea of eternity. (There is no reason, however, to retort by saying this argument, if true, would disprove also the *eternity*, and, therefore, the *existence* of *God*. For we do not pretend to comprehend or to explain that mysterious union of infinite perfections of which Deity is the sum. We *believe* that *all* perfections, including *eternity* and *motion*, as well as *immutability*, are inherent in Him. But also, He is above all; and we do not pretend to be capable of analyzing

* Sánkhya Káriká, No. 59.

the antagonism or union of perfect qualities in Him. But, with regard to other and inferior things, in which it is not argued that there is an union of all perfections, but the existence of one or so of such qualities is attributed, such as the eternity of matter, or the eternity of the human soul, or the eternity of spirit, or perpetual motion or succession—I deny the soundness of such a belief, unless it can be shown that succession is consistent with the notion of eternity. Now everything connected with the structure and past history of our planet at least speaks of succession and change. Even if the antiquity of the earth were so vast as to be *almost* illimitable—commensurate in age with the grand conceptions of the Hindu chronology*—this would not be *eternal*. The atmosphere, with its powerful and continual agencies of storm, and vapour, and rain; the ocean, with its waves and tides, according to the most careful geological researches, have never varied. But the land has frequently changed in its position and superficial appearance, in obedience to the action and influence of those slowly operative causes which are even now in our own time at work upon it, and which are gradually changing it again. There was a period in the annals of the earth when none of the present animals or plants existed; yet

* See Note 51.

we *know* that the waters teemed with life then, as now, because, imbedded in the early formations, the microscopic remains of numbers of once living creatures are discovered. At a later period a few of the races of animals now existing made their appearance, together with many kinds now extinct; and in the succeeding, up to the latest *strata*, the proportion of living to now extinct classes becomes greater, until the marks and remains of the present inhabitants of the earth everywhere present themselves. Succession, progress, formation, and extinction are indicated by the various geological landmarks which the eye of science has learned to discern, while to those who explore most deeply the marvels which the earth conceals in her bosom, the contending agencies of water and fire declare their continual operations down below, in the core of the earth, and from thence, by innumerable channels and ramifications, affecting the whole *convex ball*. And, like the path of the moon's light upon the waters when clouds fitfully traverse its face, so as to render its light *dim* from time to time, but not to obscure it altogether, even during the time of their passing, just so an unbroken *climax* of animal and vegetable life can be traced, gradually and furtively appearing, gradually and furtively disappearing, and so on. Reverting to the earliest geological ages, the

evidence is distinct that some of the species of each system have existed along with some of those of the succeeding system.

These facts also prove (and it is for this reason I mention them) that there is no evidence, as far as the internal "*testimony of the rocks*" is concerned, in favour of the hypothesis of the Hindu *kalpas*, which is, that there are periodical deaths of existing races, and renewals of existence in successive forms. As far as the researches of geology have penetrated most deeply into the structure and framework of the earth, there are no internal proofs in favour of this theory.* It seems, accordingly, most reasonable to conclude, insisting upon the argument that the traces of succession which may be observed in the world are inconsistent with the notion of its eternity, that internal evidence contradicts the belief that the world which we inhabit, or the universe of which it is a part, is *eternal*. It is in accordance with reason to conceive that there is but *one* independent, self-existing Being. The very idea of absolute perfection implies that *everything* must *depend* upon the absolutely perfect Being, and, consequently, that matter, as to its existence, cannot be self-dependent, but must de-

* See Note 52.

pend upon that one independent self-existing Being, who is God. And eternity (as to having no beginning) is a term to be considered, not merely as *connected with God*, but as being *connected with God alone.* To ascribe eternity to matter is to hold that the phenomena of nature may be otherwise accounted for, than by attributing them to the agency and will of God; and if the substratum of matter (*prakriti*) has such a self-active power as to unfold itself into colours and forms and figures, the unnumbered and diversified appearances of the natural world, on such a supposition the necessity of God's interference is precluded. But it is incredible that unintelligent nature can be so regular as it is, so uniform and precise in its operations and results, without its depending upon some superior Intelligent Being; or if we will attribute this power to *unintelligent* nature, is it not more philosophical and more reasonable to ascribe it to Intelligent God? The favourite argument of those who maintain that the world has existed from eternity is, that "nothing can be produced from nothing."* True—this is true with regard to those productions which are made according to the ordinary course of nature, none of which are produced without there being

* See Note 53.

some pre-existent matter which is operated upon. But there is no reason wherefore we should carry this maxim so far as to deny the power of creating out of nothing, however difficult or impossible it may be to conceive it, to an infinitely perfect and almighty Power. It is much more reasonable to believe that eternal existence belongs to such a perfect Being as we conceive God to be, than to those subtile rudiments of matter which the Sánkhyas suppose to be the substratum of the world; nor is the final cause which nature is described as having in view, viz., the information of soul, with a view to its liberation, sufficient to account for the necessity of Prakriti exhibiting such wonderful and varied tableaux, unless there be some Power superior both to Prakriti and soul, who has ordained not only the *confinement*, but also the method of the liberation of the latter. Therefore, the existence of Prakriti as an active *incogitative* principle may be admitted, if, as is represented by some Sánkhya authors, it is made to depend upon God—its existence may be admitted, but its existence from eternity cannot be proved. Besides, it is not easy to conceive *spontaneous* motion in matter by itself. As an illustration of this, we may move the members of our bodies *when* and *how* we please. And though the impressions of

the *senses* may occasion those motions, we know that there is something besides, some higher principle, which we call volition or will, which directs, controls, and regulates the movements of the body. Also, if it be considered a thing inconsistent with the notion of the Divine immutability to have created the world in *time*, may it not be conceived, that the creation of the world was in the *purposes* of the Divine mind from *eternity*, but that the accomplishment of that purpose took place *in time?* Enough has been said to show that it cannot be proved that the world is eternal, meaning by the *world*, *prakriti*, according to the Sánkhya notion, the invisible substratum of all things material; and meaning by *eternal*, that which has had no beginning. We have still the Nyáya doctrine to consider, with which we may shut up the question of the eternity of the world.

Now, as to this Nyáya doctrine of the eternity of the atoms of which the world is composed, I think that it may fairly be required that some positive proof of the truth of this doctrine be advanced before its truth is affirmed. But this has not been done. All is pure hypothesis, or, at best, such an argument as I have already referred to, viz., that "nothing can proceed from nothing." But if we examine this argument closely, we shall find that it only amounts

to this, that *nothing can produce itself.* This we do not assert: we hold that an eternal God is the Creator of everything; we hold that the matter of which the world is made, that all substance, that all spirit, and all substance, even to the most minute particle, is the creature and the manufacture of a Being necessarily existent, and perfect in power and in will. The proof of the eternity of atoms is incumbent upon those who hold the doctrine, and if it be asked, what kind of proof is required, I say, "Let it appear that *necessary* existence is included in the idea of matter." No one, however, who considers the question can perceive any such necessity: no absurdity strikes the mind when we conceive the *absence* of matter, any more than when we think of it as present. The truth of this doctrine, I suggest, cannot be proved unless it can be shown that it is absurd to believe that *atoms* are *not necessarily* existing, for whatever has not a *necessity* of existence in its *nature* cannot be proved to have actually existed from eternity. The *necessity* of *God's* existence can be proved, because it is incredible, as I have already remarked, that unintelligent nature can be so regular as it is, so uniform and precise in its operations and results, without its depending upon some superior intelligent Being. But for argument's sake, allowing

atoms to be eternal,* as the Naiyáyikas suppose, they could not have formed the world without the intervention of the Creator, unless their motion had been eternal also. And, allowing eternal motion to be inherent in them, could they have *fortuitously** formed the world ?

"As the co-eternity of matter opposes God's independence, the proper notion of the Deity, so does it also contradict His all-sufficiency. For if, without the production of something besides Himself, he cannot make a demonstration of His attributes, or cause any sensibility of His power and will, for the illustration of His own glory ; and if, without something wholly distinct from Himself, He cannot produce anything, then must He want something external, and whosoever wanteth anything is not all sufficient. And certainly, he must have a low opinion and a poor conception of the Infinite and Eternal God who thinks that He is no otherwise known to be omnipotent than by the benefit of another. . . . The supposition, then, of an eternal *matter* is so unnecessary where God works, and so derogatory to the infinity of His power and all-sufficiency of Himself, that the later philosophers, something acquainted with the truth which we profess, though rejecting Christianity,

* See Notes 54 and 55.

have reproved those of the school of Plato, who delivered as the doctrine of their master an eternal companion, so injurious to the Father and Maker of all things. Wherefore, to give an answer to that general position, 'that out of nothing, nothing can be produced,' which Aristotle pretends to be the opinion of all natural philosophers, I must observe that this proposition was first framed out of a consideration of the works of art and nature, for if we look upon all kinds of artificers, we find they cannot give any specimens of their art without materials. Hence they collected that the world must have been produced out of some subject—and consequently that there must be a matter eternally pre-existing. Now what can be more irrational than from the weakness of some creatures to infer the same inability (imbecility) in the Creator? and to measure the arm of God by the finger of man? Although the most absolute idea in the artificer's understanding be not sufficient to produce his design, without hands to work and materials to make use of, it will follow no more that God is necessarily tied unto pre-existing matter,* than that He is really compounded of corporeal parts."

* See Note 56.

SECTION V.

Of the Metempsychosis.*

The doctrine of the metempsychosis which makes the transmigration of the soul into a higher scale of bodily existence, or a lower one, according to the virtuous or vicious moral habits which the soul has contracted during former existence, a reward of virtue, or a penalty of vice, by way of necessary consequence,—fails in one important particular of answering this end, and of showing that it is consistent with the wisdom of God to appoint such an uncertain mode of measuring out reward and punishment, inasmuch as such reward is, on the supposition of the doctrine being true, or such punishment is, on the same supposition, a secret thing, and unknown to the soul which is elevated to honour of which it is unconscious, or degraded to infamy, the disgrace of which is unfelt, because the soul, in either case, is oblivious of its condition in former existence.† The doctrine of the metem-

* "Sansarati lingasaríra," संसरति लिंगशरीरं, "Rudimental body migrates."

† The Hindus, however, hold that in some cases, which are exceptions, a recollection of former existence is retained. Thus Jaigíshavya, says,—" By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations;"

psychosis is as follows, as it is expressed by Sánkhya teachers :—

"Subtile body is lasting; it migrates according to the imperative influence of acts through the forms of deer, beasts, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances; or, in consequence of virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celestial abodes, until knowledge is attained; when that is attained, the sage, abandoning all body, acquires liberation."* "By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region below."†

It is a questionable point whether, according to the views entertained by those teachers concerning the independence and individuality of the soul, men can be fairly considered to be fit subjects for future reward or punishment. For they deny that the soul has any independent power of action. Their aphorism is that "soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, passive."‡ And they teach also that men's actions are not to be attributed to free agents. "Thus all acts whatever, whether

and the Vedas are said to have been remembered by "the great saint Kapila" from a former state of existence; but, as a general rule, the recollection of former life is supposed to be lost at the moment of new birth.

* Gaurapáda. † Sánkhya Káriká, No. 44.

‡ Sánkhya Káriká, No. 19.

external or internal, ascertainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others, are denied as acts of soul; consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I as an individual agent exist."*

"The conclusion is incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."† Whoever believes this, cannot believe in God's moral government of the world, either that He interferes at present by His supreme power, overruling even the wickedness of men to illustrate in the event the triumph of those good principles which nature has inscribed upon our hearts, although they have now become sadly obscured, or that He will interfere hereafter as Judge to punish the wicked or to reward the good, according to their deservings. For the notion of not being *independent* agents, excludes the notion of being *responsible* agents, and, consequently, of *Divine Justice* taking *cognizance* of our actions. Now, if I can suggest an observation, which shows that God interferes in the natural government of the world, is it not a presumption that He also interferes in the moral government of the world? (assuming that such a presumptive proof is, *pro*

* Sánkhya Tattwa Kaumudí. † Sánkhya Káriká, No. 64.

tanto, a proof against the soundness of the Sánkhya doctrines which I have mentioned).* And there is this presumptive proof that God interferes in the natural world, that there arises, as every one who is acquainted with physics knows, a constant diminution of *motive power* from natural causes, and, consequently, a loss of *motion* in the world, which would sooner or later bring the whole system to a stand-still, were there not an active independent power, with ability and will to interfere effectually, who does interfere, and renovates the languishing *vis momenti* with fresh supplies of motive power, of which He is the source.† Matter never could have continued from the beginning to the present time to have discharged its functions of motion according to the laws originally impressed upon it, since by friction and adhesion there is a continual loss of *vis viva*, were it not that God is always ready to exert upon matter new force and activity in proportion as motion diminishes, and fresh impulse is required. This shows the necessity of acknowledging a Governor of the world, who by His providential care interposes to preserve it. And if the inanimate part of nature could not be kept and preserved in motion, by the power of attraction alone,

* See Note 57. † See Note 58.

without the continual agency of God exerting His power according to the original laws of motion ordained by Himself, much less could the organization of plants and animals be preserved as formed at first, according to fixed laws of motion, attraction, and cohesion, without the interference of the same Almighty Being. Hence we conclude that God continually acts as Governor and Preserver of the natural world; and the presumptive inference from this conclusion is, that He also interferes in matters of a moral nature (in which I need not say how much the happiness of His creatures is involved), not so, indeed, as to overrule men's present acts, or their *immediate* results (for He reserves *them* for *final* retribution, and leaves men free to choose and to act), but so as to produce the greatest amount of general good and of benefit in various ways to the *entire* community, from the misconduct and from the evil, the consequences of which are *present*, but *partial*.

Now, among other arguments against the doctrine of the metempsychosis, the following one is worthy of a place :—The Hindu philosophers hold, as in the references which I have already given, that the soul in its investiture of subtile body after death migrates into other material receptacles of a more elevated or a lower caste and character, ac-

cording to the kind of moral habits which it has contracted during life, and that this is virtually a condition of reward or punishment. But I would suggest that a condition of reward or of punishment, to be such really, should be conjoined with consciousness thereof on the part of the individual who is rewarded or punished. For unless memory informs a man that he is reaping the fruits of his own actions, it may be questioned whether a more degraded, or even a more painful, condition is, properly speaking, a state of punishment; or a more exalted condition than the former one, a state of reward. For such is the force of habit, and such the pliable character of human nature, that we soon become accustomed to and reconciled with *any* condition in which we may be placed.* But let the recollection of a former and a better state be wanting, and who *feels* that his present condition is one of reward or of punishment? No! Providence has appointed it to be an inseparable condition of human nature that we should *remember* the deeds of which we ought to repent. And as to the Hindu theory that the shock which the infant undergoes at the moment of birth obliterates all recollection of former existence, is there anything in the analogy of thought and memory, as far as

* See Note 59.

we can observe, which favours such a supposition? Do we not observe that the consciousness of being the *same thinking being* not only continues connected with all the particular sensations of the body, but also accompanies all the changes of organization which happen to the body, and constitute the stages of life?* Though our bodies are formed of dissolving elements, so that they are repeatedly recomposed during life, the same sentient and thinking being, as at the first, continues to the last; the same unchanged, unimpaired consciousness is preserved.† Therefore, we cannot prove a cessation of thought after death, nor conclude with any certainty that a change of organization would destroy the consciousness of the past. Since we see that the same consciousness keeps pace with all the changes that can happen to a man in this life, much less can we conclude that a new birth awaits us, in which we shall suffer or be exalted, yet forget what caused our suffering or honour.

The Hindu doctrine of the metempsychosis (I must at the same time add) is not that after death fresh corporeal *human* forms are *immediately* taken possession of by human souls. Their theory is, that inasmuch as there can be no enjoyment or suf-

* See Note 60. † See Note 61.

fering, unless in connexion with *corporeal* form or *material* form of some kind or another, that, therefore, suitable places and suitable forms are prepared for the souls of men in their subtile bodies after death; therein they enjoy or suffer, according to their virtuous or vicious conduct during their preceding existence.* But these states are only of temporary duration, the temporary inhabitants of heaven and of hell must again and again be born in human forms to resume their progress in quest of final liberation of spirit, at the point at which the termination of their latest human existence had left it unfinished,†

* "By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region below; by knowledge, is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage." —*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 44.

"Having made virtue the efficient cause, it leads upwards; by upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of Brahmá, Prajápati, Soma, Indra, the Gándharbas, the Yákshas, the Rákshasas, and the Pisáchas, the subtile body goes thither; or, if vice be the efficient cause, it migrates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or a mineral."—*Gaurapáda.*

† "But not in hell alone do the souls of the deceased undergo pain; there is no cessation even in heaven, for its *temporary* inhabitant is ever *tormented* with the prospect of descending again to earth—again is he liable to conception and to birth — he is merged again into the embryo, and repairs to it when about to be born. Then he dies, as soon as born, or in infancy, or in youth, or in manhood, or in old age. Death, sooner or later, is inevitable. As long as he lives, he is immersed in manifold afflictions, like the seed of the cotton amidst

until knowledge has been attained, nothing can liberate the soul: subtile body may be dissolved into its constituent elements,* but still a new body and new migrations await the soul until knowledge has been attained.

Thus in its progress to perfection, the human soul, if virtuous, resembles a traveller, who during his long and painful journey is permitted to pause at intervals, to rest and refresh himself, but must

the down that is to be spun into thread. Where could man, scorched by the fires of the sun of this world, look for felicity, were it not for the shade afforded by the tree of *emancipation.* Attainment of the Divine Being is considered by the wise as the remedy of the threefold class of ills that beset the different stages of life, conception, birth, and decay, as characterized by that only *happiness* which *effaces* all other kinds of felicity, however abundant, and as being absolute and final." . . . "Travelling the path of the world for *many thousands of births*, man attains only the weariness of bewilderment, and is smothered by the dust of imagination; when that dust is washed away by the bland water of real knowledge, then the weariness of bewilderment sustained by the wayfarer through *repeated* births is removed: when that weariness is relieved, the internal man is at peace, and he obtains that supreme felicity which is unequalled and undisturbed."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book VI., Chapters V. and VII.

* "If any one has dispassion without knowledge of principles, then from such dispassion, unpreceded by knowledge, occurs *absorption into nature*,[1] or when the individual dies he is resolved into the eight pri-

Sanscrit Terms.—[1] प्रकृति लयं prakriti laya.

return to the road and recommence his journey at the same point where he had left it off; or, if vicious, the human soul resembles the refractory prisoner, whose servitude, in a condition of bondage, is only interrupted by those intervals in which he is undergoing fitting chastisement for his misconduct, but is compelled to return to his chains as soon as the chastisement has been applied. Now, in the case of the vicious who undergo the punishment of migrating into animals (assuming for argument's sake the doctrine to be true), we cannot of course tell whether they are conscious of their former condition as men, or whether all that had occurred in a previous state is forgotten by them. But it might not be an easy matter to show that it would be an adequate punishment to a bad man to be metamorphosed into an animal, so that the fear of

mary elements, or nature, intellect, egotism, and the five rudiments; but there is no liberation, and, therefore, he migrates anew."—*Gaurapáda.*

"By dispassion occurs absorption into nature, or as the Kaumudí and Chandriká express it, resolution into the chief one and the rest. Gaurapáda makes the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear: according to him, it signifies the resolution of even the subtile body into its constituent elements, but this is not in this case equivalent to liberation, it is only the term of one series of migrations, soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and commencing a new career of migratory existence until knowledge is attained."—*Professor Wilson's Commentary.*

undergoing it would be likely to deter from meriting such a punishment. As far as physical enjoyment or physical suffering is concerned, man perhaps has not much to boast of with regard to a superiority over other animals; or (it might be asked), have *all* the animals in the world *human* souls, which at one time inhabited *human bodies?* If *so*, we might expect to find the numerical proportion of men to other animals greater than it is; if *not*, we might expect to be able to distinguish from indications of the presence of the soul within, what animals of any species contain them, from those which have them not. But no person could undertake to make this *diagnosis*. Nor would it be a sufficient encouragement to persevere in goodness, if the good was to look forward only to a *temporary* reward, for all his enjoyment would be soured by the anticipation of its coming to a conclusion; and would not many a person born in a state of suffering, caused by his having a feeble, or imperfect, or fragile bodily organization, which he bears from the cradle to the grave—would not many a one, in such a pitiable condition, prefer, supposing that the option were allowed him, the condition of a *tree* or a *stone* to that of a *sensitive* human form? *Why* God wills that there should be such differences in *this* respect as in *other* respects between individuals,

we cannot take upon us to say, except that on the principle of compensation *here* and *hereafter*, much of this suffering may be shown to be alleviated—alleviated in different ways. This observation brings me to our next section, with which this, I trust, not altogether uninteresting chapter is concluded.

SECTION VI.

Compensation—How provided for the Three Sorts of Pain.

It is a part of the Divine scheme relating to the world, to make compensation hereafter for the present moral and physical imperfection of mankind—"God is a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him."

All must assent to the maxims of Hindu philosophy concerning the evils and pain to which mankind are subject. According to Hindu philosophy, the three sorts of pain to which men are exposed are—1st, natural, आध्यात्मिकं, *ádhyátmika ;* 2nd, extrinsic, आधिभौतिकं, *ádhibhautika ;* and 3rd, supernatural, *ádhidaivika*, आधिदैविकं. The final object of philosophy, therefore, is to ascertain the means by which escape from life as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bond-

age and evil, may be attained. But we as Christians differ from them in other most important particulars, for they (the Hindus) believe in the doctrine of the metempsychosis (the cycle of repeated births), and consider that thus the souls of men expiate their sins, or enjoy their reward. We hold that no life here is, or can be shown to be, a state of *retribution*, but that human life is a state of preparation for another different state to come, which, when it has come, shall continue for ever. We believe that thus the moral character and moral government of the world by God are most conspicuously illustrated.* They hold that the dispositions of the mind to good or evil (*bhávas*, भावः) are to be attributed to the nature of the qualities (गुणाः *gunas*) of which substance in its simplest form is composed, and to the preponderance of one or other of these qualities in the composition of each mind respectively. Those qualities are either *goodness* (*satva*, सत्वं), *foulness* (*rajas*, रजस्), or *darkness* (*tamas*, तमस्); and whichever of these predominates in the composition of each mind, it is disposed accordingly. Thus, it is said, in the "Bhagavad Gítá," Lecture iii., v. 27:—"Actions are effected by the qualities of nature according to

* See Note 62.

their shares. The soul deluded by the conceit of individuality imagines, 'I am the agent.'" But this is a very *antinomian* doctrine, which, if it could be proved to be true, might be pleaded by bad men as an excuse for their vices, for they might say that they are not morally responsible for their actions, having yielded to influences which were not under their control, because fate has decreed that the element of their mind should be *rajas* (*foulness*), or *tamas* (*darkness*), not *satva* (*goodness*); that there is no responsibility, because the moral character of each man is not acquired by his free agency and choice of action, but is to be ascribed to *homogeneousness* (*samanwaya*), with that element of which he is chiefly constituted. We believe, on the contrary, that moral obligations are binding upon all men, who, being free-agents, and endowed with reason, are, therefore, responsible beings. While, with the Hindu theorists, we deplore the present imperfections from which we suffer, and the pain to which we are subject, feeling that our natural powers are weak—that our understandings are capable of knowing but a few truths—that our judgments are fallible, and our uniformity of purpose is irregular—and that this pain and disorder is increased, in consequence of the compound nature of things in the world, and because, from the union of soul and body,

discord arises—(for our reason and our passions engage in continual strife)--still it is not in our power to define the precise limits of this imperfection, *because it extends to our knowledge.** Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as perfection anywhere, but in relation to God. Whenever, therefore, we speak of imperfection, we conclude it to be an evil which is the consequence of being finite and dependent.

In the several parts of man's nature, mind as well as body, this evil of imperfection is manifest; but it is one which is shared by the highest created beings. Now, herein is cause not to lament under the constraint of an imperious necessity, but to admire the wisdom of that Divine Providence who has thus constituted a chain of subordination† in which men figure as having proper duties to perform, and as being capable of rewards and punishments hereafter. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that God will deal with His creatures according to their capacities, and that His arrangements are so conducted that virtue and happiness shall eternally coincide, and *vice versâ*. It is only the present state of things with which we are acquainted; we are in great measure ignorant both of what is past and of the future, but we know enough

* See Note 63. † See Note 64.

to be convinced that natural evil is greatly increased by the misapplication and abuse of those powers and faculties, in the exercise and employment of which man is comparatively a free agent, because he not only is informed by conscience of what is right, but has a power of acting accordingly; because he is not only endowed with passions, but has a power of regulating and governing them according to reason and reflection, and a regard to the future, as well as to the past and present: he can compare his actions with an antecedent law, for transgressing which he is accountable to the Supreme Being; and the obligation of which is according to the eternal fitness of things, which consists in maintaining the natural order which God has established. But there is in mankind great carelessness and want of observation, so that they prefer and willingly give their belief to any scheme or system which relieves them from the labour of reflection, from the labour of observation, from the labour of self-restraint, and substitutes the pretence of fatality, or of human weakness, for the doctrine of the strong will, determined to conquer pain and difficulty,—the will which God approves, and will assist. "Being assured, as we are by experience, that, weak and infirm as we are, God has sufficiently provided for our wants in this life, and

that, considered as part of the natural world, we have a very full proportion of good things allotted to us; what conclusion does it lead us to, if we consider ourselves as part of the moral and rational world. Is it reasonable to imagine that God has taken so much care of us in His natural government of the world, and that He will neglect us in the moral part of it; that he regards us as *animals*, but regards us not as rational and moral agents? Can any man think seriously of God as a reasonable, just, and upright Being, and suppose this to be the case? There is a similitude and proportion in all the works of God; it is reasonable, therefore, to infer from the visible regard shown to men in one respect, the regard had for them in all, and that God will provide for the well-being and reward of moral creatures, as well as He has provided for the well-being of natural creatures."*

* Bishop Sherlock's Works, vol. i., pp. 216-17.

PART II.

ON THE VEDA AND PURANAS.

CHAPTER I.

On the Origin and Inspiration of the Veda and the Puránas.

The origin and inspiration of the Veda* and Puránas are the subjects in the consideration of which we are next to engage. It is a subject of great importance in Hindu controversy, because, whatever arguments or observations tend to discredit the inspiration of the Hindu sacred books have force in diminishing the weight of their philosophical tenets also, which appeal to the texts of the Veda as incontrovertible and infallible. The weight due to the philosophical systems depends either upon the authority conceded to the teachers and sages to whom those systems are attributed, or upon their intrinsic merits as works of reasoning, or upon arguments established by reference to pas-

* The original Veda was the *Yajur*.

sages and to texts taken from the Veda,* which I need not say is regarded by all Hindus as having plenary inspiration, and, as such, claiming to be received with the most unquestioning faith and profound reverence, which, indeed, is virtually paid to the Veda by every Hindu. Whatever may be the difference of castes, customs, or sentiments in other matters, or upon other subjects—all agree in this high esteem of the Veda, and hold it in the chief repute above all other volumes, as being a written revelation which has emanated directly from the Deity.

Accordingly, the first thing to be done is to consider what reasons may be assigned for regarding the said Hindu sacred books with *less* reverence, as not establishing a claim to be received as inspired, as being apocryphal in their statements, and incredible in regard to the account given of their origin.

If this can be proved, the whole argument from internal and external testimony falls to the ground. And if the evidence in favour of the Veda can be sifted and disparaged, what shall be said of the popular theology of the Puránas? of the poetical and dramatic representations in the Mahábhárata? and

* See Note 65.

of the allegorical transcendentalism of the Bhagavad Gítá ?

Having, therefore, undertaken to call in question the basis upon which the reputation of the Veda rests, and to subject the claims of its sacred volumes to a severe scrutiny, namely, the tests of inspiration which we consider necessary to apply, before yielding implicit credence to the doctrines or precepts, or general statements of any book, which, having come down to our times from a remote antiquity, or from a former age, professes to contain the counsels of the Most High regarding the children of men, and to be an inspired communication from Him, I shall now proceed to consider the grounds upon which Hindu faith in the Veda, as an inspired book, rests, beginning with a summary or succinct account of its origin and the successive modifications which that sacred volume has received, with quotations from the volume itself, and the Puránas which contain the popular traditionary lore of the Hindus on theological subjects. There is also a multitude of authorities extant, in the shape of commentaries and criticisms, for herein, as in everything else, Hindu literature is very voluminous and prolific, but as, in my judgment, as far as my opportunities for examining them have extended, they coin-

cide in all matters of importance, both in their principal statements and in the fountains from which those statements are derived,—I shall not trouble my readers with quotations of this kind, except in cases where they are necessary, either for illustration or explanation of the meaning attached to those passages of the Veda which they refer to. An authentic account of the origin and date of the composition of the Vedas, or four divisions of the Veda (वदेः knowledge), the great authority referred to by the Hindus in all questions—sacred, literary, poetical, historical, political, and philosophical—is necessary first to be given. The Hindus hold that from eternity the work of creation and dissolution has been continually going on, or, I should rather say, continually repeated, according to a regular system, viz., that Brahma, in the first place, creates all things in their order, and that this creation, having been perfected, continues for a certain period, 4294,080,000 years, called a kalpa, or day of Brahma, and that this period is divided into four parts or ages, a thousand times repeated, in the ratio to each other of 4, 3, 2, 1, and called the Krita, Tretá, Dwápara, and Kali ages. At the conclusion of the Kalpa a dissolution of the universe occurs, which lasts for an equal period of time, at the conclusion of which Brahma begins

the work of creation again, and creates precisely the same things in the same order, and for the same duration of time; and whatever events have taken place in the present kalpa, and in the present ("kali") age of it, have taken place in the innumerable kalpas which have preceded it; and the present kalpa is called the Váráha (वाराहं कल्प: *Váráha Kalpa*), because Brahma* at the commencement of it assumed the form of a *boar* for the purpose of raising the earth from beneath the waters of the great deep.

The present is called the Váráha Kalpa, because in the commencement of it Brahma assumed the

* "Brahma is said to be born,—a familiar phrase to signify his manifestation, and as the peculiar measure of his presence. A hundred of his years is said to constitute his life; that period is called Param, and the half of it Parárddham. . . . Time is a form of Vishnu; hear how it is applied to measure the duration of Brahma and of all other sentient beings, as well as of those which are unconscious, as the mountains, oceans, and the like. . . . Twelve thousand divine years constitute the period of the four Yugas, युग: or ages. They are thus distributed:—The Krita age has four thousand divine years; the Tretá, three thousand; the Dwápara two thousand; and the Kali, one thousand. The period that precedes a Yuga is called a Sandhyá, and it is of as many hundred years as there are thousands in the Yuga; and the period that follows a Yuga, called a Sandhyánsa, is of similar duration. The Krita, Tretá, Dwápara, and Kali, constitute a great age, or aggregate of four ages; a thousand such aggregates are a day of Brahma; and fourteen Menus reign within that term.

form of a boar, to raise the earth from beneath the waters, "concluding that within the waters lay the earth; and, being desirous to raise it up, he created another form for that purpose; and as in preceding Kalpas he had assumed the shape of a fish, or a tortoise, so in this he took the figure of a boar." At the beginning of this Kalpa, Bráhma* created first immovable things, then animals, then gods (ऊर्द्ध स्रोतस्, *urddha srotas*, "*nourished above*"), and then men (अर्वाक् स्रोतस्, *arvvák srotas*, "*downward nourished*").

Fourteen Manwantaras constitute a Brahma day. At the end of this day a dissolution of the universe occurs, when all the three worlds, earth, and the regions of space, are consumed by fire. . . . When the three worlds are but one mighty ocean, Brahma sleeps upon his serpent bed for a night of equal duration with his day, at the close of which he creates anew. Of such days and nights is a year of Brahma composed, and a hundred such years constitute his whole life. One Parárddha, or half his existence, has expired, terminating with the Mahá Kalpa, called Pádma. . . . The Kalpas are infinite in number; thousands of millions of Kalpas have passed, and as many are to come."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book I., Chapter iii.

* "Whilst Bráhma in the beginning of the Kalpa was meditating on creation, there appeared a creation beginning with ignorance, and consisting of darkness. From that great Being appeared fivefold ignorance, consisting of obscurity, तमस्, *tamas*; illusion, मोहः *moha*; extreme illusion, महामोहः *mahámoha*; gloom, तमिस्रं, *tamisra*; and utter darkness, अन्धतमिस्रं, *and-*

The narrative then proceeds to state how Brahma produced or created the *Veda.* "From his eastern mouth Brahma then created the Gayatrí metre, the Rig Veda, the collection of hymns termed

hatamisra. This creation was the fivefold world, without intellect or reflection, void of perception or sensation, incapable of feeling, and destitute of motion. Since immovable things were first created, this is called the first creation. Brahma, beholding that it was defective, designed another; and whilst he thus meditated, the animal creation was manifested. Beholding this creation also imperfect, Bráhma again meditated, and a third creation appeared, abounding with the quality of goodness, termed "urddha-srotas." This, termed the creation of immortals, was the third performance of Brahma, who, although well pleased with it, still found it incompetent to fulfil his end. Continuing, therefore, his meditations, there sprang, in consequence of his infallible purpose, the creation termed *arvvák srotas.*

"The first creation was that of *mahat*, or intellect, महत्; the second was that of the rudimental principles, तन्मात्र: *tanmátra*, thence termed the elemental creation. The third was the modified form of egotism, termed the organic creation, or creation of the senses, *aindriya*; the fourth, or the fundamental creation, was that of inanimate bodies. The fifth was that of animals, तिर्यक्स्रोतस्, *tiryak srotas.* The sixth was the creation of the divinities, ऊर्द्धस्रोतस्, *urddhasrotas.* The seventh was the creation of the *arvváksrotas*, अर्व्वाक्स्रोतस्, or of men. There is an eighth creation called *Anugraha*, अनुग्रह: and there is also a ninth, called the Kumára, कुमार: (from *kumára*, a *boy*)."

Trivrit, the Rathantara portion of the Sáma Veda, and the Agnish'toma sacrifice. From his southern mouth he created the Yajur Veda, the Trish'tubh metre, the collection of hymns called Panchadasa, the Vrihat Sáma, and the portion of the Sáma Veda termed Uktha. From his western mouth he created the Sáma Veda, the Jayati metre, the collection of hymns termed Saptadasa, the portion of the Sáma called Vairúpa, and the Atirátra sacrifice; and from his northern mouth he created the Ekavinsa collection of hymns, the Atharva Veda, the Aptoryámá rite, the Anushtubh metre, and the Vairája portion of the Sáma Veda.

"From his eastern and other mouths Brahma *created* the Rig, Yajur, Sáma, and Atharvan *Vedas*, the Sastra, Ijyá, Stuti, Stoma, and Práyaschitta; also the Vedas of Medicine, Arms, Music, and Mechanics; and the Itihásas and Puránas (*which are a fifth Veda*). . . This did the Divine Brahma, the first Creator and Lord of all; and, *these things being created*, *discharged the same functions as they had fulfilled in a previous creation*, whether malignant or benign, gentle or cruel, good or evil, true or false, and according as they are actuated by such propensities will be their conduct. And the Creator displayed infinite variety in the objects of sense, in the properties

of living things, and in the forms of bodies; he determined in the beginning by the authority of the Vedas, the names, and forms, and functions of all creatures, and of the gods, and the names and appropriate offices of the Rishis, as they also are read in the Vedas. In like manner as the *products of the seasons designate* in *periodical revolution the return of the same season*, so do the *same circumstances indicate the recurrence of the same Yuga.* And thus in the beginning of each kalpa does Brahma repeatedly create the world, possessing the power that is derived from the will to create, and assisted by the natural and *anugraha* faculty of the object to be created."—*See Vishnu Purana*, Book I., and *Purana Bhágavata.*

Therefore, according to this account, the Veda dates from *eternity* being reproduced by Bráhma at the commencement of every Kalpa.

But the person to whom is ascribed by the Hindus the arrangement of the Veda is Krishna Dwaipáyana.* The age in which he lived, and

* "In every Dwâpara, or third age, Vishnu, in the person of Vyâsa, in order to promote the good of mankind, divides the Veda, which is properly but one, into many portions; observing the limited perseverance, energy, and application of mortals, he makes the Veda four-fold, to adapt it to their capacities. And the bodily form which Vishnu assumes, in order to effect that classification, is known by the

any other circumstances of his history which might elucidate the real era of the composition of the Veda, are impossible to be ascertained with any degree of accuracy, owing to the cloud of fiction and embellishment with which every circumstance connected with the Veda is obscured by Hindu writers.

But the devout Hindus believe that each of the Veda Vyásas, who are enumerated above, was

name of Veda Vyása (i. e. 'the distributor or arranger of the Veda'). Of the different Vyásas in the present Manwantara, and the branches which they have taught, you shall have an account. 'Twenty and eight times have the Vedas been arranged by the great Rishis in the Vaivaswata Manwantara, in the Dwápara age, and consequently eight and twenty Vyásas have passed away, by whom, in their respective periods, the Veda has been divided into *four*. In the first Dwápara age the distribution was made by Swayambhu (Brahma) himself; in the second, the Veda Vyása, was Prajápati; in the third, Usánas; in the fourth, Vribaspati; in the fifth, Savitri; in the sixth, Yama; in the seventh, Indra; in the eighth, Vasishtha; in the ninth, Saráswata; in the tenth, Tridháman; in the eleventh, Trivrishan; in the twelfth, Bharadwája; in the thirteenth, Antaríksha; in the fourteenth, Vapra; in the fifteenth, Trayyáruna; in the sixteenth, Dhananjáya; in the seventeenth, Kritanjaya; in the eighteenth, Rina; in the nineteenth, Bharadwája; in the twentieth, Gotama; in the twenty-first, Uttama; in the twenty-second, Vena, who is likewise named Rajásravas; in the twenty-third, Somasushmápana, also Trinavindu; in the twenty-fourth, Riksha; in the twenty-fifth, Sákti; in the twenty-sixth, Parásara; in the twenty-seventh he was succeeded by Jaratkáru; the Vyása of the twenty-eighth, or the present Dwapara, was Krishna Dwaipáyana."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book iii., Chapter iii. See also the Kurma and Vayu Puránas.

Brahma himself in human form. "Vasudeva, which is Supreme Spirit, or Brahma, composed of the Rig, Sáma, and Yajur Vedas, is at the same time their essence, as he is the soul of all embodied spirits. He, distinguished as consisting of the Vedas, creates the Vedas, and divides them by many subdivisions into branches. He is the author of those branches: he is those aggregated branches; for He, the Eternal Lord, is the essence of true knowledge."

In the next place, having to state the particulars of the arrangement of the Veda, for the information of such of my readers as may not happen to have an opportunity of consulting the original authorities, I cannot do better than give this statement as translated from Vishnu Purána:—

"The original Veda, in four parts, consisted of one hundred-thousand stanzas. In the twenty-eighth Dwápara age, Vyása separated the four portions of the Veda into four Vedas. In the same manner as the Vedas were arranged by him as Veda Vyása, so were they divided in former periods by all the preceding Vyásas, and the branches into which they were subdivided by him were the same into which they had been distributed in every aggregate of the four ages. When Vyása was enjoined by Brahma to arrange the Vedas in different

books, he took four persons well read in these works as his disciples. He appointed Paila reader of the Rig, Vaisampayána of the Yajur, and Jaimini of the Sáma Veda. And Sumantu, who was conversant with the Atharva Veda, was also the disciple of the learned Vyása. He also took Súta, who was named Lomaharshana, as his pupil in historical and legendary traditions (*itihásas* and *puránas*). There was but *one Yajur Veda*, but, dividing this into four parts, Vyása instituted the sacrificial rite, that is administered by four kinds of priests, in which it was the duty of the Adhwaryu to recite the prayers (*yajush*, from यज्, *to worship*); of the Hotri to repeat the hymns; of the Udgátri, to chant other hymns, called Sáma, सामं, and of the Brahman to pronounce other formulæ, called Atharvas, अथर्व: Then the Muni having collected together the hymns called *Richas*, compiled the Rig Veda, with the prayers and directions termed Yajushas, he formed the Yajur Veda; with those called Sáma, he formed the Sáma Veda; and with the Atharvas he composed the rules of all the ceremonies suited to kings, and the function of the Brahman agreeably to practice. The vast original tree of the Vedas, having been divided by him into four principal stems, soon

branched out into an extensive forest. In the first place, Paila divided the Rig Veda, and gave the two Sanhitás (संहिता: *collections*) to Indrapramati and to Báshkali. Báshkali subdivided his *sanhitá* into four, which he gave to his disciples Baudhya and Agnimáthara, Yajnawalka and Parásara; and they taught these shoots from the primitive branch.

Indrapramati imparted his Sanhitá to his son Mandukéya, and it thence descended through successive generations, as well as disciples. Vedamitra, called also Sákalya, studied the same Sanhitá, but he divided it into five Sanhitás, which he distributed amongst as many disciples, named severally, Mudgala, Goswalu, Vátsya, Sálíya, and Sisira. Sákapúrni made a different division of the original Sanhitá into three portions, and added a glossary (*nirukta*, निरुक्तं), constituting a fourth. The three Sanhitas were given to his three pupils, Krauncha, Vaitálaki, and Valáka; and a fourth, *Niruktakrit*, had the glossary. In this way branch sprang from branch. Another Báshkali composed three other Sanhitás, which he taught to his disciples, Káláyani, Gargya, and Kathájava. These are they by whom the principal divisions of the Rig have been promulgated. Of the tree of the YajurVeda there are twenty-seven branches, which

Vaisampáyana, the pupil of Vyása, compiled and taught to as many disciples." . . . "Jaimini, the pupil of Vyása, divided the branches of the Sáma Veda. The son of Jaimini was Sumantu, and his son was Sukarman, who both studied the same Sanhitá under Jaimini. The latter composed the Sáhasra Sanhitá, or compilation of a thousand hymns, which he taught to two disciples, Hiranyanábha, also named Kausalya, and Paushyinji. Fifteen disciples of the latter were the authors of as many Sanhitás. They were called the northern chanters of the Sáman. As many more, also the disciples of Hiranyanábha were termed the eastern chanters of the Sáman, founding an equal number of schools. Lokákshi, Kuthumi, Kushídí, and Lángali were the pupils of Panshyinji, and by them, and their disciples, many other branches were formed. Whilst another scholar of Hiranyanábha, named Kriti, taught twenty-four Sanhitás to as many pupils, and by them again was the Sáma Veda divided into numerous branches. I will now give you an account of the Sanhitás of the Athárva Veda. The illustrious Muni Sumantu taught this Veda to his pupil Kabandha, who made it twofold, and communicated the two portions to Devadersa, and to Pathya. The disciples of Devadersa were Maudga, and Brahmabali, Saulkáyani, and Pippaládá. Pa-

thya had three pupils, Jájali, Kumudádi, and Saunaka, and by all these were separate branches instituted. Saunaka having divided his Sanhitá into two, gave one to Babhru, and the other to Saindhaváyana, and from them sprang two schools, the Saindhavas and Munjakesas. The principal subjects of difference in the Sanhitás of the Atharva Veda are the five *Kalpas*, or ceremonials: the Nakshatra Kalpa, or rules for worshipping the planets; the Vaitána Kalpa, or rules of oblation, according to the Vedas generally; the Sanhitá Kalpa, or rules for sacrifices according to different schools; the Angirasa Kalpa, or incantations and prayers for the destruction of foes, and the like; and the Sánti Kalpa, or prayers for averting evil.

Accomplished in the purport of the Puránas, Vyása compiled a Pauránik Sanhitá, consisting of historical and legendary traditions, prayers and hymns, and sacred chronology. He had a distinguished disciple, Suta, also termed Romaharshana, and to him the great Muni communicated the Puránas. Súta had six scholars, Sumati, Agnivarcharchas, Mitrayu, Sánsapáyana, Akritavrana, who is also called Kásyapa, and Sáverni. The three last composed three fundamental Sanhitás, and Romaharshana himself compiled a fourth, called Romaharshánika, — the substance of which four

Sanhitás is collected into the Vishnu Purána. The first of all the Puránas is entitled the Bráhma. Those who are acquainted with the Puránas enumerate eighteen, or the Bráhma, Pádma, Vaishnava, Saiva, Bhágavata, Náradíya, Márkandeya, Agneya, Bhavishyat, Brahma Vaivartta, Lainga, Váráha, Skánda, Vámana, Kaurmma, Mátsya, Gáruda, Brahmánda. The creation of the world, and its successive reproductions; the genealogies of the patriarchs and kings; the periods of the Manus; and the transactions of the royal dynasties, are narrated in all these Puránas. The four Vedas; the six Angas, namely, Sikshá, rules for reciting the prayers, the accents and tones to be observed; Kalpa, ritual; Vyá-karana, grammar; Nirukta, glossary; Chhandas, metre; Jyotish, astronomy; with Mímánsá, theology; Nyáya, logic; Dharma, the institutes of law; and the Puránas, constitute the fourteen principal branches of knowledge." . . . "I have thus described the branches of the Vedas, and their subdivisions; the persons by whom they were made, and the reason why they were made, or the limited capacities of mankind. The same branches are instituted in the different Manwantaras. The primitive Veda (the Yajur), that of the progenitor of all things, is eternal; the branches are but its modifications."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book III., chapters IV., V., and VI.

Such is the narrative, taken from authentic and popular writings, of the belief of the Hindus concerning the origin of the Veda. They claim, you see, a very high antiquity for their sacred volume, assuming that it has existed during the various Kalpas which are supposed to have already elapsed, having been reproduced at every regeneration of the world; and it has been twenty-eight times arranged by Vyásas. There is also in this account a full statement of its classification and contents, and who the *rishis* and commentators were who had a hand in this great work. We may add that, according to the Hindu universal belief in the transmigration, the same teachers of the Veda are supposed to reappear in successive ages or periods of the world, fulfilling the laws of the revolutions, and reappearances of human beings. Thus, Jaigishavya says,—"By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations." Kapila also is said to have remembered the Veda from a former state of being. And so great is the number of teachers and commentators, and of contending claims on the reverence of the multitude, that we find the distinction carefully laid down and drawn between knowledge, which is founded on divine authority, वेद वाक्यं, *veda vákya;* and knowledge which is founded on human authority, आप्त वाक्यं, *ápta*

vákya ; and knowledge of the meaning of sacred texts, श्रुती, *srutí.*

At all events, the Veda is a volume, most undoubtedly of very high antiquity; and in the *Rig* Veda, probably the most ancient portion of the original *Yajur* Veda, there is collected an assemblage of hymns which are not anywhere surpassed for elegance and simplicity. They indicate that early period when, as I have observed in a former chapter, the religion of the Hindu people was addressed to the elements, when the heavenly bodies were considered either as gods or as the shrines of gods; and the elements were regarded as weapons wielded at pleasure by powerful *Djins*, to pacify and propitiate whom by libation, and song, and choral-dance, and sacrifice, and prayer was the Brahminical office (ब्रह्मत्वं यथास्थिति, *Brahmatwa yathásthiti.*)

I subjoin some extracts from the Rig Veda, which will convey a slight idea of the character and contents of that book, which will be found such as I have described it.

EXTRACTS *from the Hymns which form the Sanhitá of the Rig Veda, illustrating the state of theology and of philosophical opinion when that Book was composed, and also the poetical conceptions and eloquent phraseology with which it abounds.*

PRAISES OF INDRA (GOD OF THE AIR OR VISIBLE HEAVENS).

"Ketum krinvan aketave peso maryáh apesase sam ushadbhih ajáyatháh."—*Hymn* vi., *verse* 3.	"Giving appearance to (the world) incapable of appearing, form to that devoid of mortal form, in the shining beams of morning you (Indra) wert born!"
"Na hi trá rodasí, ubhe righáya mánam invatah."—*Hymn* x., *verse* 8.	"Not heaven and earth are able to contain you" (Indra.)
"Indro dírgháya chakshasa á súryam rohayad divi vi gobhir adrin aviayat."—*Hymn* vii., *verse* 3.	"Indra commanded the sun to rise in heaven; he awakened the world with his rays."
"Sa ghá víro na rishyati yam Indro Brahmanaspatih Somo hinoti martyam."—*Hymn* xviii., *verse* 4.	"That man truly does not perish, whom, being mortal, Indra, Brahmanaspati, and Soma protect."
"Ivam tam Brahmanaspatih, Soma, Indrascha, martyam Dakshiná pátu anhasah."—*Hymn* xviii., *verse* 5.	"Do thou, Brahmanaspati! and thou Soma, and Indra, and, Dakshina guard that mortal from crime."
"Ivam asya páre rajaso vi omanah chakrishe bhumim	"Thou, dwelling at the boundary of this airy expanse,

prati mánam ojaso tvam bhuvahprati mánam prithivyáh."—*Hymn* lii., *verses* 12, 13.

"Divás chit asya varimá vi paprathe."—*Hymn* lv., *verse* 1.

"Na hi nu yad ad hi imasi Indram."—*Hymn* lxxx., *v.* 15.

hast made the earth the image of (thy) strength. Thou art the image of the Earth."

"His (Indra's) magnitude is greater than heaven."

"We do not observe Indra passing by us."

THE FUTURE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL, AND ITS DELIVERANCE FROM THE BONDAGE OF MATTER.

"Ka no mahyá aditaye punar dát pitaram cha driseyam mataram cha (Agnis), sa no mahyá aditaye punar dát pitaram cha driseyam mátaram cha."—*Hymn* xxiv., *verses* 1, 2.

"Who shall restore us to the great Earth (after death), that I may see again father and mother? Agnis (the principle of life, or *fire*) shall restore (me) to the great Earth, that I may see again father and mother."

"Ud uttamam Varuna, pásám asmad ava adhamam vi madhyamam sratháya."—*Hymn* xxiv., *verse* 15.

*"Remove, O Varuna! the topmost fetter from us; take away the one at the feet (the lowest), and take off the one at the middle!"

"Ud uttamam mumugdhi no vi pásam madhyamam chrita ava adhamáni jívase."—*Hymn* xxv., *verse* 21.

*"Remove from us the topmost fetter; take away the middle one; withdraw the lowest fetters for the sake of our living."

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* The allusion in both these passages seems to be to the three guna (satva, rajas, and tamas), the supposed basis of matter.

ALLUSIONS TO THE TRANSMIGRATION OF THE SOUL—THE पूर्वजन्मन्, PURVA-JANMAN, 'FORMER BEING.'

"Ivâm, Agne, prathamó Angirá rishih."—*Hymn* xxxi. *verse* 1.

"Thou, Agnis, at first wert the wise Angiras!"

"Ivam, Agne, prathamam áyum áyave devá akrinvan Nahushasya vispatim."—*Hymn* xxxi., *verse* 11.

"Thee, O Agnis! formerly invested with a human body, the gods appointed guide to a man, Nahusha."

HEAVEN ATTAINABLE BY GOOD WORKS, VOWS, OR LIBATIONS.

"Adhárayanta vahnayo abhajanta sukrityaya bhágam deveshu yajniyam."—*Hymn* xx., *verse* 8.

"They once lived a mortal life, but by *good works* they obtained a place to be honoured among the gods with sacrifices."

"Srinan upa sthát divam bhuranyuh."—*Hymn* lxviii., *verse* 1.

"He who offers libation attains to heaven."

"Vedá yo vínám padam antarikshena patatám vedá návah samudriyah vedá máso dhrita vrato dvádasa praja vatah vedá ya upajáyate vedá vátasya vartanim uror rishvasya brihatah vedá ye adhi ásate."—*Hymn* xxv., *verse* 7.

"He whose *vows* are faithfully performed knows the path of the birds flying through the air; he knows concerning ships at sea; he knows the months, twelve in number; he knows the course of the mighty wonderful wind; he knows the powerful gods who dwell above."

PRAISES OF AGNIS.—(अग्निस्, FIRE).

"Ive (Agne), visvá sam—gatáni vratá dhruvá yani devá akrinvata."—*Hymn* xxxvi., 5.	"On thee, Agnis, depend all the collected firm works which the gods have raised."*
"Dadhush tva Bhrigavah divyaya janmane." —*Hymn* lviii., *verse* 6.	"The descendants of Bhriga worshipped thee (Agnis) for the sake of obtaining a divine birth."†
"Yamah hajátah, yamah janitvam járah kaninám patih-janínám."—*Hymn* lxviii., *v.* 1.	"All things that exist are united with (fire), and all things that shall exist shall be thus also united."‡
"Támih sindhunám Agni." —*Hymn* lxv., *verse* 1.	"Agnis, kindred to rivers."§
"Manushasya janasya janma, janma martan cha vidván vardhan yam púrvih.—*Hymn* lxx., *verse* 1.	"Knowing the origin of human beings; knowing the offspring of gods and men protect creatures!"¶

HEAVEN, EARTH, AND HELL.

"Tisro Dyávah Savitur dvá upa, sthá eká yamasya bhuvane virásthát."—*Hymn* xxv., *verse* 6.	"There are three worlds—two of them near the Sun; the other is in the dwelling of Yama, receiving men who have died."

* Fire, an universal agent, which consolidates all things.

† They sacrificed themselves in the flames, or perhaps it means, purified themselves with fire.

‡ Alluding perhaps to the agency of fire in the production, and carrying on the present system of nature.

§ Joint agency of fire and water may be alluded to here.

¶ The doctrine of the Rig Veda seems to be that the Deity, or soul of the universe, is a fiery essence.

The extracts which I have given above from the Rig Veda are sufficient to afford a fair idea of the nature of that composition, and of the sentiments contained in it; but I cannot admit that they furnish any of the admitted marks and tokens of inspiration. We cannot test the Veda by or according to the legitimate rules which are applied to test all writings which claim the authority due to a Divine revelation; or, I should rather observe, the claims put forward asserting the divine origin of the Veda will not bear such a scrutiny: they rest on little more than bare assertion (the assertion of those who have been and are avowedly interested in upholding the reputation of the sacred writings)—popular belief, which is not an evidence of much weight, and a venerable antiquity.

The truth of this observation of mine will appear, I hope, when I have concluded my remarks as to the kind of records and evidences, internal as well external, which we have a presumptive right to expect and to find, but in which the Vedas are deficient. As to the tradition of their (the Vedas) having been handed down from eternity, and that it is for this reason that the date of their promulgation does not appear, I judge it to be unnecessary to argue against such an opinion and belief. For, no doubt, it would be impossible to produce an impression by mere force of reasoning, or by any

argument of which I am master, on any one who, after careful examination, knowing what is possible and probable, continues to believe in the wonderful narrative which I have given above of the machinery upon which the doctrine of the eternity of the Vedas depends for support.

In the first place, then, it is a test of internal truth that the book should be authentic and genuine; that it should have been really written at the period to which it is ascribed; and that there should be proof that the author was the person to whom the composition of it is assigned. This being ascertained to be true, is a presumption that the contents of the book describing the author's sayings and doings are not fictitious. The Veda professes to be a book, of which God is the author, and to contain an account of the sayings and doings of God with regard to His creatures. I certainly cannot disprove its authenticity; but this is not enough: to deserve the veneration, and to command the faith of mankind, its authenticity should be *proved* —proved so as to satisfy the inquirer without doubt or uncertainty.

The only certain proof of the truth of a divine revelation is the establishment of it at first by miracles, and the maintenance of that truth afterwards, either by the confirmation of miracles or by

the fulfilment of those prophecies successively which the revelation, if of divine origin, may be expected to contain. Such evidence proves beyond any question the divine origin of those writings which profess to be of divine origin, and which contain the prophecies, and to establish the doctrine contained in which the miracles have been performed. But the performance of the miracles either must be attested by independent testimony, or there must exist institutions ordained expressly as a memorial of the miracles having been performed as narrated, the observance of which institutions can be traced back without interruption to the time at which the miracles are related to have been performed. And with regard to the fulfilled prophecies there must be reason to believe that they really belong to the book in which they are found. Such proofs, certainly, will not guarantee the whole of the book which contains the record of miracles and prophecies, for interpolations may have been inserted, or changes made in other parts of it. But they will guarantee the inspiration of that part of the Book to which they relate, and are a presumption for the inspiration of the remainder, if there be no reasonable grounds for thinking that additions or alterations have crept in. And the ordinary guarantees for the genuineness of the text are the testimony

of those persons who have in successive ages and in different parts of the world examined and studied such sacred records, and who have borne and bear concurrent testimony to the integrity of the text, because without their knowledge alterations could not have been made; also, the concurrence of ancient copies with modern editions. Thirdly, the books in question having been employed in public use, and their contents thus generally known; and lastly, the internal evidence derived from mutual coherence and consistency of the various parts of the book with each other. These are proofs of a book, as we have it, being genuine; but this is not the matter into which we are inquiring. We may admit the genuineness of the Veda, i. e. that the present Veda is the same as the original Veda. The controversy is concerning the authenticity of the Veda; that God, the Author to whom it is attributed, is really its Author; and this, I say, cannot be proved for want of the necessary evidence of miracles and prophecy, supported as I have described; and this evidence the Veda cannot furnish, or its defenders appeal to. In fact, a book professing to be a record of divine revelation must be suspected, if it has emerged into notice only during dark and illiterate ages; or if its contents refer to a time unknown to genuine history. We may fairly demand

that it should belong to times in which learning and civilization had made at least an average progress in that part of the world in which the sacred volume has first appeared, so that we may enjoy the concurrent testimony of historians or other writers to confirm and corroborate the facts referred to in the sacred volume; and also that the allusions in such a book may refer to matters which are elsewhere related in authentic history. But this is not the case with regard to the Veda, which is said to have been handed down from an age anterior to the existence of any other book; and the historical allusions therein are concerning events and persons, concerning whom, in the absence of all collateral history, we can only conjecture, for we cannot reckon legends and traditions of the exploits of mythological personages as accredited and *bonâ fide* history; so that there is no possibility of ascertaining the real age of the Vẹda by comparing it with other known works which have come down to our times, because the other Hindu writings are, compared with it, of a much more modern date. The Veda, the age of which cannot be determined with precision, is a compilation of very high antiquity, and probably made at various times by various persons.

"The arrangement of the Vedas and other writ-

ings considered sacred by the Hindus, being in fact the authorities of their religious rites and belief, is of much importance to the history of Hindu literature, and of the Hindu religion. The sage Vyasa is represented, not as the author, but the arranger or compiler of the Vedas, the Itihásas, and Puránas. His name denotes his character, meaning 'the arranger, or distributor;' and the recurrence of many Vyásas, many individuals who new-modelled the Hindu Scriptures, has nothing in it that is improbable except the fabulous intervals by which their labours are separated. The re-arranging, the refashioning of old materials is nothing more than the progress of time would be likely to render necessary. The last recognised compilation is that of Krishna Dwaipáyana, assisted by Brahmans who were already conversant with the subjects respectively assigned to them. They were the members of a college or school, supposed by the Hindus to have flourished in a period more remote, no doubt, than the truth, but not at all unlikely to have been instituted at some time prior to the accounts of India, which we owe to Greek writers, and in which we see enough of the system to justify our inferring that it was then entire. That there have been other Vyásas and other schools since that date; that Brahmans unknown to fame have remodelled some

of the Hindu Scriptures, cannot reasonably be contested after dispassionately weighing the strong internal evidence which all of them afford of the intermixture of unauthorized and comparatively modern ingredients. But the same internal testimony furnishes proof equally decisive of the anterior existence of ancient materials; and it is, therefore, as idle as it is irrational to dispute the antiquity or authenticity of the greater portion of the contents of the Puránas) in the face of abundant, positive, and circumstantial evidence of the prevalence of the doctrines which they teach, the currency of the legends which they narrate, and the integrity of the institutions which they describe, at least three centuries before the Christian era. But the origin and development of their doctrines, their traditions, and institutions, were not the work of a day; and the testimony that establishes their existence three centuries before Christianity carries it back to a much more remote antiquity, to an antiquity which is probably not surpassed by any of the prevailing fictions, institutions, or belief of the ancient world."*

It appears thus that the Veda is destitute of the support of that collateral evidence, which is a proof of the authenticity of a book stated to have been

* Professor Wilson.

derived from a divine source, and upon which evidence *historical faith* is founded. What is *historical faith?* I mean by historical faith, when we have an opportunity of examining the nature of the evidence that is to be met with in the common fame, tradition, and in other contemporary writers, whose number, concurrence witheach other, veracity, and character for integrity, we have a clue to judge of; and being convinced, upon those accounts, that we have the same reason to believe the contents of the books in question that we have to believe in the reality of any well-authenticated fact of which we have not been ourselves eye-witnesses. Such testimony, coupled with other collateral arguments, such as the excellency of its precepts and irreproachable morality, may fairly be required in a book professing to be *revealed truth.* It may be alleged that the institution of the Brahmans and other castes existing at this day is a testimony to the truth of the Veda, because the Brahmans were to be a sacred caste, distinguished from the rest of the Hindu people, and intrusted with the care of the sacred books, and the performance of the ritual of the Hindu religion; and to this day the Brahmans exist, fulfilling those conditions. And that the four castes, namely, *Brahmans*, *Kshatriyas*, *Vaisyas*, and *Súdras*, or *priests*, *warriors*, *merchants*, and *menials*, who are

said to have sprung respectively from the mouth, breast, thighs, and feet of Brahma, may be traced back to the most remote times of Indian history, generation after generation. But a distinguished writer* has given certain rules for the purpose of distinguishing the true from the false in such cases. Those rules are as follows:—First, "that the matters of fact recorded and referred to in such books (books claiming to be revered as sacred and of high antiquity), be such as that men's outward senses, their eyes and ears, may be judges of them. Secondly, that such facts have been done publicly, in the face of the world. Thirdly, that not only public monuments be kept up in memory of them, but also some outward actions be performed with the same design. Fourth, that such monuments, and such actions or observances, be instituted, and do commence from the time that the matters of fact were done." It is true (to apply these rules in the present case) that the Hindus have their Brahmans, and they have also many festivals and anniversaries in commemoration of their deities, and also institutions in honour of their exploits. But all these want this mark of truth, viz., positive and disinterested evidence, that the Brahmanical priesthood, and other sacred institutions, commenced at, and

* See Note 66.

have continued since the very time at which things and occurrences, which they commemorate, took place. Brahma is spoken of in the Veda as the progenitor and founder of the Brahmans, and also the prayers and devotions in public use are found therein; but this is not conclusive evidence of its divine origin. And it is not enough to reply—"Prove that the Brahmans and Hindu festivals have been introduced at a later age than that to which the Vedas are referred." It is not enough to reply thus. For I conceive that the *onus probandi* rests with the other side. When I am expected to believe certain articles and doctrines of a religious nature, it is not sufficient that I cannot ascertain that their external evidences are false or doubtful. I may fairly require indisputable proof of their being true. I may require, before yielding assent to those sacred books, proof—positive and unquestionable proof — that they are as ancient as the events they record, or that those events have taken place at all; and without such collateral and contemporary testimony they cannot be considered as anything but mythological fables, composed with great art and elegance, and embellished with much that is of interest, but not furnished with the credentials of a divine faith.

Such are my reasons for considering that the

evidence of the divine origin of the Veda is inconclusive. Nor are its contents exactly in accordance with our ideas of a divine revelation, on account of the undue preponderance given to ritual and ceremonies. It is true, that if we examine the precepts of the Veda, we find much of unexceptionable moral teaching. This is the teaching of the Sastras:—"Be not proud of wealth, and attendants, and youth, since time destroys all of them in the twinkling of an eye; check thy attachment to all these illusions like Máyá; fix thy heart upon the foot of Brahma, and thou shalt soon know him." There is also a distinction made between the worship of the Deity, and worshipping him under a shape and visible form.

The lamentable and vicious idolatry of the Hindu people is not sanctioned by the Sastras. "They that adore only the appearances and forms of the Deity are fallen into thick darkness." One would also suppose (a thing which practically is not the case) that the superiority of the spirit of religion to the form would be carefully maintained when we meet with such maxims as this,—"They who are ignorantly devoted to the mere ceremonies of religion are fallen into thick darkness." But after all that can be said, there is much confusion and contradiction on such points in those writings.

Thus we are again informed that a "distinct reward is reserved for ceremonies, and a distinct reward is reserved for divine knowledge."

And the reward is as follows:—"By ceremonies he passes the gulf of death, and by divine knowledge he attains immortality." The objection, then, against the divine origin of the Veda derived from the general character of its precepts (although a few passages may be found in which a truer and more enlightened teaching is propounded) is this, that too much stress is laid upon ceremonial and penitential works, as necessarily conducting the devotee to a higher state in a future existence, as the consequence of his scrupulous practice of such ceremonies and such austerities, without a regard to that in which the spirit of true religion consists—a change of heart. Yet we read that "he is a well-regulated person, who by the perusal, as prescribed, of the Vedas and their dependent sciences has attained to a rough notion of the sense of the whole Veda; who, by renouncing in this, or a former life, things desirable and things forbidden, and by observance of the constant and of the occasional ceremonies of penances and of devotions, being freed from all sin, is thoroughly purified in his heart." But I speak of the *general* character of the teaching contained in the Sástras, &c. And the force

and the weight of this objection will not be diminished by my quoting the sentiments of a most distinguished author:—

"Though mankind have in all ages been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and, consequently, without determining which is to have preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows *all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tendency of Scripture*, and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God without moral virtue."* It will not, I hope, be considered by my readers to be uninteresting or tedious, if I explain, as concisely as possible, the methods by which the Hindus are taught to believe that God, according to their notions, is to be served.

Since it is the principal and the chief concern of mankind to attain unto God, the Hindus are instructed that there are two methods by which this may be accomplished. As the design of Hindu philosophy is to specify the knowledge, by attain-

* See Note 67.

ing which the souls of men become absorbed in the Great Universal Soul eventually, so also Hindu theology proposes knowledge also, as well as good works, as the means by which that most desirable object, namely, an union with the Supreme Spirit, is to be accomplished. This knowledge is described as being of two kinds, viz., शब्दं ब्रह्म: '*sabda Brahma*,' Spirit or God to be attained through the *word* (the Veda); and secondly, परं ब्रह्म: '*para Brahma*,' Spirit or God to be attained, and union with Him acquired by *meditation*. On the one hand, we are informed that "he who is thoroughly imbued with the word of God obtains Supreme Spirit;" and on the other hand: "As the loadstone attracts the iron by the virtue which is common to itself and its products, so the Supreme Spirit attracts to itself him who meditates upon it." "Contemplative devotion is the union with Brahma ('*Yoga*')."

The term *Yoga*, योग: in its literal signification, means union or junction. In a spiritual sense it denotes union of separated with universal soul, and, with some latitude of expression, it comes to signify the means by which such union is effected. And the system of the Yogi is explained in the following passage of the Vishnu Purana (Book vi., chapter vii.):—

"The sage, or Yogi, when first applying himself to contemplative devotion, is called the novice or practitioner; when he has attained to spiritual union he is termed the adept, or he whose meditations are accomplished. Should the thoughts of the former be unvitiated by any obstructing imperfection, he will obtain freedom after practising devotion through several lives. The latter speedily obtains liberation in that existence, all his acts being consumed by the fire of contemplative devotion. The sage who would bring his mind into a fit state for the performance of devout contemplation must be devoid of desire, and observe invariably continence, compassion, truth, honesty, and disinterestedness. He must fix his mind intently on the supreme (Brahma), practising holy study, purification, contentment, penance, and self-control. These virtues, respectively termed the five acts of restraint (*yama*), and five of obligation (*niyama*), bestow excellent rewards when practised for the sake of reward, and eternal liberation when they are not prompted by desire. Endowed with these merits, the sage self-restrained should sit in one of the modes termed Bhadrásana, &c., and engage in contemplation. Bringing his vital airs, called *Prána*, under subjection by frequent repetition, is thence called Pránáyáma, which is, as it

were, a seed with a seed. In this the breath of expiration and that of inspiration are alternately obstructed, constituting the act twofold, and the suppression of both modes of breathing produces a third. The exercise of the Yogi, whilst endeavouring to bring before his thoughts the gross form of the Eternal, is denominated Alambana. He is then to perform the Pratyáhára, which consists in restraining his organs of sense from susceptibility to outward impressions, and directing them entirely to mental perceptions. By these means the entire subjugation of the unsteady senses is effected, and when by the Pránáyáma the vital airs are restrained, and the senses are subjugated by the Pratyáhára, then the sage will be able to keep his mind steady in its perfect asylum."

Thus, there is a regular system of religious contemplation, and a regular vocabulary of terms to describe the different effects and postures, viz.—

1. Yoga.	6. Alambana.
2. Atma Prayatna.	7. Prána.
3. Yama.	8. Bhadrásana.
4. Niyama.	9. Pránáyáma.
5. Bíja.	10. Pratyáhára.

The class of persons who practise these precepts strive after higher and more eminent holiness than

ordinary persons can attain; they practise them rigidly, hoping to enjoy intimate communion with God in this life, and, on leaving their earthly bodies, to rise without impediment or difficulty to the celestial world. They suppose that many things are forbidden to them, which are allowed to other men: that they must emaciate their bodies with watching, fasting, toil, and hunger, and torture them with the most extraordinary penances; and that it is their chief duty to retire to deserted places, and abstract their minds from all external objects. They impose these severe restraints upon themselves with good intentions, it may be supposed, but setting an injurious example, detrimental to practical and vital religion, and recommending instead thereof sundry superstitions and unprofitable usages, an indolent mode of life, and practices highly objectionable, as they are witnessed to be in those parts of India where the Yogis exhibit themselves in public, with a view of gaining the applause and the veneration of the multitude.

At the same time I must admit that there is a difference of opinion among the Hindu theologians as to the value of those self-inflicted penances, and many explain the doctrine of the Vedas as approving only of spiritual communion and meditation,

to which devotional exercises they restrict the meaning of योगः *yoga*. They call the religious recluse, "Vánaprastha," and the Yoga they term "Yama," "restraint." Thus in the Bhagavad Gítá* we read:—"Learn that what they call Yama is the same with *Yoga*. He cannot be of the Yogi who in his actions hath not abandoned all intentions."—*Bhagavad Gítá*, Lecture vi., verse 2.

"The Yogi are more exalted than those who harass themselves in performing penances,—respected above the learned in science, and superior to those who are attached to moral works: wherefore, O Arjuna, resolve thou to become one."—*Bhagavad Gítá*, Lecture vi., verses 46, 47.

Yet in other *slokas*, the superiority of good works over forsaking the world is dwelt upon equally:—

"Thou now speakest of the forsaking of works, and now again of performing them. Both the desertion and the practice of works are equally the means of extreme happiness, but of the two the practice of works is to be distinguished above the

* The Bhagavad Gítá, or the "divine song," relating the conversations of Krishna (an *avatar* of Deity) and Arjuna, a work attributed to Krishna Dwaipáyana Vyása, is an episode in the great epic poem concerning the fortunes of the family of Bhaurut, the Mahábhárata, supposed to have been written 4000 years ago.

desertion."—*Bhagavad Gítá*, Lecture v., verses 1, 2.

This is quite opposed to the theory of penance and mortification, and the preference is given to an active life of piety over the life of the religious recluse. The highest perfection of devotion is described as being *action without passion*. The mind is to be altogether impassive to any emotions which external objects can produce. Action is approved of, but it must be without emotion or sensibility; otherwise it is not of the proper quality; there should be no disturbance of, no impression made upon, the unruffled soul. Yet though the vocation of the religious recluse is inferior to a state of activity, free from the drawbacks of sensibility and emotion, yet still it is not to be despised; nor is the life of the retired devotee unacceptable to the Supreme Spirit.

When the all-contemplative Brahmajnáni (he who knows Brahma) is not engaged in the objects of the senses, nor in works, then he is called Vinnishpannasamádhi (the adept).

The Yogi of a subdued mind, "thus employed in the exercise of his devotion," is compared to "a lamp standing in a place without wind, which waveth not."—*Bhagavad Gítá*, Lecture vi., verses 4, 19.

In these maxims, no encouragement is given to the self-inflicted tortures of the Hindu ascetic. However, a plea has been put forward in defence of such penances, on the grounds of the indolence and sensuality engendered among the natives of India by the heat of the climate, and other topical causes—that they are designed to correct this evil by "subduing the body and bringing it into subjection." But, in general, the theory of the Sástras is, that austerities, however useful and salutary in secondary respects, are inferior to active and contemplative devotion, as for example:—"The zeal which is exhibited in self-torture by the fool without examination, or for the purpose of injuring another, is of the *tamas guna* (the principle of darkness and evil)."—*Bhagavad Gítá*, Lect. ix., v. 17.

Much that is true is at the basis of the Hindu religion: much that is sublime is found in its details; but the practical and popular errors of the people vitiate and cloud it. Although many of their barbarous practices have been suppressed by legislative enactments, still, polluted temples and licentious worshippers practically contradict the ideas which might be formed of the genius of the religion from the moral and benevolent precepts of the Sástras.* Why is this? Because the spiritual-

* See Note 68.

ism of Hindu theology and philosophy is not adequate to alter the nature of mankind, which is "earthly, sensual, devilish."

Nor is their moral system indeed entirely unobjectionable, as is shown by the sentiments contained in the following passage:—

"Chakrá yudhasya námáni sadá sarvvatra kírtteyat. Násauchakírttena tasya sa pavitrakaro yata. Harirharti pápáni dushta chintairapi smrita Anichchyapi sansprishto hahatypi pávaka."

"Let a man everywhere and ever *call over* the *titles* of Him who is armed with the chakra (discus). For *repeating* them, even by one that is impure, is a means of purification. *Hari* removes all sins, even when *invoked by evil-minded persons*, as fire burns one by whom it is unwillingly approached."*—*Vishnu Dharma Tantra.*

Inconsistencies found in any system, professing to be founded on revelation, are fatal to its claims to be regarded as inspired. The authenticity of writings is tested by internal consistency. Propositions or statements of any kind which contradict each other, or in which inconsistency or want of *vraisemblance* is detected, argue contrivance, or the defects to which mere human compositions are liable, in those writings in which such propositions

* See Note 69.

or statements appear. The Puránas differ from each other in their interpretations, some giving the chief honours to Siva, .others to Vishnu, because the Hindus are divided in admiration of these two deities. We have Saiva and Vaishnava writings, alike claiming the support of the Veda.

And if we look to the practical results of the Hindu system, we find the population at large indulging either in the coarse and corrupt polytheism and idolatry, for which the opportunity is amply provided by the vast pantheon of their popular deities, or in demoralizing practices connected with the worship of the Saktis of Rudra; while the more refined minority are divided in opinions—some embracing the paradoxes of Vedantic immaterialism; others believing in a compound divinity, consisting of matter and mind conjointly; while a third, and no inconsiderable portion, assent to the hopeless atheism of the Sánkhya.

Such consequences are the natural results of, on the one hand, the excessive abuse of representing Deity by visible forms, and, on the other hand, of the attempts to discuss minutely and familiarly those matters which are placed beyond the range of human understanding, however extensive. They are indeed *res tenues*, such as elude the grasp of human mind, although *tenui sermone peractæ*.

An analysis, according to the criteria by which we judge of matters of fact, shows that there is not conclusive evidence of the divine origin of the Hindu Scriptures: no unambiguous testimony of works of miraculous power; no prophecies fulfilled, and in course of fulfilment; no distinct marks or signs of a divine original within. We have still one point to consider before concluding, and it shall form the subject for our consideration in the next chapter, viz., to refute the notion of the inspiration of the founders of the philosophical systems.

CHAPTER II.

On the Hindu Doctrine of Innate Inspiration.

THE reason which the Hindu commentators assign for attributing superhuman authority to the founders of their philosophical systems or schools is this, that they were endowed at their birth with minds or dispositions of a peculiar and special kind; that in this respect the Hindu teachers, and wise men, and great sages, whom they term, each of them, गुरु, *guru*, and ऋषि, *rishi*, and महामुनि, *mahámuni*, are exceptions to mankind in general; and that, therefore, having received at their birth the innate faculty of knowledge, and capacity for giving instructions therein, they have communicated the results of this knowledge to mankind in general, who have no such *innate* faculty of knowledge, but can only acquire it by the slow and painful and imperfect methods by which instruction is received, and by which information is usually acquired. According to this supposition, we find dispositions or conditions of the mind, by the Hin-

dus termed भावाः *bhávas*, divided into three classes, viz., *innate*, सांसिद्धिका, *sánsiddhiká ; essential*, प्राकृतिका, *prákritiká* ; and *incidental*, वैकृतिका, *vaikritiká*. Innate dispositions are *supernatural* or transcendental, and are peculiar to saints and sages.* The essential are the dispositions of the four sons of Brahma.† The third class, *vaikritika*, or incidental, belongs to men in general, and is that kind of disposition which is wrought upon by instruction. Some, omitting the finer distinction, hold that there are two sorts of dispositions,—one *inherent*, which they term *swábhaviká*, स्वाभाविका (including both the *sánsiddhiká* and *prákritiká*), and the second, the incidental, or resulting from instruction (*vaikritiká*).

To the former, the great philosophers and teachers belong; and to the latter, all other ordinary

* "Thus, in the beginning of creation, the first sage, the venerable and great Muni Kapila, appeared, *spontaneously endowed* with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The incidental and unspontaneous dispositions were produced by the cultivation of the means of producing them, as the lessons of Práchetasa, and other great Rishis."—*Váchespati*.

† The four sons of Brahma are described by name, as Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanátana, and Sanatkumára, and these dispositions were produced in them in consequence of merit in a former state of existence."—*Gaurapáda*.

mortals. It is on these grounds, accordingly, that infallibility and supernatural authority are claimed by those teachers, and the most profound deference is for the same reason paid to their writings by those who study them.

The founders of the Sánkhya, Nyáya, and Vedánta systems of philosophy were (as I have stated in chapter I.), Kapila, Gotama, and Kanáda, and Jaimini, who invented or introduced the Mímánsá, also termed the Vedánta system, from its alleged conformity to the Vedas. Concerning those ancient philosophers I have not been able to discover any regular biographical account or memoirs; but the notices which I insert here about them, and which are derived from the scholiasts, &c., are not devoid of interest.

First, with regard to Kapila, Gaurapáda, the scholiast on the Sánkhya Káriká, the authorship of which is attributed to Iswara Krishna, describes Kapila as having been one of the sons of Brahma.

"The divine Kapila, the son of Brahma, as it is said, 'Sanaka, Sanandana, and Sanátana, Asuri, *Kapila*, Borhu, and Panchasikha; these seven sons of Brahma were termed great sages (*mahamunis*)." Kapila is also described by the Vaishnava writers as having been the fifth *avatára*, or incarnation of Vishnu.

"The fifth avatára was named *Kapila*, the chief of saints, who revealed to Asuri the Sánkhya explanation of first principles which has been impaired by time."

Here it appears to me to be suitable to relate a curious legend, or anecdote, concerning Kapila, which is narrated at length in the Vishnu Purána (Book IV., chapter iv.), and in it we may observe not only that divine power is ascribed to him, but his identity with Vishnu is also asserted.

"Asamanjas was from his boyhood of very irregular conduct; his father hoped that as he grew up to manhood he would reform, but finding that he continued guilty of the same immorality, he abandoned him. The sixty thousand sons of Sagara followed the example of their brother Asamanjas. The path of virtue and piety in the world being obstructed by the sons of Sagara, the gods repaired to the *Muni Kapila, who was a portion of Vishnu*, free from fault, and endowed with all true wisdom. Having approached him with respect, they said: 'O Lord! what will become of the world, if these sons of Sagara are permitted to go in the evil ways which they have learned from Asamanjas. Do thou then assume a visible form, for the protection of the afflicted universe!' 'Be satisfied,' replied the sage, 'in a brief time the

sons of Sagara shall be all destroyed.' At that period Sagara commenced the performance of the solemn sacrifice of a horse (the *aswamedha*), which was guarded by his own sons; nevertheless, some one stole the animal, and carried it off into a chasm in the earth. Sagara commanded his sons to search for the steed, and they, tracing him by the impressions of his hoofs, followed his course with perseverance, until, coming to the chasm where he had entered, they proceeded to enlarge it, and dug downwards, each for a league. Coming to Pátála, they beheld the horse wandering freely about, and at no great distance from him they saw *Rishi Kapila*, sitting with his head declined in meditation, and illuminating the surrounding space with a radiance as bright as the splendours of the autumnal sun shining in an unclouded sky. Exclaiming, 'This is the villain who has maliciously interrupted our sacrifice, and stolen the horse; kill him! kill him!' they ran towards him with uplifted weapons. The Muni slowly raised his eyes, and for an instant looked upon them, and they were reduced to ashes by the sacred flame that darted from his person. When Sagara learned that his sons, whom he had sent in pursuit of the sacrificial steed, had been destroyed by the might of the *great Rishi Kapila*, he despatched Ansumat, the son of Asamanjas, to

effect the animal's recovery. The youth proceeding by the deep path which the princes had dug, arrived where Kapila was, and, bowing respectfully, prayed him, and so propitiated him, that the saint said, 'Go my son, deliver the horse to your grandfather, and demand a boon: thy grandson shall bring down the river of heaven (Gangá) upon earth.' Ansumat requested as a boon that his uncles who had perished through the sages' displeasure might, although unworthy of it, be raised to heaven through his favour. 'I have told you,' replied Kapila, 'that your grandson shall bring down upon earth the *Ganges* of the gods, and when her waters shall wash the bones and the ashes of thy grandfather's sons, they shall be raised to *Swarga*.'"

In the Bhagavad Gítá, Krishna, the impersonation of Vishnu, also describes himself as Kapila, viz., सिद्धानां कपिलं मुनिः *Siddháná Kapila Muni*, i. e. "of saints, the Muni Kapila."—Lecture x., verse 26.

It is probably because Kapila thus claims a share in the divine honours of Vishnu, that the author of the Bháshya Commentary assigns to *him alone* the *sánsiddhika bhávas*, or superhuman disposition, the highest order of inspired intellect. "Dispositions of being are considered to be three-

fold: innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or innate, are those four which in the first creation were cognate with the divine sage Kapila, or *virtue*, knowledge, dispassion, and power." Here I may observe that Kapila was not the author of the Sánkhya Káriká. His aphorisms were collected into a volume called Sánkhya Pravachana. They were taught by him to Asuri. Asuri, according to the succession of teachers, or, as it is termed, "the tradition of pupils," communicated them to Panchasikha. Thus the Sánkhya philosophy was handed down successively to Iswara Krishna, who composed the Sánkhya Káriká, which is an analysis in verse of the Sánkhya philosophy, and who is supposed to have lived about the eighth century of the Christian era. Gaurapáda, the author of the Commentary called Bháshya, was the preceptor of Sankara Achárya, who flourished about the same period.

Other teachers of the Sánkhya system were Vijnána Bhikshu, Náráyana Tirtha, and Váchespati. It is in this manner that the celebrated Hindu schools of philosophy have been continued from age to age to the present times. They were taught by the founders first, who handed them over to their favourite pupils, who in their turn communicated the same doctrines, of which they

were the depositories, to their successors, by whom in their turn they have been handed down to the present generation. Thus there exist regular *catenæ* of teachers from the foundation of each system.

2nd. *Of Gautama, or Gotama.*—Gotama, the founder of the Nyáya system, must have lived at a very early period, for mention is made of him in the Rig Veda, in the following passage:—

"Etat tyat na yojánam acheti sasva hayat marutah Gotamah vah."—*Hymn* ci., *verse* 5.	"This hymn is learned like that which Gotamah repeated to you, Marutes!"

Gotama is also described as having been the Vyasa, or arranger of the Vedas, in the twentieth Dwápara age.

"In every Dwápara, or third age, Vishnu, in the person of Vyása, in order to promote the good of mankind, divides the Veda, which is *properly* but *one*, into many portions. Observing the limited perseverance, energy, and application of mortals, he makes the Veda fourfold to adapt it to their capacities, and the bodily form which he assumes, in order to effect that classification, is known by the name of Veda Vyása. . . . .

"Twenty-eight times have the Vedas been ar-

ranged by the great Rishis in the Vaivaswata Manwantara, in the Dwápara* age, and consequently eight and twenty Vyásas have passed away, by whom, in their repective periods, the Veda has been divided into four. . . . . In the twentieth Dwápara age, the Veda Vyása was *Gotama*."—*Vishnu Purana*, Book III., chapter iii.

He, or another sage of the same name, is counted among the seven Rishis, viz., "Vasistha, Kasyapa, Atri, Jamadagni, *Gautama*, Viswámitra, and Bharadwája."

3rd. *Vyása—Jaimini.*—It is doubtful whether *Vyása*, to whom the Vedanta system is ascribed, was an individual, or a name applied to a succession of individuals, as we find several persons recorded as having been *Vyásas*, or arrangers of the Vedas.† However, Jaimini, who perfected the Mímánsá, or Vedánta system of philosophy, is spoken of as Vyása's pupil, viz., "When Vyása

* The present is considered to be the Kali age of the Váráha Kalpa, and is said to have commenced at the apotheosis of Krishna, or his return to heaven.

"The Sudharman palace, and the Párijata tree, which had been brought to earth by Krishna, both proceeded to heaven, and on the same day that Hari (Vishnu as Krishna) departed from the earth, the powerful dark-bodied *Kali age descended.*"

† See Note 70.

was enjoined by Brahma to arrange the Vedas in different books, he took four persons well read in those works as his disciples. He appointed Paila reader of the *Rig*, Vaisampáyana of the Yajur, and Jaimini of the Sáma Veda; and Sumantu, who was conversant with the Atharva Veda, was also the disciple of the learned Vyása. . . . . *Jaimini*, the pupil of Vyása, divided the branches of the Sáma Veda. The son of *Jaimini* was Sumantu, and his son was Sukarman, who both studied the same Sanhitá under Jaimini."

We enter next into the controversy, to the consideration of which this chapter is assigned, viz., the grounds upon which inspiration is attributed to the founders of the Hindu philosophies, of whom mention has been made above. And first, I deny the doctrine of *bhávas sánsiddhika*, as explained above, as being incredible and devoid of evidence to establish its truth. That there should not only be differences in men's capacities and intellects, but degrees thereof, and vast disproportions, is witnessed by universal experience. That some are superior, and surpass their contemporaries in acuteness of understanding and originality, or in the capacity for communicating knowledge, is equally admissible. That occasionally nature produces a master-

piece of mind or of body (as if to manifest of what high perfection her handiwork is capable), is proved by the records of history. But as to this *innate, divine talent, this intuitive* and *spontaneous knowledge* and *perception of truth*, there is no possibility of comprehending how its existence can be reconciled with the faculties of a finite being like man. At the same time, it is not a difficult matter to explain the argument in support of it,—in support of the possibility of this *birthright* of infallibility having been possessed by some. For since the Hindu metaphysicians hold that the nature of men's dispositions depends upon the proportions or mixture of the *guna, sattwa, rajas*, and *tamas*, of which such dispositions are composed: according to this theory it must of course follow, that the purity and divine character of the individual disposition will be in proportion to the amount of the quality *sattwa* (*purity*), in the composition of such disposition. And also, as the faculty of knowledge is impeded by the admixture in the element of the mind of the qualities *rajas* (*foulness*), and *tamas* (*darkness*); the less there is of either, or of both of these ingredients, the more apt with regard to knowledge the soul will be. So, in whatever cases the disposition (*bhávas*) is constituted of more unadulterated *sattwa* (*purity*); in such cases there

must be the pure faculty of knowledge, which is termed *sánsiddhika.* It occurs to me, however, that this theory, although plausible, may be replied to in a manner which shows that the argument is not conclusive. Properly speaking, according to our ideas of perfection, unadulterated purity, free from every alloy, is to be found seated in the divine nature alone. If such, also, be the innate spontaneous knowledge of the Hindu sages, it would be unnecessary to raise any special controversy about it, because such an opinion is only equivalent to holding those wise men to have been incarnations or avatáras of Deity; their knowledge would be identical with divine knowledge, and Krishna is to be understood literally when he speaks of Vishnu as being *Kapila*, whose writings, with those of Gotama and Kanáda, &c., in such a case come under the denomination of divine revelations, and must be tested like the Veda, to which, in such a case, their writings would have to be considered only as supplementary.

Therefore, if we are to treat the question merely as one of logical inference, and this to be the proposition, viz., "that the greater the amount of the ingredient, *purity*, in the disposition, the greater will be the inherent or intuitive faculty of knowledge, and, therefore, when this purity is unmixed, there must be also knowledge equal to inspiration," I

reply, that it has to be proved still that there ever have been mortals' dispositions composed of this quality singly.

"Sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum."*

There are certain boundaries, beyond which we cannot safely pass in philosophizing. In whatever instances this rule has been lost sight of, and investigation pushed to an extreme point, the conclusions of human reason have been baffled by plunging into invincible confusion. Thus, by way of illustration, if we go on deepening the most opposite colours by degrees, we finally assimilate them, because they converge to *black;* or, if we make the shades lighter and lighter by degrees, finally they are absorbed in *white.* Therefore, we consider *white* and *black* to be undefined, and although we are able to trace the degrees or shades of a colour up to the very point, or stage, at which it merges into white or black, *there* they lose their individuality or essential difference, and we cease to be able to classify them as shades or degrees of a certain colour. In the same way, although we may reasonably admit, that the greater the proportion of purity (*sattwa*) in the disposition, the more in-

* Horace's Satires, Book I., Sat. i., vv. 106, 107.

tellectual and clear-sighted the mind will be, still, the notion of a mind consisting of pure *sattwa* is too undefined for even a metaphysician to realize to his satisfaction, and, therefore, such a notion should not enter into philosophical calculations. Besides this natural inspiration, this innate and transcendental gift, this fountain of spontaneous and infallible knowledge, contradicts and differs from all other human experience with respect, also, to the knowledge itself which is supposed to have been thus communicated. Certain persons are said to have possessed, by a sort of birthright, the gift of plenary inspiration concerning the deepest and the most important matters of science, and to have revealed and communicated to others, less favoured by nature and inspiration than themselves, their speculations, at an exceedingly remote period of time, arranged as regular systems, not to be doubted or called in question, nor admitting of any alterations or additions from the researches of succeeding ages. Of what communicated knowledge can the same be affirmed, except of immediate Divine revelation; the completeness and infallibility of which has to be maintained by the evidences of miracles and prophecy? Now, if we are justified in requiring such evidences, prior to assenting to a revelation professing to emanate directly from God, and to the

perfection of which, as not being capable of receiving addition or improvement, we may reasonably enough assent, when first its divine origin has been thus established,—how much more should we require the like proofs before giving an assent to the supernatural claims put forward in behalf of teachers for whom there are no *parallels* in our own times, and for the reality of which extravagant claims no proof can be given, save and except the postulates of a theory, and the belief of their admirers and disciples. For if persons who were endowed with this wonderful gift existed now to maintain the possibility of such spontaneous knowledge being possessed by themselves, or formerly by their predecessors, or even if the doctrines of those ancient sages, to whom this natural inspiration is ascribed, if their doctrines harmonized, there would be *something* to corroborate the theory, and in favour of those claims; but we neither have been apprized of the existence of any living or late philosophers who have claimed the possession of such spontaneous knowledge by themselves, nor have the Sánkhya, Védánta, and Nyáya systems the mutual support which is derived from an agreement in essentials. The theory is at variance with the universal rules of development. The revolutions and cycles concerning which the philosophers of former times

delighted to speculate, have been discarded, because it has been proved that the course of events is progressive, and not revolving. Thus, from the rudest and most primitive structures and organizations which present themselves in the lowest strata of which the crust of the earth is composed, at the greatest depths to which the art of man has penetrated, or the convulsions of nature have rent it open, there is a vast and uninterrupted chain of progressive improvement and of increasing perfection until we arrive at the surface, and the existing forms and modifications of nature. Thus, the seed passes through a regularly graduated course of development before a perfect plant appears; the buds must germinate and swell, expand and unfold themselves, before the tree assumes its leafy vesture. Although the seasons return each year regularly in their circle, and the hours of the day which has just now expired shall be renewed on to-morrow with unfailing precision, still, time does not revolve, but continually advances, nor does nature pause in her course, or retrograde. Thus it is also with man's intellectual and physical being. The soft and the untutored faculties of the infant become moulded by degrees until they have received those impressions of knowledge which are suited to the mind and the capacities of a child, and which the ma-

ture intellect of the man loses sight of in his application to studies and pursuits of a more severe and engrossing description. In like manner, the infant's puny and tender limbs speedily outgrow the measures and size which they had at the time of birth. The once tender and yielding tissues become hard and firm; the proportions all become well defined and regular. Each day, each month, each year brings nearer the period when the full-grown human being, having attained to maturity, and to the fulness of size and stature, shall stand upon God's earth, a monument of his Creator's divine wisdom and wonderful power. Thus, also, like everything else, in the very nature of the case, knowledge must be progressive. If this were not the case, there would not be such considerable results for the benefit of mankind from discoveries and inventions, and other increments of knowledge. Nay, human progress, as far as the improvements resulting from knowledge are concerned, would at this day differ little from the state to which they were brought by the experience of the first generation of human beings who inhabited the earth.* "In fact, this is very nearly the situation of the species in all those parts of the earth in which the existence of the race depends on the separate efforts which each individual

* See Note 71.

makes in procuring for himself the necessaries of life, and in which, of consequence, the habits and acquirements of each individual must be the result of his own personal experience. In a cultivated society one of the first acquisitions which children make is the use of language, by which means they are familiarized from their earliest years to the consideration of *classes of objects* and *general truths*, and before that time of life at which the savage is possessed of the knowledge necessary for his own preservation, they are enabled to appropriate to themselves the accumulated discoveries of ages. . . . The natural disposition of the mind could not fail to lead individuals, even in the rudest state of society, to collect the results of their experience for their own instruction, and that of others; and in consequence of the gradual improvements which take place in language as an instrument of thought, the classifications, both of things and facts, with which the infant faculties of each successive race are conversant, are more just and comprehensive than those of their predecessors: the discoveries which in one age were confined to the studious and enlightened few, becoming in the next the established creed of the learned, and, in the third, forming part of the elementary principles of education."*

* See Note 72.

I may appropriately add here the quotation from the writings of Condorcet, with which the chapter, from which the quotation I have given already is taken, is concluded by the author (speaking of the progressive improvement of knowledge):—"Allow me to state, as an example, the history of that science in which the advances of discovery are the most certain, and in which they may be measured with the greatest precision: those elementary truths of geometry and of astronomy, which in India and Egypt formed an occult science, upon which an ambitious priesthood founded its influence, were become, in the times of Archimedes and Hipparchus, the subjects of common education in the public schools of Greece. In the last century a few years of study were sufficient for comprehending all that Archimedes and Hipparchus knew, and, at present, two years, employed under an able teacher, carry the student beyond those conclusions which limited the inquiries of Leibnitz and of Newton. Let any person reflect on these facts; let him follow the immense chain which connects the inquiries of Euler with those of a priest of Memphis; let him observe at each epoch how genius outstrips the present age, and how it is overtaken by mediocrity in the next: he will perceive that nature has furnished us with the means of abridging and

of facilitating our intellectual labour, and that there is no reason for apprehending that such simplifications can ever have an end; he will perceive that at the moment when a multitude of particular solutions and of insulated facts begin to distract the attention and to overcharge the memory, the former gradually lose themselves in one general method, and the latter unite in one general law; and that these generalizations, continually succeeding one to another, like the successive multiplications of a number by itself, have no other limit than that infinity which the human faculties are unable to comprehend."

What is here observed as to the progress of mathematical discovery, and the improvements which have been made in the knowledge of the abstract sciences, holds good with regard to philosophical truth in general: human knowledge in such matters is progressive. In compassion to us, indeed, God has been pleased to aid the infirmities of our nature; to set before us the most excellent rules of living; to enforce the observance of those rules by the most influential considerations; and to communicate, besides, such additional knowledge as is designed to explain our condition, and to encourage in the performance of duty. But still, the knowledge which has been communicated to the wisest of men is but

partial. Light has been let in, proportioned to the necessities of our present state, sufficient to guide in the path of duty, and to conduct to eternal happiness. God, however, has only supplied our *wants* in regard to knowledge. As yet we see through a glass darkly.

Our notion of *inspiration*, accordingly, is such as this—viz., that *God alone* reveals superhuman knowledge, and at those times when He communicated it, communicated it in such a manner that the inspired person conceived, and thought and acted as the Divine power willed that he should conceive, and think, and act. And with regard to those other many persons* who, not belonging to the Jewish or Christian Church, have appeared from time to time, and have claimed to possess the gift of inspiration, I would sum up my opinion with regard to them in a few words, that *they were either deceivers* or *deceived*—deceived by the well-known potency of enthusiasm, and a heated imagination. And since, without the verification of his words either by miracles, or by their accomplishment, a prophet cannot be known to be a prophet; by the same evidences alone can we judge safely concerning genuine inspiration, proving thereby both the authority of the teacher and the truth of

* See Note 73.

his lessons. Wherefore, *we*, in judging of the claims of *our inspired authorities*, are accustomed rather to weigh the force of evidence in their favour, than to *object* to them on the score of the information they afford on certain matters of revelation being meagre. In this we differ from the Hindu votaries, who believe in the inspiration of the Vedas, and the sacred character of the philosophies, for they certainly lay much greater stress upon the copiousness and minuteness of the information in those books, than they do upon the evidence which is requisite to satisfy inquiring minds of the truth of their revelation. *We*, on the contrary, do not expect from those persons who have been sent from God to reveal His will, that they should solve all the difficulties which affect the belief and practice of religion.

Doubts still exercise the wisest, concerning the nature of the soul, and its passage to another world, and concerning the place and condition of that other world. These doubts have not been cleared up by Revelation, which has not opened to our inspection the mysteries of nature, and the minutiæ of the future state, nor enabled us to comprehend the texture of the soul, or its manner of subsisting out of the body. Nor have we been taught to understand the state or the details of the next world. Yet we

accept, without this information, the evidence which is conclusive as to the inspiration of our sacred writers; and, believing what is written in our Scriptures, we hopefully await the consummation of knowledge, when, the end for which they were required having been accomplished,—

> "Faith and hope shall die,
> "One lost in certainty—and one in joy."*

* Addison.

CHAPTER III.

Conclusion.

The religion and philosophy of the Hindus form a *stupendous system*—a *stupendous system*, whether we consider the comprehensive range of the philosophy, and the grandeur of the theological conceptions, or the exquisite finish and care with which, in their numerous and minute details, both the religion and the philosophy have been elaborated, so as to astonish the inquiring mind. Every subtlety which mental acumen could devise—every proof, and shadow of a proof, which human ingenuity, treating concerning things known and unknown, could employ—every metaphysical paradox which the most versatile invention could construct—all find currency in those systems of philosophy which have been reviewed in this book. Human reason has never had exponents superior to Kapila or Gotama, however sparkling or profound the researches of ancient or modern metaphysicians may have been, however lofty may have been the

genius of western philosophy. And, as to the religious system of the Hindus, it is constructed on a scale of vastness which fairly wearies the mind, and bewilders the imagination. The grandeur and justice, for instance, of the conceptions which we find therein concerning Supreme Spirit, can only have flowed from a fountain of thought both pure and deep; the doctrine which is taught concerning the origin, progress, and perfection of the human soul, is at least commensurate with the importance of the subject. In the Hindu sacred books, information is found on every subject which can possibly interest the curious mind. Every motive is urged—every reason is given—every method is sanctioned—which can be employed to excite the spirit of religious inquiry in the student, to stimulate the proud exclusiveness of the self-righteous worshipper, or to inflame the enthusiasm of the ascetic devotee.

Justification may be variously attained: by faith in the mysteries of the Hindu creed; by good works; by prayer and ritual observances; by penances and private meditations. Each of these has its proper place, and is discussed at length in their great theological repertoires, the Vedas and Puránas, and is recommended as being meritorious, and available to conciliate the Divine favour; while, at

the same time, a liberty is conceded to the irresolute and undecided neophyte of choosing from among those various paths to heaven the one which he may prefer as being the most convenient or the most agreeable. And the theory of the *metempsychosis* connects the religion and philosophy into the one *stupendous* system, providing for the souls of deceased men an almost indefinite series of corporeal affinities, from which no human soul can escape, according to that theory, until, after a long lapse of migrations, it attains to perfection, and finally merges in the ocean of infinity.

And yet, although such a system as this might be supposed to be the very thing calculated to impress the mind with religious emotions, and with a persuasion of the value of cultivating religious impressions on account of the truth and sublimity of the theocracy which rules the world—as far as I can see, Hindu religion, although sublime—Hindu philosophy, although profound—both fail in satisfying the innate cravings of the soul, and its desire to enjoy communion with God—fail in supplying motives sufficiently cogent to overcome the coarse attractions of sin and sensual indulgence, or to deter the wicked from prosecuting their career of iniquity. Moreover, while they flatter self-justifying pride, they repel with cold superciliousness

those who are too enlightened to acknowledge distinctions of caste, too humble-minded to believe that heaven and earth have no secrets too abstruse for human knowledge to fathom. While, on the one hand, the extreme refinement and high *intellectualism* of Hindu philosophy baulk and disappoint the mind, which, after having made the *sturdiest* efforts to comprehend all the information it affords feels as if it had grasped a shadow; on the other hand, the religion also fails, in consequence of the very grandeur and immensity of its conceptions concerning things divine, and man's relation to them. For, since the strongest motive to a religious life is the expectation of *future* reward, we cannot say that this motive is very strongly supplied in a religious system, according to which the fruition of such a reward is put off, and postponed almost *ad infinitum*, owing to the slow and painful ordeal through which the soul must pass in its gradual progress to the liberation from material bondage, in which liberation the reward of the good consists. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick," *indeed*, if we are to look forward to passing thousands and tens of thousands, or perhaps hundreds of thousands, or millions of years, and of ages, in preliminary probation. Is such as this the hope

which is calculated to answer the design of religion in cheering the mind, and rendering it contented in adversity, self-governed, and superior to the influence of things temporal, and the sinister ascendancy of corrupt matter, the power of which over the soul, Hindu philosophers vainly deplore, while the remedy which they prescribe is inadequate or impossible! For, according to their ideas, the Supreme Spirit is placed at such an immense distance from the approximation of the soul desirous of that union with Supreme Spirit, which is the end and object of the truly wise, that even *hope* must soar with *drooping* wing so far, and the heart of the most sanguine devotee must feel a weary, aching void, because of the almost immeasurable distance which separates him from the object of his desires and aspirations. If there was no better hope of approaching to God than that which the Hindu system holds out (although it professes to be able to furnish the means by which this object may be effected), men might despair of ever being able to realize it. The soul might weary itself in vain, seeking to ascend to the source of all perfection, to an altitude vast and interminable, like the fiery *Linga* in which Maheswara (Síva) revealed himself, when Brahma and Vishnu disputed the pre-eminence

with each other, as is related at length in the Linga Purána.

"Siva, in the shape of a fiery pillar, or the *Linga*, suddenly towered before them, but when, after travelling upwards and downwards for a thousand years in each direction, neither of them could approach to its termination, they confessed their inferiority to Siva, and were reconciled. Upon the *Linga* the sacred monosyllable, ओम्, *OM*, became visible, and the Vedas proceeded from it, by which both Brahma and Vishnu were enlightened, and confessed the superior majesty and glory of Maheswara."

If a religious belief which professes to be founded on revelation is confined to those plain, simple matters which influence religious practice, such a religious belief is suited to the wants of mankind, and does not require an assent to anything incredible. We may also with reason expect that *Revelation* should be explicit as to the following particulars, viz., the existence and the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, the future state of rewards and punishments, the notion of God's excellency and perfection, and man's ability to perceive good and evil, the necessity of confidence in God's wisdom, and justice, and goodness, when we consider the present very unequal distribution of re-

wards and punishments, and the close connexion which certainly may be proved to exist between morality and happiness. These are the points with regard to which we may fairly expect that Divine Revelation would be explicit, and with respect to which the Hindu religion contains much in its doctrine to which no reasonable inquirer can fairly object. The unity and self-existence of God is affirmed, for instance, even by those Hindu theologians who differ most in their opinions as to His nature. *Patanjali*, for instance, holds that "Spirit has no intercourse with visible objects;" *Gotama* teaches that "God is matter as well as Spirit"—that "Brahma is the cause of all things, as well as the things themselves:" "If it be not allowed that he is the clay as well as the potter, it will follow that He is indebted to some other for the clay." *Patanjali* says that "God is to be seen by the Yogi." But *Kapila* explains "that when the Veda speaks of God or the Supreme Spirit being visible, it only intends to state that 'Spirit is perceived by the understanding.'" *Patanjali* holds "that the universe arose from the will of God, who infused into the system a power of perpetual progression." *Gotama* taught that "atoms are eternal." These differences of opinion are difficult to reconcile with the notion that the philosophers, who differed from

each other in opinion, possessed a gift of natural inspiration, and, therefore, of infallibility. But, notwithstanding the immense amount of fiction by which the truth of the unity and self-existence of God is disguised, and the almost infinite number of mythological fables, and of ancient legends by which Hindu theology is incumbered, still, this truth is taught in the Veda in a confused and incoherent manner, but still satisfactorily enough to enable the reader to recognise the true doctrine upon which, as a foundation, the wide superstructure of error is constructed, or rather, the volume which contains this teaching might be compared to a fractured mirror, which represents a true image of the external appearance, the outlines, and size, and relative proportions of the objects which it reflects, but represents them as broken and disjointed images.

But man, constituted as he has now become, must have some motive to lead him to religion independent of obligation and duty, or of fear,—fear of the consequences of neglecting it. The notion, therefore, of being steadfast in the course of duty without being stimulated by desire is not natural, particularly when we take also into our consideration the admitted fact that we are at present placed in a probationary state, a state of preparation for a condi-

tion which is to be unchangeable; but that what it shall be for each depends upon his religious progress now. The great impediment which stands in the way of the soul's desire being satisfied, because it almost indefinitely protracts the period of the soul's union with the Supreme Spirit, according to the Hindu doctrine, is the "transmigration," concerning which so much has been already observed in the preceding chapters. It is, I may add, a doctrine which is quite opposed to the results of modern *physiological* and *psychological* investigation; but still extensively prevails, as we have seen, perhaps because in India the comparatively modern method of conducting philosophical inquiries by *induction* from ascertained facts, has not superseded the antiquated system of *theory* and *hypothesis*—a system which is not only inartificial and unscientific, but also leads to results which must be uncertain, and such as cannot be depended upon. As all knowledge of the material world rests ultimately on the result of experiment, thus also all our knowledge of the spirit of man is strictly confined to the information which is afforded by consciousness. And consciousness furnishes no evidence as to the reality of the transmigration. Besides, this doctrine is at variance with an established natural law, viz., that each individual species retains the essential and peculiar cha-

racteristics which distinguished it from others,—a law which we may regard as extending beyond structural organization, and material composition to spiritual sensibilities and functions; so that each separate species is distinguished by a greater or a less degree of sensibility, as to its internal as well as its external constitution. To suppose, then, that the souls of men are capable of being introduced into organizations thus essentially distinguished from each other, is to suppose that, without sufficient cause for its being done, the laws of nature, as to the preservation of the unity of each kind of living creatures, are continually broken. Moreover, I ask, what becomes of the acquired tastes and habits which the soul contracts during life, and which, as far as we can conjecture, are *not* destroyed by the stroke of death? Yet they are quite inconsistent with and contrary to the habits and instincts of the inferior animals. I must explain my meaning more clearly. There are certain intellectual principles which men have in common with brutes. These are, consciousness, the powers of external perception, attention, abstraction, association of ideas, and memory. And although all the lower animals seem to be usually occupied with their present sensations, and their present perceptions, there is no reason to conclude but that they possess, at least

in some degree, those qualities which I have mentioned. But there are, besides what they have in common, certain *differences*, arising from the constant exercise of man's faculty of *reason*, and which, as a matter of course, the human soul acquires during its sojourn in a *human* body. For instance, the effect of experience on the mind is to render it disposed to look forward to consequences, to practise self-denial with a view to future gratification, and to continue with systematic steadiness in the pursuit of particular objects. We see that man can take the benefit of his past experience, and not only endure lesser evils, which are productive of pleasure and ease eventually, but also he can relinquish those gratifications which would be attended with suffering. Now the lower animals have not any signs of such a faculty. They are led by feeling and instinct, the degree of which is generally the same in all animals of the same kind, and leads them with unerring certainty in those cases in which it influences them. But if human souls or intelligences were incorporated with them, would we not observe some marks and tokens of the results of human experience in such cases? I cannot, however, occupy my readers' time with more dissertations concerning the metempsychosis, and the objections to that doctrine, but must content myself

by referring him to those preceding parts of this treatise in which the subject has been considered.

Now, with regard to another Hindu philosophical doctrine, that of the eternity of matter, and of the eternal revolutions of material forms, I have little to add to what I have already observed with regard to this subject in chapter VI., sects. ii. and iv., Part I. This is one of those hypothetical theories which we may conceive to have been devised in support of that entire system of which it forms a part. But it is by no means supported practically by the results or the conclusions of geological discovery and investigation. For if such revolutions have taken place at intervals, entombing all kinds of creatures living at the time; and if, after the lapse of each appointed period of nature's cessation, the work of the world's regeneration each time has been repeated precisely as before, the strata of the earth's crust, as deeply as it has been examined, surely would not present the regularly graduated chain of organization which it does,—a chain of organization gradually improving from the lowest and most ancient deposits up to the most recent and superficial ones?—from the *Lingulæ* and *Trilobites* of the Cambrian and Silurian deposits, up to the fossil remains of palæozoic existence, or from the extinct monsters whose bones lie imbedded in the alluvial val-

leys of the Mississippi, up to the residuum of animal life in the present period. Besides, what a preposterous notion it is to suppose that the period of each of these revolutions has been four thousand three hundred and twenty millions of ordinary years! Is such a theory borne out by facts? Take this case,—as the present time is reckoned to belong to the fourth or kali age of one of those revolutions (the last age of it), we may fairly conclude that the greater period of the entire *kalpa* (or period of revolution) must have already expired. What then? Does the earth show signs of having lasted for so long a period? Have the customs and manners, the civilization and languages of the earth's inhabitants—have all these things attained to the degree of perfection which might have been expected after so long a duration? Has the world made either natural or artificial progress worthy of such a prolonged continuance? Nor can it be suggested, in reply, that a large portion of the time may have been spent in creating the earth and its different orders of inhabitants. For it has been calculated that, supposing the whole mass of the earth, from the core to the surface, to have been in a state of fusion, three hundred and fifty millions of ordinary years would elapse during its transition from a molten, or fluid, to a solid state; also, that sup-

posing the temperature of the surface of the earth to have been, when first vegetable life commenced (say, when the plants of the *coal period* were produced), at 22°, it would require twenty millions of years for the earth's surface to cool down to its present state of temperature, which is, I believe, maximum 14°, and minimum temperature 8°; in all, three hundred and seventy millions of years most probably have elapsed during the preparatory state of the earth. But how small a deduction is this when subtracted from the entire period of four thousand three hundred and twenty millions of years, the greater part of which must have already elapsed, as this is the kali or last age of the world, if we are to suppose the Hindu account to be true. What then, I ask, has the world been doing? or rather, what has been doing in the world during the remainder of the vast period of years which must have elapsed, if this account be true? Why is History silent? Wherefore do not its archives contain the records of a more remote antiquity? What cause has retarded the increase of population in earlier times, as compared with modern statistics of the same?

In general, according to my judgment, the errors of the Hindu philosophical systems may be attributed to two causes, viz., *reasoning on metaphysical*

points from the analogies of material things; and secondly, *too great indulgence in hypothesis.* Thus we find the Hindu authors not only continually illustrating metaphysical subjects by comparisons taken from material objects, and describing them by phrases, and in terms which are properly only descriptive of such objects, or of the ideas connected with them, but even confounding things so totally distinct as mind and matter are, placing physical and intellectual agents and phenomena in the same category or list. Thus we have in the Nyáya catalogue of substances the following classified together: i. e., *prithiví*, *tejas*, *ab*, *váyu*, *ákása*, *kála*, *dig*, *átmá*, *manás*, *navan:* "*earth*, *light*, *water*, *air*, *ether*, *time*, *space*, *soul*, *mind* (*in number*), *nine*."

"In the investigation of physical laws" (observes a distinguished metaphysician*), "it is well known that our inquiries must always terminate in some general fact, of which no account can be given, but that such is the constitution of nature. The case is exactly the same in the philosophy of mind: when we have once ascertained a general fact, such as the various laws which regulate the association of ideas, or the dependence of memory on that effort of the mind which we call attention, it is all we ought to

* Stewart's "Philosophy of the Mind;" Introduction; Part I.

aim at in this branch of science. If we proceed no further than facts for which we have the evidence of our own consciousness, our conclusions will be no less certain than those in physics. *But if our curiosity leads us to attempt an explanation* (*of things for which we have not this evidence*), *we evidently blend a collection of important and well ascertained truths with principles which rest wholly on conjecture.*"

In fact, there is a deep enigma connected with our existence, and a mystery environs us which no intellectual skill or discernment can penetrate. We know by the testimony of consciousness that we are sentient beings endowed with admirable faculties. We act, we think, we feel, compare, reason, and judge, but we do not know by what means we perform those different functions. The operations of nature, as well as of mind, are beyond our knowledge, even the most common and simple things abound in mystery. The process, for instance, of vegetation, how the earth brings forth first the blade, then the ear, and then the full corn in the ear; how the bud swells, and the soft green leaf within protrudes from its capsule; how the petals of the blossom inherit their gorgeous colours, and the seeds grow in their delicate cysts,—all these things are matters of mystery. And since this is

the case with regard to the simplest and the most ordinary phenomena, how can we penetrate into the profound depths of that higher knowledge which is denied to us now, or learn that mystical lore which "men cannot successfully read, nor make known the interpretation thereof."

"Since the constitution of nature, and the methods and designs of Providence in the government of the world, are above our comprehension, we should acquiesce in, and rest satisfied with our ignorance, turn our thoughts from that which is above and beyond us, and apply ourselves to that which is level to our capacities, and which is our real business and concern. Knowledge is not our proper happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing, will see that it is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainment of the mind. Indeed, if the proper happiness of man consisted in knowledge, men who are possessed of the largest share would have a very ill time of it, as they would be infinitely more sensible than others of their poverty in this respect. Thus he who increases knowledge would eminently increase sorrow. *Men of deep research* and *curious inquiry* should just be put in mind not to mistake what they are doing. 'The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are re-

vealed belong to us and to our children, for ever;' which reflexion, put into general terms, is, that the only knowledge which is of any avail to us is that which teaches us our duty, or assists us in the discharge of it. The economy of the universe, the course of nature, almighty power exerted in the creation, and in the government of the world, is out of our reach. What would be the consequence if we could really get an insight into those things, is very uncertain, whether it would assist us in or divert us from what we have to do in this present state. If, then, there be a sphere of knowledge, of contemplation and employment, level to our capacities, and of the utmost importance to us, we ought surely to apply ourselves with all diligence to this our proper business, and esteem everything else nothing in comparison of it. . . . Socrates was not the first who endeavoured to draw men off from labouring after and laying stress upon other knowledge, in comparison to that which related to morals. Our province is virtue and religion, life and manners, the science of improving the temper, and making the heart better; this is the field assigned us to cultivate; how much it has lain neglected, is indeed astonishing. Virtue is demonstrably the happiness of man; it consists in good actions, proceeding from

a good principle, temper, or heart; overt acts are entirely in our power. What remains is, that we learn to keep our heart, to govern and to regulate our passions, mind, and affections; that so we may be free from the impotencies of fear, envy, malice, covetousness, ambition; that we may be clear of these, considered as vices seated in the heart, considered as constituting a general wrong temper, from which general wrong frame of mind, all the mistaken pursuits and far the greatest part of the unhappiness of life proceeds. *He who should find out one rule to assist us in this work would deserve infinitely better of mankind than all the improvers of other knowledge put together.*"*

* Bishop Butler's Sermons, p. 272, &c.

APPENDIX.

I HAVE remarked that there are no internal proofs, corroborated by concurrent testimony, from which the antiquity of the Vedas can be concluded. I must, however, qualify this assertion, because a very warm discussion has been held by certain eminent philosophers, as to the proof of antiquity which has been sought for in the "Jyotish" ज्योतिष् (the astronomical dissertations attached to the Vedas), in an ancient treatise called *Súráya Siddhánta*, सूरायशिद्धाट, "*Sun of perfection*," and certain astronomical tables, called the "Tables of Tirvalore," used by the Brahmans in fixing the commencement of the present age of the world, according to the Hindu system, called by them "Kali Yuga," and said by them to have commenced on the 16th of February, 3102 years before the Christian era; for the positions assigned in those tables to the principal celestial bodies on that day and year have been found to coincide with calculations made by certain eminent modern European astronomers.

I conceive that I cannot omit this interesting discussion, but shall only notice it in such a manner as may give my readers a general idea thereof, referring them for further and more particular information to the "Asiatic Researches," vol. ix.,

and "The Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh," vol. ii.

It is sufficient for my purpose to show that the evidence in question, as to the accuracy of the Hindu chronology, is depreciated in value, and rendered doubtful, by the difference of opinion among those high scientific authorities who have investigated the subject. In Hindu chronology the Kali Yuga, or present age of the world, is dated as having commenced on February 16, half-past 2 o'clock A. M., 3102 years B. C., at which time it is also recorded that there was a conjunction of the planets. A distinguished French astronomer, M. Bailly, has asserted in a book of his, called "Traitè de l'Astronomie Indienne et Orientale," that this statement has been verified, as to the fact of the conjunction of the principal planets at least, by his own astronomical calculations. For he has calculated that the planets Jupiter and Mercury were then in the same degree of the ecliptic, the planet Mars was distant about 8°, and Saturn 17°. Consequently, at the time of the assigned date, those four planets might have *appeared* to be in conjunction.

Moreover, there is a certain position assigned to the Moon in the Tables of Tirvalore, which position it is supposed to have occupied at the commencement of the Kali Yuga, which is said to be an additional proof of the chronology being correct. For, calculating backwards for 3102 years before the Christian era to find the Moon's place then, and making allowance according to the law of the Moon's velocity, which was discovered by Mayer's observations in the eighteenth century, and of which the ancients do not appear to have had any knowledge; the description in the astronomical tables is said to have been found to be correct.

"The Moon's mean place for the beginning of the Kali Yuga, i. e. for midnight between the 17th and 18th of February, B.C. 3102, at Benares, calculated from Mayer's Tables, on the supposition that her motion has always been at the same rate as at the beginning of the present century, is $10^s\,0°\,51'\,16''$. But, according to the same astronomer, the Moon is subject to a small, but uniform acceleration, such that her angular motion in any one age is 9″ greater than in the preceding, which, in an interval of 4800 years, must have amounted to $5°\,45'\,44''$. This must be added to give the real mean place of the Moon at the astronomical epoch of the Kali Yuga, which is, accordingly, $10^s\,6°\,37'$. The difference is less than two-thirds of a degree, or 40′, which (for so remote a period, and considering the acceleration of the Moon's motion, for which no allowance could be made in an Indian calculation) is a degree of accuracy that nothing but actual observation could have produced. To confirm this conclusion, M. Bailly computes the place of the Moon for the same epoch, by all the tables to which the Indian astronomers can be supposed to have ever had access, and [the result is that] it is certain that the astronomy of the Brahmans is neither derived from that of the Greeks, the Arabians, the Persians, or the Tartars."—*Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, vol. ii., p. 155.

Another mode which has been adopted by those astronomers who have been interested in verifying the chronological date assigned to the commencement of the Kali Yuga, was by ascertaining the correctness of what is termed "the equation of the Sun's centre," or the variation in the Sun's motion,*

* The Hindus believe that the *sun*, moon, and stars revolve around the pole-star (Dhruva).

which, according to a law discovered by M. de la Grange, is compensated by alternate increase and diminution of velocity.

"The equation of the Sun's centre is an element in the Indian astronomy which has an unequivocal appearance of belonging to an earlier period than the Kali Yuga. The maximum of that equation is fixed in the Tables of Tirvalore at 2° 10′ 32″. It is at present 1° 55′ 30″. In the year 3102 B. C. that equation was 2° 6′ 28½″, less only by 4′ than in the tables of the Brahmans. But if we suppose the Indian astronomy to be founded on observations that preceded the Kali Yuga, the determination of this equation will be found to be still more exact: 1200 years before the commencement of that period, or about 4300 years before our era, it appears, by computing from M. de la Grange's formula, that the equation of the Sun's centre was actually 2° 8′ 16″. So that if the Indian astronomy be as old as that period, its error with respect to the Sun's equation is but 2′ 16″. . . . . . The obliquity of the ecliptic is another element in which the Hindu astronomy and the European do not agree, but where their difference is exactly such as the high antiquity of the Indian astronomy is found to require. The Brahmans make the obliquity of the ecliptic 20°. Now, M. de la Grange's formula for the variation of the obliquity gives 22′ 32″, to be added to its obliquity in the year 1700, A.D., that is, to 23° 28′ 41″, in order to have that which took place in the year 3102 before our era. This gives us 23° 51′ 13″, which is 8′ 47″ short of the determination of the Indian astronomers. But if we suppose, as in the case of the Sun's equation, that the observations on which this determination is founded were made 1200 years before the Kali Yuga, we shall find that the obliquity

of the ecliptic was 23° 57′ 45″, and that the error of the Tables did not much exceed 2′."

No less than nine astronomical elements have been enumerated, to which the Tables of India assign such values as do by no means belong to them in these later ages, but such as the theory of gravity proves to have belonged to them 3000 years before the Christian era, viz., the precession of the equinoxes; the acceleration of the Moon; the length of the solar year; the equation of the Sun's centre; the obliquity of the ecliptic; the place of the planet Jupiter's aphelion; the equation of Saturn's centre; and the inequalities in the mean motion of both these planets. At that time, therefore, or in the ages preceding it, the observations must have been made from which these elements were deduced. For it is abundantly evident that the Brahmans of latter times, however willing they might be to adapt their tables to so remarkable an epoch as the Kali Yuga, could never think of doing so by substituting, instead of quantities which they had observed, others which they had no reason to believe had ever existed. The elements in question are precisely what those astronomers must have supposed to be invariable, and of which, had they supposed them to change, they had no rules to guide them for ascertaining the variations—since to the discovery of these rules is required, not only all the perfection to which astronomy is now brought in Europe, but all that which the sciences of motion and extension have likewise attained. It is equally clear that these coincidences are not the work of accident, for it will scarcely be supposed that chance has adjusted the errors of the Indian astronomy with such singular felicity, that observers who could not discover the true state of the heavens at the age in which they lived, have succeeded

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in describing one which took place several thousand years before they were born."—*Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, vol. ii., pp. 169, 170.

On this same subject M. Bailly also makes the following observations:—

Translation.—"The Hindu motion (mean motion of the Moon) in that long interval of 4383 years does not differ one minute from that calculated by Cassini. It agrees equally with that in the Tables of Mayer. Thus, two populations, the Hindus and the Europeans, placed at the two extremities of the world, and by their institutions perhaps as much divided in point of time, have obtained precisely the same results with regard to the motion of the Moon, and an agreement which would be inconceivable, were it not founded on observation, and on a reciprocal imitation of nature. Let us remark that the four* tables of the Indians are all copies of the same astronomy; one cannot deny that the Tables of Siam existed in 1687, in the time that M. de la Loubière brought them from Siam. At that epoch the tables of Cassini and Mayer did not exist; the Indians had already the exact motion which those Tables relate, and we had it not yet. One must, therefore, conclude that the exactness of the motion in the Indian astronomy is the result of observation. In that lapse of 4383 years it is *exact*, *because it has been taken from heaven itself.* And if observation has determined the end, it has equally marked the commencement. It is the longest interval which has been

* Four sets of astronomical tables belonging to the Hindus, and brought to Europe at different times, viz., *one* from Siam, brought by M. de la Loubière; *two* which were found by M. Bailly in the Depôt de la Marine, at Paris, forwarded by missionaries in India; and a *fourth*, presented to a M. Gentil by Brahmans at *Tirvalore*.

observed, and the remembrance of which has been preserved in the records of astronomy. It has its origin in the epoch of 3102 years before our Lord, and it is a *demonstrative proof of the reality of that epoch*."—*Bailly's Indian Astronomy*, Preface, p. 36.

Such is the argument in favour of the antiquity of the astronomical calculations of the Hindus.

Now let us listen to what has been alleged in opposition to this theory,—

"Audiamus alteram partem."

Laplace says in the fifth book of his "Exposition of the System of the World," chap. i.:—

Translation.—"The Indian Tables have two principal epochs, to which they ascend backwards: the one to the year 3102 before our era; the other to 1491 A.D. Those epochs are defined by the motions of the Sun, of the Moon, and the planets, in such a manner that, starting from the position that the Indian Tables assign to all the heavenly bodies at the second or latter epoch, and ascending back to the first epoch by means of those Tables, we meet with the general conjunction which they suppose at that epoch. The celebrated philosopher, Bailly, has sought to establish in his 'Treatise of Indian Astronomy,' that that first epoch was determined by actual observations.

"Notwithstanding his proofs, laid down with a perspicuity with which he knows how to invest the most abstract subjects, I consider it to be very probable that *it has been invented* to give to the movements of the heavenly bodies a common commencement in the zodiac. Our last astronomical tables, considerably perfected by the comparison of theory with a great number of very precise observations, do not allow us to *admit*

at all the *conjunction supposed* in *the Indian Tables.* From that view they present differences much greater than the errors of which they are still susceptible. In truth, some elements of the astronomy of the Hindus could not have had the magnitude which they assign to them unless a long time before our era. One must, for example, ascend backwards for *six thousand* years to find again their equation of the sun. But independently of the errors of their calculations, one should consider that they have not taken into account the inequalities of the Sun and the Moon in relation to eclipses in which the annual equation of the Moon is added to the equation of the centre of the Sun, and augments it by a quantity nearly equal to the difference of its true value from that of the Hindus. Many elements besides, such as the equations of the centre of the planets, Jupiter and Mars, are very different in the Indian Tables from that which they ought to be at their first epoch. The appearance of those Tables, and in general the impossibility of that general conjunction which they suppose, prove that they have been constructed, or at least rectified, in modern times."

Mr. Colebrooke is of opinion that the antiquity of the Hindu astronomy is a strong argument in favour of the antiquity of the Vedas. His remarks are to this effect:—

"Citations from the Indian Scriptures occur in every branch of literature studied by orthodox Hindus. Astronomy, so far as it relates to the calendar, has frequent occasion for reference to the Vedas. . . . To each Veda a treatise, under the name of Jyotish, is annexed, which explains the adjustment of the Calendar for the purpose of fixing the proper periods for the performance of religious duties. . . . From the rules delivered in the treatises which I have examined,

it appears *that the cycle there employed is a cycle, or period, of five years only*. . . . The zodiac is divided into twenty-seven asterisms, or signs, the first of which, both in the Jyotish and in the Vedas, is 'Critica' (the Pleiades). The deities presiding over the twenty-seven constellations are enumerated in the three verses of the Jyotish belonging to the Yaju, and in several places of the Vedas."—*Asiatic Researches*, vol. viii., p. 479.

Here I must not omit to mention an observation which has been made by Sir William Jones on Hindu astronomy, viz., *that the astronomy of the Jyotish, which is the scientific astronomy of the Hindus, is not to be confounded with the popular astronomy taught in the Purănas*. Bearing this in mind, the reader will, I hope, permit a short digression, to enable me to mention some of the popular errors which are contained in Pauránik astronomy.

No. I.

"The solar orb is situated a hundred thousand leagues from the earth,* and that of the moon an equal distance from the Sun.† At the same interval above the Moon occurs the orbit of all the lunar constellations. The planet Budha (Mercury) is two hundred thousand leagues above the lunar mansions.‡ Sukra (Venus) is at the same distance from Mercury.§ Angaraka (Mars) is as far above Sukra;‖ and the priest of the gods, Vrihaspati (Jupiter) is as far from Anga-

* The Sun is really 95,000,000 miles from the Earth.

† The Moon is 236,847 miles distant from the Earth.

‡ Distance of Mercury from the Sun is 36,814,721 miles.

§ Distance of Venus from the Sun is 68,791,752 miles.

‖ Distance of Mars from Sun is 144,907,630 miles.

raka,* whilst Sani (Saturn) is two hundred and fifty thousand leagues beyond Vrihaspati.† The sphere of the seven Rishis (Ursa Major) is a hundred thousand yojanas above Sani; and at a similar height above the seven Rishis, is Dhruva (the pole-star), the pivot or axis of the whole planetary circle."—*Vishnu Purâna*, Book II., chap. vii.

No. II.

"The earth, with its continents, mountains, oceans, and exterior shell, is fifty crores‡ of yojanas‖ in extent. It is the mother and nurse of all creatures, the foundation of all worlds, and the chief of the elements."—Book II., chap. iv.

No. III.

"As Dhruva revolves, it causes the moon, sun, and stars to turn round also; and the lunar asterisms follow in its circular path,§ for all the celestial luminaries are in fact bound to the polar star (Dhruva) by aerial chords," &c.—Book II., chap. cx.

No. IV.

"In the same manner as the oil-man, himself going round, causes the spindle to revolve, so the planets travel round, suspended by cords of air, which are circling round a whirling centre. The air, which is called Pravaha, is so termed because it bears along the planets which turn round, like a disc of fire, driven by the aerial wheel."—Book II., chap. xii.

* Distance of Jupiter from Sun is 494,499,108 miles.

† Distance of Saturn from Sun is 907,089,032 miles.

‡ The *crore* is ten millions.

‖ The *yojana* is about seven miles and a half.

§ The centre of gravity of the solar system is within the body of the Sun. See "Newton's Principia," Book III., Prop. 11 and 12.

It is unnecessary to add any more examples of Paurânik astronomy. At the same time, it is only fair to repeat the caution already given, that the Purânas do not in a pure form contain the astronomy of the Brahmans. "Many intimations of a similar system occur in the Vedas, but whether the whole is to be found in those works, is yet to be ascertained. It must not be considered as a correct representation of the philosophical astronomy of the Hindus, being mixed up with and deformed by mythological and symbolical fiction."

Let us, however, now return to the point from which I have digressed, and resume the argument on the subject of the Hindu chronology. The theory of the antiquity of certain of their writings, inferring the antiquity of portions of the Vedas, has, as I have fully stated already, found very able advocates; but as it has also found equally able opponents, the proof of antiquity cannot be much depended on, and its value in connexion with the doctrine of the inspiration of the Vedas is of no weight. I shall only add another extract, taken from the writings of the late Archbishop of Dublin, and which is extracted from a work of his published near to the time when the controversy was at its height.

"The latest claim that has been set up in opposition to the Hebrew Scriptures is on behalf of the sacred books of the Hindus. These, it has been pretended, evince not only the priority of the Indian records, but also that Moses has borrowed from the Brahmans much of what has been commonly ascribed to him as original, especially with regard to the creation of the world. The fallacy of such pretences has indeed of late years been fully manifested by the valuable exertions of Sir William Jones, and those of his respectable fellow-labourers in the field of Indian literature. At the same time,

it is to be lamented, that the admissions of that illustrious vindicator of the Hebrew writings, as well as those of Mr. Maurice and others, respecting the antiquity of the Vedas, have been such as to furnish these who are desirous to pervert the truth with an opportunity of applying the produce of their meritorious labours to the prejudice of the Jewish records, an opportunity which was not neglected. . . . It is fairly to be questioned whether that antiquity (of the Hindu records) has not been rated much above its real standard. '*The astronomical tables of the Hindus, it is well known, supply the only reasonable data from which to judge of their chronology*,—their habitual exaggerations rendering every other source of chronological information altogether chimerical, insomuch that Sir W. Jones pronounces that the comprehensive mind of an Indian chronologist has no limits;' and at the same time proves his assertion by a number of the most extraordinary instances. Their astronomical calculations, therefore, having naturally become a subject of great curiosity and interest with men of science, the celebrated M. Bailly, in the year 1787, published at Paris a volume on the Indian astronomy, in which he contended for its great antiquity, carrying it back to a period of more than 3000 years B. C. This conclusion he founded upon the nature of certain of their astronomical tables, which, he contended, contained internal evidence that they had been formed from actual observation, and must, therefore, be carried up to so early a date as that of 3102 years B. C. His reasonings upon this subject, in his elaborate 'Traité de l'Astronomie Indienne et Orientale,' were followed by other astronomers, particularly by Professor Playfair, in the second volume of the 'Edinburgh Transactions,' and the 'Súráya Siddhânta,' supposed to contain the

most ancient astronomical treatise of the Indians, was also carried up to a very high date, not less than 2000 years B. C.

"*That the reasonings, however, which led to both these conclusions are erroneous, later discussions of the subject leave but little room for doubt.* Mr. Marsden, in an ingenious paper in the 'Philosophical Transactions' for 1790, had, without attempting to impeach M. Bailly's astronomical arguments, pointed out a satisfactory mode of accounting for the apparent antiquity of the Indian Tables, by conceiving the computations to be founded, not upon a *real*, but an *imaginary* conjunction of the planets, sought for as an epoch, and calculated retrospectively. The celebrated M. Laplace, again, after the most accurate mathematical investigation, has not only pronounced upon the recent date of the Tables, but he has also pointed out errors in the calculations from which M. Bailly deduced his results, *and has clearly demonstrated the epoch in the Tables not to have been real, but fictitious.* And last of all, Mr. Bentley seems completely to have settled the point in two most ingenious and learned papers, in which he not only contends that, from the principles of the Hindu astronomy, the recent date of the Tables can be deduced, but that also from authentic testimony, independent of all calculations, the age of the Súráya Siddhánta can be proved to be such as not to carry the date of its composition further back than the year 1068. In his endeavours to establish these points, he has not scrupled to pronounce M. Bailly and Professor Playfair to have been totally mistaken in their reasonings concerning the antiquity of the Indian astronomy, and to have proceeded upon an entire ignorance of the principles of the artificial system of the Hindus, the nature of which he states to consist in this, that certain points of time back are

fixed upon as epochs at which the planets are assumed to fall into a line of mean conjunction with the Sun in the beginning of Aries, and that, from the points of time so assumed as epochs, the Hindu astronomer carries on his calculations as if they had been settled so by actual observation, and determines the mean annual motions which he must employ in his system from thence as will give the positions of the planets in his own time, as near as he is able to determine the same by observation. He then proceeds to show by what means such fictitious epochs may be assumed without incurring the danger of a perceptible variation from the real mean motions, and upon the whole he has fortified his argument in a way that renders it not easy to be shaken. . . . At all events, the main foundation on which the extraordinary antiquity of the Indian records has been built must be given up as no longer tenable. . . .

"That the Indians did at a very early age cultivate astronomy, and that to them we are indebted for that most ingenious and useful invention of an arithmetical character, possessing at the same time an absolute and a local value, cannot, undoubtedly, be denied. And yet it must be admitted that there are such indications of gross ignorance in the very science which they have so much studied, that one scarcely knows how to give them credit for certain other discoveries which are ascribed to them. To make the circumference of the Earth amount to 2,456,000,000 miles, and to hold the Moon's distance from the Earth to be greater than that of the Sun, are not proofs of any great progress in astronomical research. In truth, from circumstances such as these, joined to the fact of the Indians being unable to give any explanation of, or assign any reasons for their particular Tables and

calculations, there seems to be good reason to think that much of what has been supposed to be their own invention has been derived to them from other sources."—*Archbishop Magee on the Atonement*, vol. ii., No. lxix., pp. 252–61.

It is not necessary for me to pursue this argument concerning the antiquity of the Hindu Books, proved by the collateral testimony of astronomical calculations, any farther. I have stated the principal opinions which have been maintained *pro* and *con*, and the conclusion, which will be sufficient, for my purpose, to arrive at, is simply this, that the point in dispute is doubtful. M. Delambre, who wrote some years later (in 1814) has summed up the controversy in the following manner:—

Translation.—" M. Laplace who had some interest in supporting the great antiquity of Indian astronomy, and who had at first spoken of mean movements, and of Hindu epochs, in the most favourable manner, has concluded, like the learned Englishman,* by thinking and writing that their Tables have no greater antiquity than the thirteenth century. Mr. Playfair, in replying to the objection of M. Laplace, does not overthrow it. It signifies little that Bailly has affirmed, more or less directly and positively, the general conjunction of the planets which has determined the epoch, that which has not been clearly proved is the *fact* (of the conjunction). If the Tables positively indicate that conjunction, then the epoch is imaginary, and Hindu astronomy is much more modern (than they suppose). If the Tables do not indicate the conjunction, then Laplace's objection falls of itself. But even supposing the objection itself to be without force, there would remain abundance of other difficulties.

* Mr. J. Bentley.

"A few lucky coincidences among a crowd of erroneous or contradictory calculations would not suffice to prove the antiquity of the Indian astronomy. The mysterious form of their Tables and of their methods would be sufficient to throw suspicions on their veracity. It is a question which probably will never be decided, and which cannot be decided, except by new discoveries in the writings of the Hindus, and by a much more voluminous and less amusing treatise than that of M. Bailly."

NOTES.

Note 1.—Page 8.

That spirit and matter are different, is proved by the Naiyáyikas by the following argument, viz.:—"An instrument requires an operator; thus, without an operator, no effect could result from cutting instruments, such as an axe. In like manner, without an operator, no effect would result from the eyes which are the instruments of vision. Hence, we infer the existence of an operative being."

Again, "Truth and intelligence are the eternal attributes of God, not of the individual soul which is susceptible both of knowledge and ignorance, of pleasure and pain; therefore, God and the individual soul are distinct; if you deny this, how can you account for the soul being confined to material habitations, and again released from them?"

Note 2.—Page 10.

"Iswara, or the Lord, is the principle of happiness. Jiva, or the vital soul, is the principle of consciousness. These two modes of spirit comprehend the universe. The creation, from the beginning to the consummation of all things, proceeds from Iswara; life, from the time of awakening, until it ceases in the Infinite Being, proceeds from Jiva."

Note 3.—Page 11.

The *Kalpa* is thus calculated:—"Fifteen Nimeshas, or twinklings of the eye, make one *Káshtha*. Thirty Káshthas equal one *Kalá*. Thirty Kalás equal one *Kshana*. Twelve Kshanas make one *Muhúrtta*. Thirty Muhúrttas equal one day and night. Thirty such days make one month. Six months form an *Ayana*, and two Ayanas make one year. Twelve thousand years constitute the period of the four *Yugas*. The four Yugas, viz., *Krita*, *Tretá*, *Dwápara*, and *Kali*, constitute a great age: a thousand great ages are a day of Brahma; and fourteen *Menus** reign within that term; or (if calculated by *Manwantaras**), a Manwantara is equal to seventy-one times the number of years contained in the four Yugas;—this is the duration of a Menu. Fourteen times this period, or 306,720,000 years × 14 = a day of Brahma; and this is the duration of a Kalpa, viz., 4,320,000,000 years.† At the end of *Kalpa* a dissolution of the universe occurs, when all the three worlds, earth, and the regions of space, are consumed by fire. When the three worlds are but one mighty ocean, *Brahma*, who is one with *Náráyana*, satiated with the demolition of the universe, sleeps upon his serpent bed for a night, of equal duration with his day, at the close of which he creates anew. Of such days and nights is a year of Brahma composed; and an hundred such years constitute his life. One Parárddha, or half his existence, has expired, terminating with the Mahá Kalpa, called Pádma. The Kalpa, or day of

* *Manwantara*, the period of *Menu's* incarnation.

† To make this calculation correct, the Hindus add fifteen intervals (each of 1,728,000 years, amounting in all to 25,920,000), called Sandhi, i. e. "joining," one Sandhi being allowed for the Kalpa, and one for each Manwantara.

Brahma, called Váráha, is the first of the second period of Brahma's existence."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book I., chapter ii.

NOTE 4.—Page 11.

Herodotus gives the following account of the Egyptians' belief in the doctrine of the transmigration:—Πρώτοι δὲ καὶ *τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι εἶσι οἱ εἰπόντες ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχη ἀθάνατος ἐστι, τοῦ σωμάτος δε καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον αἰει γινόμενον ἐσδυέται. ἐπέανδε πзριελθῃ πάντα τα χερσᾶια, και τα θαλάσσια, και τα πετείνα, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν· τὴν περιηλύσιν δε αὐτῃ γινέσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι.*—*Herodotus*, Κλειω, c. 123.

NOTE 5.—Page 14.

"Nous avons véritablement, me dirent ils, dans nos temples, quantité de statues diverses comme celle de Brahma, Mahádeva, Gânesa, et Bhavani, qui sont des principaux et des plus parfaits Devetas, et même de quantité d'autres de moindre perfection aux quelles nous rendons beaucoup d'honneur. Nous nous prosternons devant elles, et leur presentons des fleurs, du riz, des huiles, de senteur, du safran, et autres choses semblables avec beaucoup de ceremonie. Ne'anmoins nous ne croyons point que ces statues soient ou Brahma même, ou Vishnú lui même, et ainsi des autres, mais seulement leurs images, et representations, et nous ne leurs rendons ces honneurs qu'a cause de ce qu'elles représéntent, elles sont afin qu'il y ait quelque chose devant les yeux qui arrête l'esprit, et quand nous prions, ce n'est pas la statue que nous prions mais celui qui est représenté par la statue. Au reste nous reconnoissons que c'est Dieu qui est le maître absolu et le seul Toutpuissant."—*Voyages de Bernier*, vol. ii., p. 157, &c.

Note 6.—Page 16.

"It is not possible to conjecture when this more simple and primitive form of adoration was succeeded by the worship of images and types representing Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, and other imaginary beings, constituting a mythological pantheon of most ample extent; or when Ráma and Krishna, who appear to have been originally real and historical characters, were elevated to the dignity of divinities. Image worship is alluded to by Manu in several passages, but with an intimation that those Brahmans who subsist by ministering in temples are an inferior and degraded class. The story of the Rámáyana and Mahabhárata turns wholly upon the doctrine of incarnations, all the chief *dramatis personæ* of the poems being impersonations of gods and demigods, and celestial spirits. The ritual appears to be that of the Vedas, and it may be doubted if any allusion to image worship occurs; but the doctrine of propitiation by penance and praise prevails throughout, and Vishnu and Siva are the especial objects of panegyric aud invocation. In these two works, then, we trace unequivocal indications of a departure from the elemental worship of the Vedas, and the origin or elaboration of legends which form the great body of the mythological religion of the Hindus. How far they only improved upon the cosmogony and chronology of their predecessors, or in what degree the traditions of families and dynasties may originate with them, are questions that can only be determined when the Vedas and the two works in question shall have been more thoroughly examined."—*Preface to the Translation of the Vishnu Purána, by Professor Wilson*, pp. 2, 3.

Note 7.—Page 19.

"*Subtile body*" (differs from the *subtile elements*, as it) "is that which, at the period of universal dissolution possessed of *mahat* (intelligence) and the other subtile principles, merges into the chief one, or nature, and exempted from further revolutions, remains extant there until creation is renewed, being bound in the bondage of the stolidity of nature, and thereby incompetent to the act of migrating. At the season of recreating it again revolves, and is hence called *linga*."—*Gaurapada.*

"It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion, that the senses or their faculties and the gross elements partake of a common nature, is expressed in the verses—

Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ.
Αἴθερι δ' αιθερα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ, πῦρ ἀΐδήλον.

Professor Wilson.

Note 8.—Page 19.

The names of the five elements are *sabda*, शब्द, *sound ; sparsa*, स्पर्श, *touch ; rupa*, रूप, *colour ; rasa*, रस, *savour ;* and *gandha*, गन्ध, *odour.*

Note 9.—Page 25.

Kapila's dogma being that "variety of condition proves the multitude of souls," the "singlèness" (eka) of the soul only signifies its being one and the same in its various migrations. "One soul is born, not another, in the transmigration ;" and "there may be various unions of one soul according to the difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels."

NOTE 10.—Page 27.

"The Sánkhyas maintain the possibility of consentaneous operation of the organs of sense and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the doctrine of the Vaiséshikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process."—*See Professor Wilson's Sánkhya Kárika*, translated, p. 107.

NOTE 11.—Page 28.

There was but one rudimental or subtile body at the period of creation, consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs, five rudimental elements, and intellect. This was at first embodied in the person of Brahma under the character of Hiranyagarbha, हिरण्यगर्भ, *gold-embryo*, and afterwards multiplied individually according to variety of actions.

NOTE 12.—Page 29.

Some of the expounders of the Sánkhya doctrines have not thought even the rudimental body sufficiently material for the purpose of independent existence, when separated from gross body, and a third corporeal frame has been devised for its support.—*See Professor Wilson*, as before, p. 134.

NOTE 13.—Page 29.

"The notion of some corporeal, however subtile, envelopment of soul, giving to invisible and intangible soul some visible and tangible materiality, such as will at least enable the soul to assume some degree of material configuration, and to be capable of corporeal feelings, however spiritualized and refined, even after its separation from the body, has prevailed at all times, and in all ages."—*Ibid.*, p. 136.

Note 14.—Page 29.

"I will now describe to you elemental dissolution :—When by dearth and fire all the worlds, and *Pâtâlas*, are withered up, and the modifications of Mahat, and other products of nature, are destroyed, the progress of elemental dissolution is begun. Then, first the waters swallow up the property of earth, which is the rudiment of smell; and earth deprived of its property (peculiarity) proceeds to destruction. Devoid of the rudiment of odour the earth becomes one with water. The waters then being much augmented, roaring and rushing along, fill up all space, whether agitated or still. When the universe is thus pervaded by the waves of the watery element, its rudimental flavour is licked up by the element of fire, and in consequence of the destruction of their rudiments, the waters themselves are destroyed. Deprived of the essential rudiment of flavour, they become one with fire; and the universe is, therefore, entirely filled with flame, which drinks up the water on every side, and gradually overspreads the whole of the world. While space is enveloped in flame, above, below, and around, the element of wind seizes upon the rudimental property, or form, which is the cause of light; and that being withdrawn, all becomes of the nature of air. The rudiment of form being destroyed, and fire deprived of its rudiment, air extinguishes fire, and spreads resistlessly over space, which is deprived of light when fire merges into air. Air, then, accompanied by sound, which is the source of ether, extends everywhere throughout the ten regions of space, until ether seizes upon contact, its rudimental property, by the loss of which air is destroyed, and ether remains unmodified. Devoid of form, flavour, touch, and smell, it exists unem-

bodied and vast, and pervades the whole of space. Ether, whose characteristic property and rudiment is sound, exists alone, occupying all the vacuity of space. But then the radical element, egotism, devours sound; and all the elements and faculties are at once merged into their original. This primary element is consciousness combined with the property of darkness, and is itself swallowed up by *mahat*, whose characteristic property is intelligence; and *earth* and *mahat* are the inner and outer boundaries of the universe. In this manner, as in the creation, the seven forms of nature were reckoned from *mahat* to earth, so at the time of elemental dissolution, those seven re-enter successively into each other; and the egg of Brahma is dissolved in the waters that surround it. . . . Equilibrium of the three properties without excess or deficiency is called nature (*Prakriti*); this *prakriti* is essentially the same whether discrete or indiscrete, only that which is discrete is finally lost or absorbed in the indiscrete. Spirit also, which is one, pure, imperishable, eternal, all-pervading, is a portion of that supreme spirit which is all things; that spirit which is other than embodied spirit, in which there are no attributes of name, species, or the like, which is one with all wisdom, and is to be understood as sole existence, that is Brahma—all that is—from whence the perfect sage returns no more. Nature, essentially, both discrete and indiscrete, and spirit which is united with body, both resolve into supreme spirit. Supreme spirit is the upholder of all things, and the ruler of all things."—*Translation of Vishnu Purána*, pp. 635, 636.

Note 15.—Page 31.

"Obstruction means properly, whatever obstructs the soul's object of final liberation: it is, consequently, any cause

of bondage, or of confinement to worldly existence, or of perpetual migration; and is, therefore, one of the four elements of the creation of the world, as—if spirit was not so confined, created forms would never have existed. So the Sutra of Kapila, has 'bondage is from obstruction, but liberation depends on knowledge.'"—*Professor Wilson.*

Note 16.—Page 33.

"According to the Sánkhya Kárika and Gaurapáda, nature acts spontaneously, but the incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends, constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sánkhyas for the necessity of a Providence to whom the ends of existence are known, and by whom nature is guided. The atheistical Sánkhyas on the other hand, contend that there is no occasion for a guiding providence, but that the activity of nature for the purpose of accomplishing soul's object is an intuitive necessity."—*Professor Wilson.*

Note 17.—Page 36.

"The *Kapila* to whom the Sánkhya philosophy is attributed is variously described by different authorities. In a verse quoted by Gaurapáda he is enumerated among the sons of Brahma. Vijnyána Bhikshu asserts him to have been an incarnation of Vishnu. He refers also to an opinion of a Vedánta writer, that Kapila was an incarnation of *Agni* (or *fire*). There does not appear to be any good authority for this notion, except that Kapila, कपिल, is a synonym for fire, as it is of a brown, dusky, or a tawny colour. The

identification with Vishnu rests upon better grounds. The popular belief of the *Vaishnavas* is that there have been twenty-four avatárás of Vishnu, and that Kapila is one of them. The earliest authority for this specification is the Rámáyána—in which Vasudeva or Vishnu is said by Brahma to assume the form of Kapila. . . . Brahma having heard the words of the gods who were bewildered with the dread of destruction, replied to them, and said,—'Vasudeva is the Lord, he assuming the form of Kapila sustains continually the world.' So also the Mahábhárata, 'that Vasudeva whom the holy Munis call Kapila.' According to the Bhagavat, he was the fifth incarnation of Vishnu. The fifth avatára was named Kapila, the chief of saints, who revealed to Asuri the Sánkhya explanation of first principles. But to reconcile the facts of the case with the Sánkhya theory of the results of perfect knowledge, there is no necessity for assuming Kapila to have been an incarnation of God, and most probably if the theistical Sánkhyas thus account for the existence of their favourite teacher, the atheistical Sánkhyas would explain his prolonged existence in human form, notwithstanding his having attained perfect knowledge by one of the aphorisms of the sect, viz., 'By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless, yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it,' that is, the *yogi* (*devotee*) is no longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dispassion, &c., which are the causes of bodily existence; and his continuance in the bodily form arises from the effects lasting after the cause has ceased, 'like the whirl of a wheel, after that the impulse that set it a-going has been withdrawn.' As, when the potter's work

is done, the wheel, in consequence of the momentum given to it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such influences has expired, so virtue and vice, incident to body, initiative and mature, constitute impulse. The effects of former acts of virtue and vice then cease, when the impulse derived from them is worn out, and the possession of knowledge prevents all future acts."—*Professor Wilson.*

NOTE 18.—Page 37.

In the Gánesa of the Hindus we discover the Janus of the Romans. In Europe and India both, the god of wisdom. All sacrifices and religious ceremonies, all addresses to superior deities, and all worldly affairs of consequence, are commenced by pious Hindus with an address to Ganesa. In many parts of India every new built house has the name of Gánesa inscribed upon it, and few books begin without these words, "salutation to Gánesa." There is also another mode of address or invocation customarily met with at the beginning of Sanscrit compositions, especialy those which are considered to be sacred, viz., ओम, OM being the initials of Brahma, Vishnu, and Mahadeva (Siva). OM or OMKara, at the beginning of every *mantra*, is regarded as investing it with peculiar sanctity.

NOTE 19.—Page 38.

The Hindu notion with regard to the process of the mind in receiving impressions or ideas is different from the one usually received in Europe, viz., that the ideas enter in through the avenue of the senses, and produce their impressions upon the mind. The Hindu notion is, that the understanding goes out through the avenues of the senses, and ap-

prehends by fastening upon the objects presented. This process is compared to the mode in which liquids adapt themselves to the shape of whatever vessels they are poured into. "As the water of a reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having entered by a channel the basins, becomes five-cornered or quadrangular, or otherwise shaped just like those beds, so the manifesting internal organ having gone through the channel of the sight, or some other organ of sense (through which alone the internal organ can reach its object, just as the water without a channel could not reach the beds to be irrigated), to where there is an object, becomes modified by whatever the form of the object may be, and this modification is called 'vritti.'"—*Vedánta Paribhásha.*

NOTE 20.—Page 38.

The existence of either matter or mind is not generally disbelieved, their relation to each other is the point which is difficult to clear up. Can the mind directly perceive matter, or is there anything intermediate interposed between the two? Consciousness supposes the former—philosophy the latter—to be the case. On this, Professor Reid observes:—"We have here—as to whether the mind perceives matter directly or not—we have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions: on the one side are included all who are unpractised in philosophical research, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature,—on the other hand, all the philosophers. In this division I find myself classed with the vulgar."

NOTE 21.—Page 40.

We have a passage occurring in the Rig Veda, which may be an allusion to the Vedántic doctrine of the three qualities

(guna), and the liberation of the soul from them. The passage occurs in the twenty-fourth Hymn, and is as follows (expressed in Roman letters):—

"Tamam, Varuna, pasam asmat ava, adhamam vi, madhyamam srathaya."—"Remove, O Varuna, the topmost fetter from us; unfasten the middle one; take off the lowest also."

Note 22.—Page 46.

In the Institutes of Manu, there are but two kinds of bodies mentioned, a subtile and a corporeal one, "after death another body composed of the five rudimental elements is produced." —*Institutes of Manu*, Book XII., chapter XVI.

Note 23.—Page 48.

In the Bhagavad Gítá, soul is described as retaining senses and mind in the intervals of migration. "When spirit abandons a body it migrates, taking with it the senses, as the wind wafts along with it the perfume of the flowers."

Note 24.—Page 49.

Dialectics teach the method of treating the science of ontology. Taking the illustration of a tree, ontology resembles the root, ethics the trunk, and physics the branches. Ethics and physics, therefore, being the two derived branches from dialectics, it may be considered that if there be any radical fault in the dialectics, it will vitiate the ethics and physics. The fault of systems of ontology is the *identification* of *knowledge* and *being;* for the *defining* of being by science is, defining a whole by its part, or substance by one of its attributes, and this error flows through all the branches of such philosophy; the error of defining being by one of its modes. Phy-

siology is the science of phenomena; ontology the science of essence; ontology, or the science of essence, cannot be precise as mathematical demonstration, both owing to the nature of the mind, and the connexion of the mind with matter, for we can only know in so far as we can compare or differentiate, but when, as in this case, there are no means of comparison, there can be no knowledge. We must, therefore, be content to render to reason the things that are reason's, and to faith the things which are of faith. Ontology also may be objected to as implying that the knowledge which we have of phenomena is only phenomenal, and, therefore, untrue or uncertain; whereas, it might be objected that, as we can only know phenomena, we know them as they are, not as they seem to be; in other words, knowledge is presentative, and the mind is brought by it face to face with matter.—This subject is discussed in Sir W. Hamilton's Metaphysical Works, to which I must refer my reader.

Note 25.—Page 50.

In the "Logical Aphorisms" of Gotama, the logical mode of conducting a debate is described in a manner which strongly reminds the reader of the public disputations which used to be held in public places, and in the universities of Europe, before the art of printing. The passage is as follows:—"What is to be admitted as proof (pramána), having been ascertained, and the subject of controversy (prameya) having been stated, and an umpire having been appointed, he is as yet in a state of uncertainty (sansaya) as to the thing to be proved, and whether there is sufficient cause (prayojana) for the controversy. The postulant, therefore, enlarges upon the importance of the question, and produces authorities (drishtánta) to establish his case (siddhánta). Respondent objects, showing

the inconclusiveness of this statement by a *parâmarsa* rejoinder. The first speaker makes a refutation (tarka) of such objections, and brings forward a confirmation (nirnaya) of his own assertions. The objector persists, and calls for a fair and impartial discussion (vâda); but being defeated in fair argument he resorts to such unworthy artifices as are furnished by the art of sophistry and equivoque, viz., wrangling (jalpa); cavils (vitanda); fallacies (hetwábhása), and such like equivocations and sophistries (chchala); but having met a second time with a confutation (játi) from the first speaker, he is silenced by an adverse decision (nigrahasthána), which concludes the debate."

NOTE 26.—Page 52.

The Vaiséshikas maintain the origin of all things from primæval atoms or monads. They say that that which is not may proceed from that which is, i. e., that the insubstantial forms of things are derived from actual corpuscular substance, according to which opinion Aristotle says,—

Τούτων τό μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον.

Professor Wilson.

NOTE 27.—Page 56.

"Where eight-fold power, as *minuteness*, &c., is the efficient cause, then non-obstruction is the effect. Such power is unimpeded in the sphere of Brahmá, or in any other."—*Commentary of Bháshya on Sánkhya Kárika*, No. 45.

NOTE 28.—Page 61.

The Hindus hold that effects or products are identical with cause. They consider them as proofs of the existence of cause, and they maintain that in their manifested conditions as forms, they may possess properties different from their source or cause.

NOTE 29.—Page 62.

The multiplied existence of soul is in especial contradiction to the doctrine of the Vedántins, of the universality of one supreme soul of the world from which all human souls are derived, as in such texts as this,—"One only existent soul is distributed in all beings. It is beheld collectively or distributively (dispersedly) like the reflexion of the Moon in still or troubled water. Soul, eternal, omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied by the power of illusion, not of its own nature." The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the Vedas. As far as we are able to learn of the doctrines of Pythagoras, he taught that human souls were portions of one supreme soul. Plato held the souls of men to be emanations from God, through the soul of the world. Souls and bodies were both portions of the το ἕν, the "one existent" of the Stoics, and even Aristotle appears to have conceived the human soul to be an intellectual energy derived from an eternal intelligence. Cudworth asserts that none of the ancient philosophers maintained the Sánkhya notion of the eternity of individual souls.—*Professor Wilson on Sánkhya Kárika*, p. 71.

NOTE 30.—Page 62.

Gaurapáda observes: "There being activity of the qualities, soul, which is indifferent or inactive, appears as if it was the agent which it is not, as a man who is not a thief being taken up along with thieves is suspected of being a thief also, so soul being connected with the three active qualities is supposed, though inert, to be active also." *Prakriti* (matter) and *Purusha* (soul) are not in all respects included in the indiscrete principle. "In the properties of non-causability, constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-sup-

port, substantiveness, entireness, and supremacy, soul and nature correspond. They differ in other respects, however." —*Professor Wilson.*

NOTE 31.—Page 62.

"Although the special object in Sânkhya Kârika, No. 10, is the dissimilarity between the effects of nature and their material cause, yet the term *avyakta*, अव्यक्त, applies equally to *purusha* or soul, also an invisible or indiscrete principle, and accordingly *soul* differs from discrete principles in the same circumstances as *nature*."—*Professor Wilson.*

NOTE 32.—Page 64.

"The incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends, constitute a principal argument with the *theistical* Sânkhyas for the necessity of Providence to whom the ends of existence are known, and by whom nature is guided. The *atheistical* Sânkhyas, on the other hand, contend that there is no occasion for a guiding providence, but that the activity of nature for the purpose of accomplishing soul's object is an intuitive necessity."—*Professor Wilson.*

NOTE 33.—Page 67.

With regard to the connexion between mind and matter, there are *three* suppositions. First, that there is substantial reality in neither the one or the other, that object and subject are both phenomenal, and that all knowledge is only opinion. On this supposition the world is indeed a stage, and its inhabitants are actors; virtue and vice are but shadows, and absolute *nihilism* must be the end of all. The second opinion is, that there is reality in either subject or object (mind or

matter), but not in both. If reality is asserted of matter and not of mind, *materialism* is the result; if reality be asserted of mind, but not of matter, *idealism* is the result. The third opinion is, that there is reality in both object and subject (matter and mind), that the universal testimony of consciousness is not to be set aside because of the difficulty of deciding how such opposites as mind and matter act together. By thus believing we escape from nihilism, which denies both mind and matter. That *Unitarianism* which is the Vedántic doctrine, which admits the existence of only one thing,—mind, we also disown; and we arrive in our belief to simple *dualism*, which is so called because of the belief in the two things really existing, viz., both *mind*, which receives the impressions, and *matter*, from whence they proceed, and we refer, for proof and testimony of our belief being correct, to consciousness.—This subject is discussed in Sir W. Hamilton's Metaphysical Works, to which I must refer my reader.

NOTE 34.—Page 68.

The theory of the Realists resembles this notion, viz., that the soul contains representations of every possible substance and event (the idea being of eternal, the fact to which it is an idea being of contingent being). Thus the idea is antecedent to the fact, though the fact is to us suggestive of the idea. We are not, therefore, depending upon the phenomena of which our senses are cognizant for ideas, which have originally been impressed upon the mind, which, therefore, *sees them in dreams* without the *intervention of matter*. According to Des Cartes, however, the *idea* is the object of perception, an image derived from objects. According to him the idea is not separable from, nor antecedent to, the object which suggests it, but is derived from it.

NOTE 35.—Page 69.

The theory that there is a substance of infinite divisibility, of which the elements themselves are composed, is not peculiar to Hindu philosophy. The Greeks had their "στοιχεῖα στοιχειων"—minute and imperishable atoms, of which they supposed that all things were formed.

NOTE 36.—Page 74.

"Contrivance appears to prove everything which we wish to prove. It proves the personality of the Deity as distinguished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes a principle, which terms, in the mouths of those who use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and express an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a personal agent. Now that which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose, as well as the power of providing means and directing them to their end. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow, which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the existence of a mind, and in whatever a mind resides, is a person. The seat of intellect is a person. This sphere may be enlarged to an indefinite extent, may comprehend the universe, and, being so imagined, may serve to furnish us with as good a notion as we are capable of forming of the immensity of the Divine nature, of a Being infinite as well in essence as in power. Yet, nevertheless a Person. . . . Of this we are certain, that whatever the Deity be, neither the universe, nor any part of it which we see can be *He*. The universe itself is merely a collective name; its parts are all which are real, which are things.

Now, inert matter is out of the question, and organized matter (substances) include marks of contrivance; whatever in its constitution testifies design necessarily carries us to something beyond itself, to some other being, to a designer prior to and out of itself. . . . Nothing can be God which is ordered by a wisdom and a will which itself is devoid of, which is indebted for any of its properties to contrivance *ab extra.* The *not* having that in His nature which requires the exertion of another prior being, which property is sometimes called self-sufficiency, and sometimes self-comprehension, appertains to the Deity as His essential distinction, and removes His nature from that of all things which we see,—which consideration contains the answer to a question which has sometimes been asked, namely, why, since something or other must have existed from eternity, may not *the present universe be that something?* The contrivance perceived in it proves that to be impossible; nothing *contrived* can in a strict and proper sense be eternal, forasmuch as the contriver must have existed before the contrivance."—*Paley's Natural Theology*, chapter xxiii.

NOTE 37.—Page 75.

"It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connexion between two successive events, or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the other as its cause. From experience, indeed, we learn that there are many events which are constantly conjoined, so that the one invariably follows the other; but it is possible, for anything we know to the contrary, that this connexion, though a constant one as far as our observation has reached, may not be a necessary connexion; nay, it is possible that there may

be no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena which we see; and if there be any such connexions existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them. I shall endeavour to show in another place that this doctrine does not lead to those *sceptical* conclusions concerning the existence of a First Cause, which an author of great ingenuity has attempted to deduce from it; at present it is sufficient to remark that the word 'cause' is used in two senses, which are widely different. When it is said that every change in nature indicates the operation of a *cause*, the word 'cause' expresses something which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change, and without which it could not have happened. This may be called the metaphysical meaning of the word, and such causes may be called metaphysical, or efficient causes. In natural philosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being the cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are constantly conjoined, so that, when we see the one, we may expect the other. These may be called, for the sake of distinction, *physical* causes. . . . In stating the argument for the existence of the Deity, several modern philosophers have been at pains to illustrate that law of our nature which leads us to refer every change we perceive in the universe to the operation of an efficient cause. This reference is not the result of reasoning, but necessarily accompanies the perception, so as to render it impossible for us to see the change without feeling a conviction of the operation of some cause by which it was produced, much in the same manner in which we find it to be impossible to conceive a sensation without being impressed with a belief of the existence of a sentient being. Hence it is, that when we see two events constantly conjoined, we

are led to associate the idea of causation or efficiency with the former, and to refer to it that power or energy by which the change was produced, in consequence of which association we come to consider philosophy as the knowledge of efficient causes. . . . . In the same way we are led to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of power, force, energy, and causation, which are all attributes of mind, and can exist in mind only."—*Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, chapter i., section ii., pp. 55, 56.

NOTE 38.—Page 78.

"Our knowledge of the course of nature is entirely the result of observation and experiment, and there is no instance in which we perceive such a *connexion* between *two successive events* as might *enable us to infer the one from the other* as a *necessary consequence.* From this principle, which is now very generally admitted by philosophers, Mr. Hume has deduced an objection to the *argument a posteriori* for the existence of the Deity. After having proved that we cannot get the idea of necessary connexion from examining the conjunction between any two events, he takes for granted that we have no other idea of cause and effect than of two successive events which are invariably conjoined; that we have, therefore, no reason to think that any one event in nature is necessarily connected with another, or to infer the operation of power from the changes which we observe in the universe. . . . But if we have no idea of cause and effect, different from that of mere succession, it would appear to us no less absurd to suppose two events disjoined which we have constantly seen connected, than to suppose a change take place without a cause. The former supposition, however, is easy in all cases

whatever; the latter may be safely pronounced to be impossible. Our experience of the established connexion of physical events is by far too narrow a foundation for our belief, that every change must have a cause. . . . The most probable account of the matter seems to be, that the idea of causation or of power necessarily accompanies the perception of change in a way somewhat analogous to that in which sensation implies a being who thinks."—*Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, Sections 252, 253–57, 259.

NOTE 39.—Page 79.

"Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ cum Deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur."

Translation.—"We also, happy and *immortal* souls, when God shall decree to renew the world again, all things tottering to their fall, ourselves being but a small addition to so vast a heap of ruins, *shall be reduced to the primitive elements* (of the soul)."—*Seneca's Dialogues*, Book VI., chapters xxvi., xxvii.

NOTE 40.—Page 79.

"Socrates totam philosophiam revocavit ad mores, et hanc summam dixit esse sapientiam, bona, malaque distinguere."

("Socrates reduced all philosophy to morals, and said that this was the perfection of wisdom, to distinguish good and evil things.")—*Seneca's Epistles*, 71–7.

"Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsâ naturâ involutis in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse ut de virtutibus

et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret, cælestia autem vel procul esse a nostrâ cognitione censeret, vel si maximè cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum."

("Socrates appears to me, a thing which all are agreed upon, first to have called away philosophy from things abstruse, and wrapt in mystery by their very nature, in which things all philosophers before him have been occupied, and to have applied it to common life, to investigate concerning virtues and vices, and, in general, concerning things good and evil; and to conclude that the things of heaven were either far removed from our capabilities of knowledge, or, even if they were thoroughly comprehended, would contribute nothing to living well")—*Cicero*, *Academica*, Book I., chap. iv., sect. 15.

NOTE 41.—Page 80.

"Ἀρχαῖός τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ τα πάντα, και διὰ Θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνεστήκεν."

("There is a certain ancient account, and traditionary amongst all men, that all things are from God, and have been put together, as we see them, by God.")—*Aristotle*, Περὶ Κόσμου, chapter vi.

NOTE 42.—Page 80.

"The Gnostic philosophers maintained the existence from eternity of a Being full of goodness, wisdom, and the other virtues, of whom no mortal can form a complete idea; a Being who is the purest light, and is diffused through that boundless space to which they gave the Greek appellation of *pleroma* (πληρῶμα); that this eternal and most perfect Being, after existing alone and in absolute repose during an infinite period, produced out of himself two spirits of different sexes, that

from the marriage of these two spirits others of a similar nature originate; that successive generations ensued, and thus, in process of time, a celestial family was formed in the 'pleroma.' This divine progeny, these philosophers called Æons, *αἰῶνες* (a term which signifies eternal). Beyond the region of light, where God and His family dwell, exists a rude and unformed mass of matter, heaving itself continually in wild commotion. This mass, one of the celestial family at a certain time, either accidentally wandering beyond the 'pleroma,' or sent out by the Deity, undertook to reduce to order, to decorate with various gifts, and to people with human beings, and animals of different species, and finally to endow or enrich with some portions of the celestial light or substance. This builder of the world, who was distinct from the supreme God, they called the Demiurge, δημιουργός."—*Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History*, vol. i., p. 70. Soames' Edition.

Note 43.—Page 82.

"It is owing to the subtilty of nature, not to the non-existence of the original principle (*prakriti*) that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects."—*Sánkhya Káriká*, No. 8.

"Effect, according to the Sánkhya system, necessarily implies cause, as it could not exist without it; but on this topic there are different opinions, thus particularized by *Váchespati*:—'1st. Some say that that which is may proceed from that which is not. 2nd. Some say that effect is not a separately existing thing, but the revolution of an existing thing. 3rd. Some say that that which is not may proceed from that which is. 4th. The ancients assert that that which is comes from that which is' (*ens* from *ens*). . . Of the doctrines here

alluded to, the first is said to be that of some of the Buddhists, who deny the existence of *prakriti*, or any universal cause, or of anything which they cannot verify by perception. The second is that of the Vedántins, who maintain that all that exists is but the vivarttas, literally, the revolutions, the emanations from, or manifestations of, one only universal Spirit. It might be said that the Sánkhya seems to teach a similar doctrine, in so far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit, to one common source, and makes all else identical with *prakriti*. It differs, however, in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the radical *prakriti*, as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause which exists no longer, except in its effects. The Vedántins, on the other hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are only its present operations. The popular form of Vedantism asserts, indeed, that nothing exists but cause, and that its effects, or all that appears to exist, are unrealities, illusions, the phantoms of a dream; but the commentator on the Sánkhya Pravachana declares that the doctrine of Máyá, or illusion, is modern, and is contrary to the Vedas."—See *Sánkhya Káriká*, translated by Professor Wilson, pp. 31, 32.

Note 44.—Page 83.

See Paley's "Evidences," chapter viii.

Note 45.—Page 88.

"Dr. Reid has remarked that although Des Cartes infers the existence of mind from the operations of which we are conscious, yet he could not reconcile himself to the notion of an unknown substance, or *substratum*, to which these operations belonged. And it was on this account, he conjectures,

that he made the essence of the soul to consist in thought, as for a similar reason he had made the essence of matter to consist in extension. But I am afraid that this supposition is not perfectly reconcileable with Des Cartes' writings, for he repeatedly speaks with the utmost confidence of the existence of substances of which we have only a relative idea, and even in attempting to show that thought is the essential attribute of mind, and extension of matter, he considers them as nothing more than attributes and qualities belonging to these substances."—*Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind*, Note A.

NOTE 46.—Page 89.

"Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quæ ita existit, ut nullâ alia re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem substantia quæ nullâ planè re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes non nisi ope concursus Dei existere posse percipimus, atque ideo nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo et illis *univocè* (ut dici solet in scholis), hoc est, nulla ejus nominis significatio potest distinctè intelligi quæ Deo et creaturis sit communis."

("By a *substance* we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists as to require the aid of no other thing to help it to exist. And, doubtless, only one single substance which is depending upon nothing else at all, can be conceived, namely *God*. All other substances we conceive not to be able to exist without the help of God's support; and, therefore, the name of substance does not belong to God and to them in the same sense (*univocally*, to use a phrase of the schools), that is, no signification of that name can distinctly be understood which applies in common to God and to His creatures.")—*Des Cartes' Philosophical Principles*, Part i., chapter li.

Note 47.—Page 90.

"*'Αλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποθνησκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψύχας ἐγὼ· ἕρμαῖον γὰρ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῖς κακοῖς· 'Αλλὰ τί; τάς μὲν εὐσεβῶν ἐν κρείττονι ποι χώρῳ μένειν, τάς δε ἀδίκους, και πονήρας ἐν χείρονι, τόν τῆς κρισέως ἐκδεχομένας χρόνον τότε.*"

("However, I am by no means maintaining that all souls perish by death (for truly that would be an unexpected gain to the wicked). What then? That the souls of the good abide in a much better place, and the unjust and wicked in a worse (than the present), awaiting the time of the judgment.")—*Justin Martyr*, *Dialogues with Trypho*, p. 223.

Note 48.—Page 90.

"I confess, philosophers of old did look upon the resurrection of the body as impossible, and though some of them thought the souls of the dead did live again, yet they never conceived that they were united to the same bodies, and that their flesh should rise out of the dust, that it might be conjoined to the spirit of a man. . . . . As the ancient philosophers thought a creation impossible, because they looked only upon the constant works of nature, among which they never find anything produced out of nothing, so did they think a resurrection of corrupted, dissolved, and dissipated bodies to be as impossible, because they could never observe any action or operation in nature which did or could produce any such effect, and yet, we being not tied to the consideration of nature only, but estimating things possible and impossible by the power of God, will easily demonstrate that there is no impossibility that the dead should rise: for if the resurrection of the dead be impossible, it must be so in one of these re-

spects, either in reference to the agent, or in reference to the patient, either because it is a work of so much difficulty that there neither is nor can be any agent of wisdom, power, or activity sufficient to effect it; or else, because the soul of man is so far separated by death from the body, and the parts of the body so much dissolved and altered, as to be absolutely incapable by any power to be united as they were."—*Pearson on the Creed*, page 556.

NOTE 49.—Page 90.

The theory of the transmigration of the soul after death into a succession of gross temporary bodies, therein to inhabit the earth again repeatedly, as well as the belief in the existence of a *permanent* subtile body, is plainly at variance, and totally irreconcileable, with the doctrine of the human soul, after a period of separation, being reunited to a body composed of the same or homogeneous particles with that body in which the time allotted for natural life was passed.

NOTE 50.—Page 92.

"They (the Yogees) must direct their minds to the gross form of Hari, which is of universal perceptibility. They must meditate upon him as Hiranyagarbha, as the glorious Vásava, as Prájapati, as the Winds, the Vasus, the Rudras, the Sun, Stars, Planets, Gandharbas, Yakshas, Daityas; all the gods, and their progenitors, men, animals, mountains, oceans, rivers, trees, all beings, and all sources of beings, all modifications whatever of nature and its products, whether sentient or unconscious, one-footed, two-footed, or many-footed. All these are the sensible form of Hari. All this universal world is pervaded by the energy of Vishnu, who is of the nature of the supreme Brahma. This energy is either supreme; or,

when it is that of conscious embodied spirit, it is secondary. Ignorance is a third energy, by which the omnipresent energy of embodied spirit is ever excited, and whence it suffers all the pains of repeated worldly existence. . . . *All these various creatures* (things *without* life, *things* that *have* life, but without motion, insects, birds, wild animals, domestic animals, men, Nágas, Gandharbas, Yakshas, Gods, Sakra, Prajapati, and Hiranyagarbha) *are but the diversified forms of Vishnu*, penetrated universally by his energy, as all-pervading as the ether."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book VI., chap. vii.

NOTE 51.—Page 94.

"Parasara (*loquitur*).—'Hear from me, Maitreya, exactly the circumstances of the end of all things, and the dissolution that occurs either at the expiration of a *Kalpa*, or that which takes place at the close of the life of Brahma. A month of mortals is a day and night of the progenitors. A year of mortals is a day and night of the gods. Twice a thousand aggregates of the four ages is a day and night of Brahma. The four ages are the Krita, Treta, Dwápara, and Kali, comprehending together twelve thousand years of the gods. There are infinite successions of these four ages, of a similar description, the first of which is always called the Krita, and the last, the Kali.' In the first, the Krita, is that age which is created by Brahma; in the last, which is the Kali age, a dissolution of the world occurs."—*Vishnu Purána*, Book vi., chap. i.

NOTE 52.—Page 96.

"The dissolution of all things is of four kinds, *naimittika*, *occasional; prakritika*, *elemental; atyantika*, *absolute; nitya*, *perpetual.* The first, also termed the Brahma dissolution, occurs when the sovereign of the world reclines in sleep. In

the second, the mundane egg resolves into the primary element from whence it was derived. Absolute non-existence of the world is the absorption of the sage, through knowledge, into supreme spirit. Perpetual destruction is the constant disappearance, day and night, of all that are born. The productions of *prakriti* form the creation that is termed the 'elemental.' That which ensues after a dissolution is called 'ephemeral creation,' and the daily generation of living things is termed by those who are versed in the Puránás, 'constant creation.'"—*Vishnu Purána*, Book I., chapter vii.

NOTE 53.—Page 97.

"Quoius principium, heinc nobis exordia sumet,
Nullam rem e nihilo, gigni divinitus unquam."

Lucretius, Book I., verses 150, 151.

("We will begin by laying this down as the first law of nature, that nothing can ever, even by divine power, be produced from nothing.")

"*Πᾶν το γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γινέσθαι ἡ ἐξ ὄντων, ἡ ἐκ μή ὄντων, τόυτων δὲ τὸ μέν ἐκ μή ὄντων γινέσθαι ἀδύνατον· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δοξής ἁπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως.*"—*Aristotle*, *Physics*, Book I., chapter iv.

("It is necessary that the world must have been made either from things existing, or from things not existing. But of these alternatives one is impossible, namely, that it could have been made of things not existing (for in this opinion all natural philosophers agree.")

NOTE 54.—Page 101.

"Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se sua quæque sagaci mente locârunt
Nec quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.

Sed quia multa modis multeis primordia rerum
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis
Ponderibusque suis consuêrunt concita ferri,
Omnimodeisque coire atque omnia pertentare.
Quæquomque inter se possent congressa creare.]
Propterea fit utei magnum volgata per ævom
Omnigenos cœtus et motus experiundo,
Tandem conveniant ea, quæ conventa repente
Magnarum rerum fiunt exordia sæpe
Terraï, maris, et cæli, generisque animantum."

Lucretius, *De Rerum Naturâ*, Book v., v. 420–432.

(" For, no doubt, the elementary particles of the world did not arrange themselves, each in its order, by a designing mind, nor did they agree together as to what motions each should describe. But, because those numerous elementary particles have been accustomed from *eternity* to be driven about in many ways, impelled by collisions with each other, and set in motion by the force of gravity, and to unite in every possible way, and try every possible combination of those particles, which, having combined, would be capable of producing (the phenomena of creation). Therefore it is that, being accustomed from eternity to try all sorts of combinations, and all sorts of motions, those particles should at last come together, which, having come together suddenly, become frequently the beginnings of the great departments of nature, of the earth, the sea, the heaven, and the various species of animals.")

NOTE 55.—Page 101.

Ocellus taught that the world itself, as well as the particles of which it is composed, has existed from eternity, because

we have never heard of nor perceived any change in the appearance of the world, any increase or diminution.

"*Οὔτε γάρ (τὸ ὅλον) γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἔιδομεν, οὔτε μὲν ἐπὶ το βέλτιον και το μεῖζον μεταβάλλον, οὔτε χεῖρον πότε ἡ μεῖον γενόμενον, ἄλλα ἀεὶ κάτα το αὔτο και ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ, και ἴσον και ὅμοιον αὔτο ἑαυτοῦ.*"—*Ocellus*, Περί τῆς του πάντος φυςέως, chap. i. p. 507.

("We have no reason to believe that the world was made, for we have neither beheld it in the process of formation, nor changing to a better or greater state than that in which it has been at any time to our knowledge, nor ever becoming worse or less, but it continues in the same way, and in the same manner, equal and like to itself.")

Note 56.—Page 102.

"That of which there was antecedent non-existence is an effect."—*Aphorism of the Nyáya.*

Note 57.—Page 106.

"The scheme of providence, the ways and works of God, are too vast, of too large extent for our capacities. There is, as I may speak, such an expanse of power, and wisdom, and goodness in the formation and government of the world, as is too much for us to take in or comprehend. Power, and wisdom, and goodness are manifest to us in all those works of God which come within our view, but there are likewise infinite stores of each poured forth throughout the immensity of the creation, no part of which can be thoroughly understood without taking in its reference and respect to the whole, and this is what we have not faculties for. And as the works

of God, and His scheme of government, are above our capacities thoroughly to comprehend, so there possibly may be reasons which originally made it fit that many things should be concealed from us, which we have, perhaps, natural capacities for understanding—many things concerning the designs, methods, and ends of Divine Providence in the government of the world."—*Butler's Sermons*, Sermon xv., pp. 264–65.

NOTE 58.—Page 106.

"It is inconceivable (says Sir Isaac Newton) that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter, without mutual contact, as it must do if gravitation be essential and inherent in it. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act on another through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by, and through which, their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man, who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it."—*Sir Isaac Newton's Letters.*

"The principal resistances to the motion of bodies are forces opposed to the relative motion of their parts, and the loss of *vis viva* arising from such forces is proportional to the diminution of the square of the relative velocity. The forces which retard the relative motion of two bodies that rub against each other are *adhesion* and *friction*. The force of adhesion is opposed to the relative motion of the bodies in any direction whatever, and is proportional to the extent of the surfaces in contact. Friction is a force opposed to the relative motion of two bodies which are held in contact by a compressing

force—it depends on the nature of the bodies, and also in the case of solid bodies on the compressing force."—*Harte's Mechanics*, p. 122.

NOTE 59.—Page 108.

Bishop Butler expresses an opinion on this subject in the following passage:—"Though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are, yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings."—*Dissertation on Personal Identity.* But I do not assert that it is absolutely necessary, to constitute personal identity, that *everything* be remembered which we have done or suffered formerly; but that it is necessary to the giving full effect to retribution, that everything be remembered which that retribution has a regard to.

NOTE 60.—Page 109.

"All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings of the same living being. And they are so prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting; since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know, or to remember, or forget anything else."—*Butler's Dissertation on Personal Identity.*

NOTE 61.—Page 109.

"The effects produced on the memory by disease and old age are widely diversified. That no derangement takes place in ordinary cases in that part of the constitution on which the association of ideas depends, appears from the distinct and circumstantial recollection which old men retain of the transactions of their youth. Swift somewhere expresses his surprise that old men should remember their anecdotes so distinctly, and should, notwithstanding, have so little memory as to tell the same story twice in the course of the same conversation. And a similar remark is made by Montaigne in one of his essays:—'Surtout les vieillards sont dangereux, a qui la souvenance des choses passeés demeure et ont perdu la souvenance de leur *redites.*'"—*Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind*, Chapter on Memory.

NOTE 62.—Page 115.

"Go, wiser thou, and in thy scale of sense
Weigh thy opinion against Providence;
Call *imperfection* what thou fanciest such;
Say, 'Here He gives too little—there too much;'
Snatch from His hand the balance and the rod;
Rejudge His justice—be the God of God.
In pride, in reasoning pride, our error lies:
All quit their sphere, and rush into the skies."

Pope's Essay on Man, Epistle i., verses 112, &c.

NOTE 63.—Page 117.

"Look round our world; behold the chain of love
Combining all below, and all above;

See plastic nature working to this end—
The single atoms each to other tend,
Attract, attracted to the next in place,
Formed and impelled its neighbour to embrace;
See matter next, with various life endued,
Press to one centre still—the general good."

Ibid., Epistle iii., verse 7, &c.

NOTE 64.—Page 117.

"See dying vegetables life sustain;
See life dissolving vegetate again.
All forms that perish, others forms supply;
By turns we catch the vital breath, and die.
Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne,
They rise—they break—and to that sea return.
Nothing is foreign, parts relate to whole:
One *all-extending*, *all-preserving soul*
Connects each being—greatest with the least,
Made beast in aid of man—and man of beast.
All served—all serving—nothing stands alone,
The *chain* holds on—and where it ends, unknown."

Ibid., Epistle iii., verse 15, &c.

NOTE 65.—Page 121.

It is not easy to perceive the connexion between the text and the interpretation in some of the philosophical arguments founded on quotations from the Vedas. Such inferences not unfrequently appear to be far-fetched. Thus, for instance: "He who knows what soul is gets beyond grief;" and "He who knows God, becomes God." These passages do not *plainly* denote the identity of the soul with God. "That art thou,"

no doubt alludes to the union of the individual soul with God, but does not indisputably refer to the doctrine taught in the Vedântic school concerning the *real* (*vastu*), and the *unreal* (*avastu*).

The following is also an ambiguous paragraph, and, I may add, an equally ambiguous interpretation, or commentary:—

"When He, the first and the last, has been discerned, then the knot of the heart which bound it in the narrow error of a separate consciousness is severed, all doubts are resolved, and our acts are annihilated." Now here is the commentary:— "Though beholding the actions that he performs in accordance with this or that preceding fancy, and the fruits of past deeds which he experiences, without their obstructing his knowledge of the truth, he does not behold them as realities, for to him they have ceased to exist, just as the man who knows that so-and-so is a juggler's trick, though looking upon the illusion, does not look upon it as a reality."

Note 66.—Page 150.

See Leslie's "Short Method with Deists."

Note 67.—Page 154.

"Positive institutions are means to a moral end, and the end must be acknowledged to be more excellent than the means, nor is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter.

"Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the *latter*, and never upon the *former*, which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the former when they do not

interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. And farther, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion anywhere rather than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of (Christianity) appearing in the intimation now mentioned should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly, our Lord Himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts, and upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere."—*Bishop Butler's Analogy*, Part II., chapter i.

Note 68.—Page 161.

A large portion of the population of the *Indo-Chinese* countries, who profess the Hindu religion as taught by *Buddha*, have no division into castes. The uncertainty of the chronological matters connected with the Hindu religion, as it exists at present, is illustrated by the controversy as to whether Buddhism or Brahmanism was prior in point of time. The followers of Buddha dissent chiefly from the Brahmanical doctrines in two points, viz., in rejecting the Brahmanical accounts of the creation and destruction of the world, and in not admitting the division of mankind into castes, or offering sacrifices.

Note 69.—Page 162.

Thus also the wicked Daityas are represented as being safe from the punishment which they deserved, and from the vengeance of those whom they had injured, as long as they kept strictly to the letter of their religious rules and observances.

The prayer of the latter, on the occasion, to Vishnu, and Vishnu's reply, are recorded in the Puráná:—

"Have compassion upon us, O Lord! and protect us, who have come to thee for succour from the Daityas. They have seized upon the three worlds, and appropriated the offerings which are our portion, *taking care not to transgress the precepts of the Veda. Engaged in the duties of their respective orders, and following the paths prescribed by holy writ, practising also religious penance, it is impossible for us to destroy them.*"

When the mighty Vishnu heard their request, he emitted from his body an illusory form, which he gave to the gods, and thus spake:—

"This deceptive vision shall wholly beguile the Daityas, so that, *being led astray from the path of the Vedas, they may be put to death*, for all gods, demons, or others, who shall be opposed to the authority of the Veda, shall perish by my might, while exercised for the preservation of the world. Go then, and fear not; let this delusive vision precede you," &c.

NOTE 70.—Page 173.

The Brahmans have always possessed the right of interpreting the Vedas, but the Kshatriya caste endeavoured to deprive them of their spiritual monopoly. They intermarried among the Brahmans, whence their descendants were called "Kausika Brahmans:"—The strife between the Brahmans and Kshatriyas for spiritual authority is fabulously described in the Ramayana:—"Rama made a vow that he would extirpate the whole Kshatriya race. In fulfilment of this purpose he took up his arms, and with remorseless and fatal rage simply destroyed in fight the sons of Kárttavírya, and after them

whatever Kshatriyas he encountered, Râma, the first of warriors, likewise slew. Thrice seven times did he clear the earth of the Kshatriya caste, and he filled with their blood the five large lakes of Samanta panchaka, from which he offered libations to the race of Bhrigu."

"The son of Viswâmitra was Sunahsephas, the descendant of Bhrigu, given by the gods, and thence named Devarâta. Viswâmitra had other sons also, amongst whom the most celebrated were Madhuchchandas, Kritajaya, Devadeva, Ashtaka, Kachchapa, and Hárita. These founded many families, all of whom were known by the name of *Kausikas*, and intermarried with the families of various Rishis."

Note 71.—Page 181.

"Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Uuguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus;
Donec verba quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenêre, dehinc absistere bello,
Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter."

Horace, *Satires*, Book I., Sat., iii., v. 99–106.

("When the animals (men) crawled forth from the primitive earth, a speechless and grovelling herd, they fought for (their food of) acorns and beds (of leaves) with nails and fists, afterwards with clubs, and, progressively, at last with arms, which invention after (many experiments) had learned to forge, until they found out words, and names, by which they could denote sounds and ideas, then they began to abstain from war, to fortify towns with walls, and to enact laws in

order that no one might be a thief or a robber, nor any one an adulterer.")

NOTE 72.—Page 182.

See Professor Stewart's "Philosophy of the Mind," chapter iii., section vi.

NOTE 73.—Page 185.

The species of inspiration which is attributed to the founders of the Hindu philosophical systems is quite unique, and altogether different from the inspiration which we attribute to the authors of the books of which the Bible is composed, who had not a *natural intellect* different from their fellow men, and possessed the gift of inspiration, not as the result of their intellectual constitution, but as bestowed directly by God for the accomplishment of a special object and purpose at such periods of their lives, and for such a time as He thought fit. The claims put forward by Manes and Mahomet, who professed to be inspired with the divine afflatus, more nearly resembled the Hindu notion, but were not quite analogous to it, viz. :—

"Among the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments, which are perverted by the fraud or ignorance of the Mussulmans, they apply to the Prophet (Mohammed) the promise of the *Paraclete*, or *Comforter*, which had been already usurped by the Montanists and the Manicheans, and the easy change of letters, περικλύτος for παρακλήτος, affords the etymology of the name of Mohammed."—*Gibbon's Decline and Fall*, chapter 50, note.

"Manes, on meeting with the books of the Christians found that the religion they contained coincided with his philosophy, in some respects, and contradicted it in others. He deter-

mined to unite the two together, to enlarge and improve the one by the other, and thus to give the world a new religion. He began by giving out that he was the Paraclete, and, perhaps, he really supposed that he was so. But he was not so deranged, and carried away by his imagination, as to be unable to frame a consistent system, and to discover what would tend to confirm it, and what to weaken it. He, therefore, rejected or altered such books of the Christians as contravened his opinions, and substituted others in their place, particularly those which he pretended were written by himself under a divine impulse, '*erteng*,' or '*arzeug*' (the Gospel), which he represented to be a gift of God."—*Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History* (*Soames' Edition*), Book I., Century 3, Part II., chapter ii., page 259, note.

THE END.

ERRATUM.

Pages 52 and 202, for *ab* read **आप**, *ápa.*